The decision to allow freedom of movement for KFOR suggests a readiness among the northern Kosovo Serbs to find a way to defuse the threat of violence created by Pristina's efforts to unilaterally change the situation on the ground.
With the situation in the north having reached a dangerous stalemate, the need for a compromise - one that would help defuse tensions, and allow Belgrade and Pristina to resume negotiations on practical matters - grows ever more apparent.
TransConflict has become a signatory to the Charter for the Recognition of Every Casualty of Armed Violence, which has at its core a simple principle that ‘no person should die unrecorded’.
Though Kosovo Serbs have been called upon to accept the ‘reality’ of an independent Kosovo, it is the reality of past and present experience that continues to motivate their peaceful resistance.
Almost twenty years on from the beginning of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, two Dutch journalists are travelling the country seeking answers to the question, does Bosnia and Herzegovina really exist?
With KFOR's extended deadline for the Serbs to remove the barricades in the north set to expire, there is a distinct possibility of violence should the use of force once again prevail over dialogue and status neutrality.
Whilst imploring aspiring members to embrace its own system and values, the EU's selectiveimplementation of standards - depending on the case and context - means that countries of the region, particularly the Republic of Macedonia, should be cautious about accession.
With support for EU membership in Serbia dropping, the Kosovo Albanians refusing to compromise and no sign that Serbs in the north are ready to surrender, it remains far from clear what the Quint's Plan B may be.
What happened to writers whose once-established literary and linguistic culture faced a campaign of obliteration, such as that conducted during the post-communist transition by secessionist... Read More
What happened to writers whose once-established literary and linguistic culture faced a campaign of obliteration, such as that conducted during the post-communist transition by secessionist elites and populists in the former Yugoslavia?
Negotiations to form a state-level government in Bosnia-Herzegovina have seen the creation of two new constitutional conventions - the notion of ‘legitimate representation’ and the principle of ‘ethnic rotation’ - which will continue to exert a profound influence on the country's politics.
By accepting Berlin's 'Kosovo conditions' for further progress by Serbia towards EU membership, the EU is in effect acting to impose Pristina's rule in the north and pressuring Belgrade to simply surrender.
The EU appears to be under pressure from Germany to only grant Serbia candidate status - without a date to start accession negotiations - and only under specific conditions that would push Belgrade to surrender the north on Pristina's terms.
The unclear position of EU member states on the required modifications to Bosnia and Herzegovina's constitution has further contributed to the country's deepening political deadlock.
The example of the Brčko District, in the north-east corner of Bosnia and Herzegovina, could serve as a sustainable solution for the disputed status of the north of Kosovo.
Reeling European governments and the Brussels bureaucracy will become even less patient than before in dealing with a region where their serial failures to enforce their myth of civic identity and multi-ethnic integration have undermined the narrative of Europe as a united, just, effective and relevant international actor.
Primer Brčko Distrikta, u severno-istočnom delu Bosne i Hercegovine, mogao bi poslužiti kao održivo rešenje spornog statusa severnog Kosova.
Finding a compromise solution on customs and the North - one that would help de-escalate the current confrontation - will require both Serbs and Albanians to abandon their maximalist positions, and the internationals to pursue a genuinely status neutral approach.