Europe seems to be allowing Germany to lead it into a historic blunder by freezing Serbia out rather than bringing it in.

By Gerard M. Gallucci

German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, visited Kosovo on December 19th and encouraged the Kosovo Albanians to fight corruption, “behave responsibly” and not “stir up tensions.”  Her main message, however, seemed more focused on Serbia.  She made clear that for Germany, there is no way for Serbia to enter the EU unless it surrenders Kosovo.

Merkel did not say that Serbia must recognize Kosovo.  Indeed, it seems that the EU is anxious to make clear that formal recognition is not required.  (Five EU states themselves don’t recognize Kosovo.)  The conditions Merkel did lay down, however, would amount to a complete Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo.  Germany requires that all barricades be taken down, ways found to regularize trade, joint “border” control and the abolition of all Serb “parallel” local institutions in the north – including municipalities, courts and schools.

Merkel also visited German NATO troops and told them that “our security and our peace back home are down to troops serving their country here.”  (German security depends on subduing the Serbs in northern Kosovo? Why would that be?)

In sum, Merkel’s message was for the Kosovo Albanians to behave and while German political and military pressure on Belgrade takes care of the north.

It seems clear that while some in the EU may be uncomfortable with putting Serbia into a corner – surrender Kosovo or lose the EU – Germany is not.  And Germany commands the EU at this historic juncture because it seems only Germany can bail out the Euro.

It also seems clear that Serbia cannot meet Merkel’s conditions.  On the issue of so-called “parallel” institutions, Belgrade has responded that perhaps it would be better if the internationals accepted them as it is impractical to imagine them disappearing.  Many in Serbia are talking as if they believe EU candidacy is now unlikely and not the end of the world.  Serbia’s President, Boris Tadic – still clinging to his mantra of both Kosovo and the EU – is stretching his rhetoric as far as he can since he too understands he cannot meet Merkel’s conditions.

During a visit to Macedonia, he told the press that there is no way that Serbia can bring Kosovo back into its “state system” as it was before and there is no support for partition.  He suggested perhaps some dual sovereignty approach might work.

The continued German effort to “bludgeon” Serbia and the northern Serbs into surrender is either based on a stubborn belief that force can work or is a cynical way of keeping Serbia outside.  In the coming weeks and months – as it becomes clear that the barricades won’t come down without agreement on KFOR/EULEX status neutrality and Serbian local institutions in the north won’t be abolished in any case – how with the Quint react?

Will the US and Germany, for whatever reasons, up the military pressure and perhaps seek a solution through use of force?  Or will Serbia (and Tadic) be left to simply wither on the EU vine?  Either way, Europe seems to be allowing Germany to lead it into a historic blunder by freezing Serbia out rather than bringing it in.  Is progress on corruption, migration and ethnic conflict, etc. more likely that way?

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat and UN peacekeeper. He worked as part of US efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, South Africa and Sudan and as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and as Chief of Staff for the UN mission in East Timor from November 2008 until June 2010. Gerard is also a member of TransConflict’s Advisory Board.

To read TransConflict’s recently-released policy paper, entitled ‘The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo’, please click here.

To read other articles by Gerard for TransConflict, please click here.

To learn more about both Serbia and Kosovo, please check out TransConflict’s new reading lists series by clicking here.

To keep up-to-date with the work of TransConflict, please click here. If you are interested in supporting TransConflict, please click here.

Despite the ICJ ruling that Greece had breached its obligation under the 1995 Interim Accord, the dispute is back to square one, with few signs of genuine interest to find a lasting resolution.

By Marija Stambolieva

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recently decided that Greece has breached its obligation under the Interim Accord of 1995 by objecting to Macedonia’s admission to NATO. Leaving aside the so-called “name-issue”, however, the ICJ’s decision – and its subsequent handling – have revealed several weak points of international relations, whilst elucidating important lessons for the future.

Macedonia joined the United Nations in 1993 following a Security Council resolution (817) recommending that the country is admitted to membership under the provisional reference “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. The ensuing Interim Accord between the two parties to the dispute provided the basis for the regulation of their mutual relations, and called for continued negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement on their differences over the name.

One of the provisions of the Interim Accord was that joining international, multi-lateral and regional organizations and institutions would not be hindered, as long as the reference is used. In its recent decision, the ICJ found that Greece breached exactly this obligation when opposing Macedonia’s application for NATO.

The reactions ranged from jubilation to panic. In Macedonia, the ICJ’s ruling was greeted with celebrations; in Greece, it was received with criticism. Others warned about the mismatch between the level of expressed emotions and the expected impact of the decision.

The sobering-up came exceptionally fast – only a few hours after the announcement, NATO’s Secretary General stated that, “the ruling does not affect the decision taken by NATO Allies at the Bucharest summit in 2008”, which can only be altered “as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached”.

The EU – membership in which Macedonia is also pursuing – although not explicitly reacting to the ICJ’s judgment, has continued to postpone the start of accession negotiations with the country.

The two political alliances, NATO and EU, seem to have moved past the interim agreement already three years ago, and this decision could now be obsolete.

It would not be the first time that states have chosen to ignore an ICJ’s decision which is not to their liking. The international legal order, however, does not have instruments of enforcement at its disposal, beyond the good will of the sovereign states. Thus, the issue has to return to the realm of international politics.

This does not mean, however, that international law is without value. The resolution to be bound by consensus in decision-making is already a fixed legal commitment of inter-state alliances.

In the UN, nothing can be decided without the consent of the permanent five. There were times when some members chose to undertake certain actions without the endorsement of the Security Council – like in the case of Kosovo, or Iraq – but even then the issues found their way back to the Council’s agenda. The most powerful players have admitted that they need allies for their missions.

On the other hand, one might say that the “name issue” is surely not as critical as cases where potential large-scale security threats or humanitarian disasters are in sight. It should not be forgotten, however, that back then, at the onset of the Yugoslav crisis, the fear of a potential new conflict was what motivated the Security Council to assume responsibility for facilitating the Interim Accord in the first place.

What now, therefore? Almost two decades later, this dispute is back where it was – at the beginning. Bearing in mind the historical background and the current state of international affairs, there are three possible three scenarios:

1. The matter remains frozen – contemporary history has witnessed a proliferation of disputes and conflicts and the approach to many of them has been to localize and control, but not necessarily solve. The main players seem to have their hands full with pressing issues in Africa, North Africa, the Middle East and Kosovo, such that smaller, seemingly harmless ones will be kept at bay. Furthermore, Greece belongs to the club of established allies and, in light of the current financial and economic crisis, neither of the European states nor the United States has any interest in opening ‘new’ fronts. Macedonia’s applications for NATO and EU membership will, therefore, stay put.
2. Powerful player(s) take(s) the lead – the United States has on many occasions demonstrated that it is willing to take on the responsibility for maintaining and building peace and security. Under its lead, agreements have been brokered; even seemingly impossible ones, such as that between Israel and Palestine, Israel and Egypt. One of the thus far disinterested European states could back the process. Macedonia’s claims along the lines of international law are respected, and so are its efforts to support international coalition operations. The root of Greece’s concerns is addressed. Heated rhetoric is cooled-off and both states are reasoned into an agreement.
3. The UN decision is altered - the Security Council recommends to the General Assembly that Macedonia is to be referred to under its constitutional name.

For the time being, the second scenario seems implausible and the third impossible. Those who made it their task to get the Balkans on track, however, cannot back down now. Perhaps efforts to create a “mutually-acceptable solution” should be intensified; perhaps alternative approaches to Macedonian approximation should be considered. The latest example in the EU on matters of the euro has shown how member states can push forward despite a veto. Or perhaps one should just wait for “better times”. In the meantime, Greece will probably be ‘saved’ by Europe. The Macedonians, meanwhile, are headed towards deeper isolation, manipulation and deprivation. Back to square one? Fine, as long as there is genuine interest to move things forward.

Marija Stambolieva is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Kassel in Germany. Her current research project focuses on studying the post-socialist transformations of the post-Yugoslav states in light of their social policies. She also holds a law degree and a Master in European Studies.

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A peace initiative by Kosovo Serbs in the north opens the door to backing away from further confrontation, and seems to suggest that they are prepared to enter a dialogue on the future of the north.

By Gerard M. Gallucci

The Russian aid convoy finally was allowed to enter north Kosovo on December 16th after a compromise over the EULEX demand to accompany the trucks.  As the local Kosovo Serbs were still preventing EULEX from travelling by road to the Jarinje crossing point – they believed that EULEX was seeking to bring Kosovo Albanian police with them – the EULEX vehicles traveled from south Kosovo north through Serbia and then around back to Kosovo.  It is not known if they had any Kosovo customs officials in the trunk.

The absurd lengths that EULEX went through to not commit itself to acting according to its status neutral UN mandate suggests that the crisis in the north is not yet over.  EULEX chief de Marnhac justified EULEX’s demand that it “control” the entry of the Russian vehicles as a matter of “rule of law.”  EULEX (and KFOR) cite this principle without specifying which rule of law they believe they are enforcing.  Their insistence on subjecting the north to Pristina’s “rule of law” – bringing Kosovo Albanian police and customs officials to the boundary – is at the root of the dispute that has kept the locals on the barricades since July.  Russia’s Ambassador to Serbia correctly noted that EULEX had exceeded its UNSCR 1244 mandate for political purposes.

Meanwhile, the northerners have presented KFOR and EULEX with a proposal for a “time out for peace” while broader issues are settled through dialogue including them.  Everyone would commit to not undertake unilateral actions.  The barricades would come down while the local Kosovo police (KPS) man the crossing points under KFOR and UNMIK supervision.  KFOR would mount checkpoints around Mitrovica to prevent unilateral moves while EULEX would operate normally from there south.  All this would leave time for filling in the details of the agreement to have both Serbian and Kosovo officials on the Gates.  So far, however, there has been little comment from the internationals, with KFOR saying it is a “political matter” and EULEX only that it is “looking” at the proposal.

At the core of the proposed peace plan is the northerners continued distrust of EULEX.  They remain opposed to an EULEX presence at the northern Gates as long as it seeks to impose Kosovo authority and customs there.  EULEX efforts to do so are without question beyond the UN mandate for rule of law passed to them in November 2008.  Perhaps Russia will now insist that the UN take back that responsibility?

The peace initiative opens the door to backing away from confrontation and it seems to suggest the northerners themselves are prepared to enter a dialogue on the future of the north.  The government in Pristina continues to insist that the northern mayors are “illegal”, but they have demonstrated they are the leaders on the ground and capable of acting responsibly.  Chancellor Merkel will visit Kosovo this week.  She should meet with representatives of the northern Kosovo Serbs – perhaps visit them on the barricades – and hear their side to judge for herself if they are all “criminals.”

The open question remains the US.  Left to themselves, the Europeans might well decide on an approach looking to peacefully implement issues agreed between Pristina and Belgrade while discussing further issues.  But if anyone simply wishes to out-wait the northerners – leave it to winter to drive them off the barricades – or look for a good moment to again use force, it would be the US. Pristina’s insistence on its plans for incorporating the north suggests at the least that its US patron is encouraging them to not compromise.  So, the danger of war remains.  Merry Christmas?

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat and UN peacekeeper. He worked as part of US efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, South Africa and Sudan and as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and as Chief of Staff for the UN mission in East Timor from November 2008 until June 2010. Gerard is also a member of TransConflict’s Advisory Board.

To read TransConflict’s recently-released policy paper, entitled ‘The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo’, please click here.

To read other articles by Gerard for TransConflict, please click here.

To learn more about both Serbia and Kosovo, please check out TransConflict’s new reading lists series by clicking here.

To keep up-to-date with the work of TransConflict, please click here. If you are interested in supporting TransConflict, please click here.

Celebrating and instrumentalising shared cultural heritage in Novi Pazar carries enormous potential for creating a positive platform for dialogue between its two main communities.

By Teddy Noel-Hill

Novi Pazar is a town much maligned and much misunderstood. My first visit there came in in 2008 and I was struck by its distinctive and captivating cultural heritage. Since then I have been convinced that using and promoting the shared cultural history of Novi Pazar, both within the town and in Serbia more widely, could have positive transformative effects pertaining to intercommunity relations and its position within Serbia. I was privileged enough to return to Novi Pazar with TransConflict. Whilst on the trip, I gained a small insight into the problem the town faces and what needs to be done to tackle them.

Novi Pazar is home to a vibrant, well educated and numerically significant population of young people. Given that most of the rest of Serbia, along with high profile cases in Western Europe, not to mention Russia, are going through demographic crises, this is an important advantage when looking to the town’s future. It was with a selection of these young people that TransConflict – in collaboration with Kulturni Centar DamaD – engaged in a debate on life and interethnic relations in Novi Pazar.

The discussion was primarily based around the question of coexisting in a multicultural society and the role that culture plays in that existence. Central to the debate was the idea of shared cultural heritage and how this is represented in Novi Pazar. Novi Pazar has a rich and compelling cultural heritage that in theory is shared between the town’s Bosniak and Serb populations. Unfortunately, cultural exclusivism is pervasive within public life in Novi Pazar.

One member of the group gave an example that illuminated the problem in a telling way. They recounted the case of a programme on local television dealing with the shared history of Novi Pazar and Sandžak more generally. The only problem was the content was actually split into two programmes; one focussing on Serbian cultural heritage, the other on Bosniak cultural heritage.

The group was unanimous in establishing that culture represents an important pillar of society and is therefore crucial to the betterment of interethnic relations. Celebrating and instrumentalising shared cultural heritage in Novi Pazar carries enormous promise for creating a positive platform for dialogue between its two main communities. The economic benefits for doing so were also discussed, in the context of attracting tourists and outside investment.

There was no denial of the multi-dimensional rewards and holistic transformations that shared cultural consciousness and promotion could bring to Novi Pazar. However, various members of the group pointed out that the idea of shared cultural heritage remains a major area of disagreement between the two communities. One member of the group stated that discussions concerning shared culture too often run the risk of offending people from the other community. The fear of causing offence, or saying things that could be open to distortion, were highlighted by those at the debate as restrictive forces on improving intercommunity relations.

Insidious promotion of cultural exclusivity by those in positions of authority in Novi Pazar is sadly strangling any potential efforts towards the realisation of a shared cultural heritage, be it in the past or looking towards the future.

There was then a clear message from this part of the discussion – Novi Pazar needs tangible projects that promote the shared cultural heritage of the town that explicitly draw attention to the fact that the project would be undertaken by members of both the Bosniak and Serb communities.  It would be a tragedy not to use Novi Pazar’s unique and richly endowed cultural landscape to improve interethnic relations within the town and to improve its poltical, economic and social position within Serbia and the region. The transformative power of culture can be harnessed in interesting and constructive ways in Novi Pazar, with many members of the discussion group putting forward tangible ideas to this effect. The production of a weekly television programmed highlighting the shared history if the Sandžak region and the making of an interactive cultural map of Novi Pazar were two potential projects that were mentioned.

As I left Novi Pazar there was a pertinent reminder of the challenges facing the town in regards to its situation within Serbia as a whole. It was a Saturday and Novi Pazar football club were hosting a team from Belgrade. The Belgrade side have a fan base notorious for their extreme-right wing orientation, which alas, seems to be a common trait of football hooligans across Europe. Football stadia all too often represent a stage for all forms of bilious hate-filled sentiments that encompass racism, anti-Semitism, homophobia etc.  In the instance of this Saturday in Novi Pazar, the chanting was of a highly unsavoury politico-religious nature. As someone who watches football regularly in England, I am no stranger to the highly-charged atmosphere of football matches and the heavy police presence that accompanies them. The police presence in Novi Pazar however was more akin to a military operation and it felt as if the potential for violence and was very real.  Hateful chanting takes on an altogether more serious dimension in places such as Novi Pazar where there are heightened interethnic sensitivities and divisions. Whilst important steps can be taken within the town to improve relations between Bosniaks and Serbs, influxes of this nature reflect some of the perceptions and treatment of Novi Pazar throughout the rest of Serbia that need to be tackled. They could also potentially act as dangerous tipping points for strained community relations. Serious measures must be taken by the state authorities to address this, both on a macro and micro level.

Although cause for concern, these events did not overshadow the positivity that I took away from my time in Novi Pazar. Despite the difficulties and divisions that exist in Novi Pazar, the dedication and talents of my warm and welcoming hosts are having and will continue to make a constructive impact. Novi Pazar is fortunate that it possess such an asset as its cultural diversity, which can and should be celebrated. It must be hoped that the foresight, understanding and determination of those young people who wish to determine the town’s future will be allowed to shine through.

Teddy Noel-Hillis currently studying for a masters in Politics, Security and Integration at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London (UCL). He is currently researching the nexus between nationalism, politics and culture in South-Eastern Europe.

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Though the EU – seemingly motivated by the US and “led” by Germany – rejected Serbia’s candidacy over its continued “refusal” to surrender Kosovo, it is increasingly apparent that the EU needs the Balkans inside even more than the Balkans needs to get inside.

By Gerard M. Gallucci

The European Union has said “no” to Serbia.  Chancellor Merkel’s order to the rest of Europe to become more German will probably lead to the unraveling of the Euro – and maybe the EU – as the mandated austerity will sooner or later splinter on the various national political realities.  In the middle of this, Serbia’s president, Boris Tadić, continues to tie his country and his own political fate to gaining EU membership.  One might see in this an a-historical strategic choice.

The EU – apparently motivated by the US and “led” by Germany – rejected Serbia’s candidacy over its continued “refusal” to surrender Kosovo.  The US seems to believe that all the Serbs need is some good hard hits on the head to come to heel.  In north Kosovo, US KFOR has acted on the ground to administer such blows (as on September 27th) while pushing the German/Austrian KFOR to do the same.

In the “diplomatic” realm, the EU is expressing its certainty that surely Serbia will get candidacy next year after it has shown the good sense to do as it has been told and give up the north.  The EU wants to see “actions and not words.”  The EU is careful to inform that this does not mean “recognition” but “normalization” of relations with Kosovo.  And taking down those nasty barricades that injured NATO soldiers trying to remove them.

However, “normalizing” relations with Pristina will not mean any special status for the north but rather bringing the north into Kosovo institutions on Kosovo Albanian terms.  The dialogue that Brussels has sought to use to find an un-American way to approach the northern stalemate keeps running into Pristina’s refusal to accept any practical arrangements that do not somehow entrench Kosovo sovereignty.  The US says it doesn’t have to.  Meanwhile, KFOR sometimes passes through the barricades and sometimes doesn’t because the northern Serbs refuse to let EULEX by until it stops taking Kosovo Albanian officials to the boundary crossings and KFOR still insists.  (EULEX is using helicopters for now despite the Kosovo Albanian officials sitting and doing nothing once there as the crossings remain blocked.)

Tadić remains wedded to doing everything he can for EU membership.  The northern Kosovo Serbs are worried that under EU pressure he might try to cut them off.  Perhaps stop paying salaries or withdraw the MUP.  As almost everyone knows, however, except apparently the Quint, Tadić cannot simply cut the north off, certainly not when the EU placed a noose around his neck and is kicking the chair out from under him.  He has to have somewhere to put his feet.

It has been said that the trouble with the Balkans is that it produces more history than it can consume.  It actually seems more that the Balkans produces too much history for the rest of Europe to consume.  It was the frontline for centuries in Europe’s defensive war with the Ottomans, who were still there just 100 years ago.  The “Holy Romans” and “Habsburgs” of today are now standing at the Gates keeping the Serbs out of Europe.  In truth, however, the EU needs the Balkans inside even more then the Balkans needs to get inside.

The EU loses if there is any “outside.”  As it is discovering, for a united European economy to work, everyone must be inside and playing by the same rules.  An EU based on exclusions and inequalities – where Germany can reap huge profits by selling to neighbors who don’t pay their debts – won’t work.  Austerity alone will only stop the buying and not resolve the problems.  And anyone left outside might do quite well taking-up with those who eventually fall out.

Serbia might be wiser to tell the EU that for now, it is comfortable with handling the Kosovo issue in its own way and when it is ready, it will get back to Brussels.  Don’t call us, we’ll call you?

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat and UN peacekeeper. He worked as part of US efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, South Africa and Sudan and as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and as Chief of Staff for the UN mission in East Timor from November 2008 until June 2010. Gerard is also a member of TransConflict’s Advisory Board.

To read TransConflict’s recently-released policy paper, entitled ‘The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo’, please click here.

To read other articles by Gerard for TransConflict, please click here.

To keep up-to-date with the work of TransConflict, please click here. If you are interested in supporting TransConflict, please click here.

Despite Europe’s general loss of interest in further expansion, Serbia’s state of aporia keeps it riveted to the European Union; leaving the country without a road, much less a roadmap.

By David B. Kanin

In various ways, the philosophical term “aporia” and Emile Durkheim’s concept of “anomie” represent a sense of disorientation, perplexity, lack of purpose, or a sense of meaning in life.  An individual or a community can find itself without direction or belief in a constructive future.

This is where Serbia finds itself, no matter its Chinese water torture-like relationship with the European Union.  Serbia has been buffeted by serial defeats, at least since the Nazi invasion of 1941, that have negated not only the internal sense of identity forged during the nationalist era before 1914, but also the rather prideful place Serbian publicists advertized their nation had gained through the sacrifices of World War I – especially the iconic retreat of 1915-16 – and the reward given the Karadjordjevic dynasty at Versailles.  Tito’s anything but Serbian Yugoslavia, the failed federal interregnum of the 1980s, the self-serving and self-defeating tactics of a Milošević as devoid of strategic vision as he was of concern about anyone but his family, and wars in the 1990s ripped apart what at best had been a country insufficiently prepared to deal with Balkan developments in the first place.

Even Serbia’s one post-Yugoslav success, Milošević’s deal with Holbrooke at Dayton (they were the central actors in that drama – Tudjman had won what he needed on the battlefield and Izetbegović had little choice but to accept that his community was getting screwed) came at the price of accepting the intra-Serbian border drawn at the Drina.  Along with Belgrade’s acquiescence in the decisive Croatian victories of “Flash” and “Storm,” that acquiescence put to death nationalist dreams to revive the projects composed in 1844 and 1986.

Milosevic’s narrow personal agenda destroyed Serbia’s communal sense of meaning.  His successors have done little to lead the society toward a new one.  Two incidents of the previous decade illustrate Serbian aporia.  The assassination of Zoran Đinđić in 2003 provoked a huge turnout at a funeral marked as much by genuine anguish over Serbia’s self-inflicted suffering as by grief over the politician’s death.  In each year since, the anniversary of that murder has led to new commentaries by public intellectuals not only bemoaning what might have been, but also pointing to the country’s lack of leadership and direction.

In 2005, Serbia’s decision not to join the general celebration of the 65th anniversary of V-E Day underscored that – for too many Serbs – the decision of 1945 marked a defeat, not a victory.  The record of the 1990s is not the only reference point reminding Serbs they are out of step with their own memories, not just with the memories of others.

This state of aporia is what keeps Serbia riveted to the European Union, even though membership in that club has become less than universally popular.  No matter Brussels’ congenital self-righteousness, never mind the moving targets of conditions for accession that mask Europe’s general loss of interest in further expansion (and forget the assertive, insecure Russians) – Serbia’s insular sullenness and lack of leadership has left it with nowhere else to go.

Vuk Drašković, an erstwhile royalist, has teamed up with the Milo Đukanović wannabe Cedomir Jovanović to wave a tattered EU banner in Boris Tadić’s face.  The so-called Progressives have claimed they too want to join “Europe.”  Ivica Dačić, one of those honest enough to acknowledge that further partitions in Kosovo (and, in my view, elsewhere) are possible, expressed in his recent “threat of war” speech the general sense of self-pity and aporia.

• “We have let the Serbs, who were the greatest victims of the wars, become a synonym for war criminals, those who conquer somebody else’s territories ad jeopardize peace all over the world just because we think that the truth (my italics) is enough and that it does not need to be advertized.”

The EU’s latest non-decision on whether to bestow on Serbia a date for its candidacy was unimportant.  What was more instructive was how desperate Belgrade was for Serbs in northern Kosovo to dismantle barricades for the sake of Serbia’s EU candidacy.

• Despite head fakes after December 5, at this writing that brouhaha remains unsettled.  It still is not clear why – judging from his public comments beginning November 26 or 27 – Zubin Potok’s Slaviša Ristić broke ranks with his colleagues and cut a perishable deal with KFOR.  Ristić and Mitrovica’s Krstimir Pantić continue to have different public lines as to how their constituents should behave.  (KFOR’s willingness not to insist on free movement by EULEX and to engage in discussions that conceded to Ristić the appearance of sovereignty also are issues worth discussing).

In its current anomic state, Serbia’s political establishment will hold to the chimera of EU membership as tightly as the West Europeans themselves cling to their damaged project for European unity.  As long as Serbian spokespeople claim pride of place as victims and imply they represent some special “truth”, Serbia cannot help itself and will not contribute constructively either to possible Balkan futures or to whatever becomes of “Europe.”  Meanwhile, concerns over chronic economic problems, such possible blows as the threat to close US Steel’s plant in Smederevo, and the local impact of transatlantic financial mismanagement link material concerns to the poor public mood.

In this vein, now that the EU once again has spoken (sort of), Serbia’s politicians and public intellectuals are using their usual noises to avoid the necessary work of finding a future.  Whether expressing desire to join the EU or urging their people to stop acting like terminal supplicants, the conversation in Serbia obscures the country’s baseline aporia – as usual, the country finds itself without a road, much less a roadmap.

This does not have to be the case.  The same Serbia that lost so much in the last three quarters of a century can stop blaming everyone but itself for its problems and – finally – take the lead in fashioning a strategy for regional development.  Of course, this would require Serbian government and society putting its EU aspirations on the back burner (which is where the Europeans have placed them).  They should acknowledge there is no alternative to a down-to-earth decision to embrace the problems and potential common to all Balkan communities, and disgorge the self-destructive mythology connecting spiritual sacrifice to national character.

There is no substitute for Serbia taking part – as one Balkan community among others, not as special hero or victim – in regional strategies and policies designed to overcome the geographic and economic obstacles in the way of peace and the general prosperity.  Neither the declining transatlantic powers nor the self-serving Russians can offer more than inertia as they enable Serbia and its neighbors to slough off on outsiders the responsibility they have been avoiding for their own problems.  Looking to the EU is pointless – it is inept in handling Balkan problems and perhaps facing its own flavor of anomie if it continues to dither in the face of financial problems.

The key to a constructive direction for the region is for Serbs, Albanians, Greeks, Macedonians, the communities loosely connected by the failing entity called “Bosnia,” and minority people living among them to ignore the outsiders, confront their own biases, hatreds, and frustrations, and finally engage with each other as passengers irrevocably condemned to travel in the same small boat.  To jumpstart this process, there is no substitute for building a transportation network and other infrastructural skeleton intended to – finally – create an integrated regional market.

Questions of border and population patterns (which, no matter great power rhetoric, remain very much in play) should take a back seat to problems of physical engineering and financial flows.  Build “corridors” with off-ramps that channel commerce to local destinations, not just Western Europe.  Develop resource plans and economic strategies that harness the capabilities of all Balkan communities and establish a regional approach to broader international trade designed to enable everyone who lives there, not to privilege parochial interests or tired notions of Serbian (or other) national uniqueness.  Make sure gas pipelines and other energy projects serve the needs of Balkan communities, not only the plans of West European planners or Russian oligarchs.  Seek outside investments as a strategic group rather than individual supplicants.

This strategy could enable an emerging network of commerce and trade perhaps leading eventually to further border changes – or, in the best case, softening of the significance of borders – and limited population movements.  The changed context would mean such developments could become constructive instead of destabilizing because they would be determined more by constructive material logic than destructive communal ideologies.  There are no “final statuses” in the Balkans; the question is what developments and relationships will drive the next set of changes produced by Serbs and the other communities with which they currently contest physical and spiritual pride of place.

David B. Kanin is an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and a former senior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

To read other articles by David for TransConflict, please click here.

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Articles published by TransConflict do not necessarily reflect the views of the organization.

If overlying, systemic issues are not addressed, then misperceptions and security rhetoric regarding Wahhabism will put a serious strain on inter-community relations in the Western Balkans.

By Teddy Noel-Hill

Mevlid Jašarević’s attack on the United States Embassy in Sarajevo elucidates much about the nature and causes of extremism in the Western Balkans. The event has thrust Wahhabis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia further into the forefront of public debate and caused concern across all sections of society. However, it is imperative that Wahhabism is understood as part of the wider environment that drives people to extremism, particularly in Bosnia and Serbia. If these overlying, systemic issues are not addressed, then misperceptions and security rhetoric regarding Wahhabism will put a serious strain on inter-community relations.

The reality of the Wahhabi (1) movement in the Western Balkans is a small number of people living in largely introspective communities in remote areas. Wahhabism is, of course, a foreign import.  It first came to Bosnia during the war, with the predominantly Arab volunteers of the El Mudžahid unit fighting within the Bosnian Army (ARBiH). Wahhabi ideas and practises have spread outside of Bosnia, and there are adherents in Sandžak (both Serbian and Montenegrin), Kosovo and Macedonia. The vast majority of foreign combatants who came to Bosnia to fight during 1992-1995 have largely been thrown out of the country. Furthermore, the influences of Saudi Arabian Islamic networks espousing Wahhabi ideals have been severely curtailed. Instances like the current controversy of the naming of the new University of Sarajevo library demonstrate the sensitivities over Saudi involvement in Bosnia, but the fact remains that Wahhabism is now a domestic issue within Bosnia and Serbia, and must be treated as such.

These days, the major external actor of Islamic orientation in Bosnia and Serbia is Turkey. Turkish religious organisations, as well as groups with no religious affiliation, have been very active in the fields of reconstruction, education and refugee assistance in post-war Bosnia. In Serbia at present, Turkish intervention to reconcile the Islamic community/communities is important on many levels, not least in helping to tackle extremism. The so-called ‘džamija diplomatija’ that is conducted through the Turkish Foreign Ministry, religious organisations and NGOs will hopefully bring cohesion to the Islamic Communities of Serbia, whilst concurrently removing some of its more outspoken figures from politics. The institutional weakness of Islam in Serbia is having a very negative effect when it comes to dealing with extremism. The rift between the rival Islamic Communities is damaging because it prevents concerted efforts to dissuade people, primarily young men, from taking extremist positions on matters of faith.

Additionally, it erodes the interpretative, administrative and representative authority (2) of a singular Islamic Community to which young disaffected men could feel a part of.  The rupture between rival Islamic Communities in Serbia makes it easier for extremist interpretations of Islam to pervade the Muslim population in Sandžak and elsewhere.

The other corollary of these Turkish-led initiatives, the separation of Islam from the politics of Serbia, will hopefully remove a crucial motivation for young men in Sandžak to turn to Islamic extremism. The conflation of Islam with politics, as most overtly embodied in Mufti Zukorlić, was seen by Wahhabis as an example of the abandonment of faith and corrupt practises which adds weight to the arguments they put to disillusioned youth in the region. Until Jašarević’s attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, almost all Islamic extremist acts, or planned acts, of violence or disruption were directed against Muslim political figures or the Islamic community more generally. This demonstrates that the first and most important steps needed to dissuade people for extremist viewpoints need to come from within the Islamic community itself. The threat posed to the state or “Western” targets, such as embassies, has remained relatively low. There can be no denying that Jašarević’s actions represent a worrying move away from this fact, but a sense of perspective is necessary. What is more, it may seem somewhat prosaic to state that not all Wahhabis are terrorists, but this truth is often neglected or purposefully omitted in popular media and the discourse of security professionals and unscrupulous politicians.

Tackling extremism in the Western Balkans, in all its forms, is dependent on changing systemic socio-economic factors. What drives young men to extremism and threatens social cohesion in the region is the overarching economic and political malaise. Young men are fed with a dearth of economic opportunities and their ineffective, often corrupt, political leaders.

Mevlid Jašarević is in many ways a typical example of an individual enticed by extremist sentiments. He is a young man from an economically depressed city with high unemployment and little opportunities. Novi Pazar has little economic, political or cultural engagement with the Serbian state, and Jašarević and many like him will not see themselves as stakeholders in the Serbian polity. What compounds these feelings in Novi Pazar and parts of Bosnia are mutually antagonistic assertions of identity between young men from different ethno-religious/ethno-national groups.  The root causes of extremist attitudes (unemployment etc.), are exacerbated in environments of existing inter-group tension where public assertions of difference are magnified and exaggerated. Religious extremism and/or extreme nationalism emanating from non-Muslim groups in Bosnia and Sandžak are inherent to the vicious cycle of provocation that Wahhabism is a part of. Even though it is primarily young men from rural areas who have been attracted to Wahhabism and Islamic extremism, there is a key urban dynamic pertaining to the proximity in which people live that needs to be addressed.

Economic, political and educational disenfranchisement of young men in places with troubled inter-communal relations is bound to cause an augmentation of disdain for the members of the other group and more extreme forms self-identification. It is clear that work needs to be done to bolster inter-community dialogue amongst the young and to improve their opportunities.  A combined approach of inter-community dialogue, political empowerment and economic opportunity is sorely needed. After all, the economic situation Bosnia, Serbia (Sandžak) is the same for everyone, regardless of religious identification or national identification

Perceptions and political manipulations of Wahhabis could lead to a dangerous process of securitising Islam. Securitisation of Islam in the Western Balkans will have disastrous consequences for the region, both in the domestic sphere and in relations between states. Securitisation takes issues out of the normal realm of politics and debate and into a dangerous state of exception in which law, rights and dialogue are disregarded. Securitisation will worsen paranoia and rhetoric portraying Bosniaks as latent fundamentalists, and lead to a degenerative process of repression, mistrust and societal polarisation. This will, of course, have a dire effect for the already difficult political situation in Bosnia, and further obstruct the inclusion of Bosniaks in the political and cultural mainstream in Serbia.

The attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo went largely unreported in the UK and, from what I have gathered, the rest of Europe. In some ways this is just as well, as there is a distinct lack of understanding and a tendency towards hyperbolic and sensationalist claims about the nature of the Wahhabi “threat” within the Western Balkans. If Islamic extremism becomes a policy driver for Western engagement with the Balkans then the consequences will be calamitous. Given that many EU member states have an, at best, ambivalent relationship with Islam, any mismanagement of the Wahhabi issue from a European/International perspective is possible, but must be avoided.

Teddy Noel-Hill is currently studying for a masters in Politics, Security and Integration at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London (UCL).  He is currently researching the nexus between nationalism, politics and culture in South-Eastern Europe.

This article is published as part of TransConflict’s newly-launched initiative, Understanding Extremism, further information about which is available by clicking here.

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Footnotes:

1. Wahhabis of course would refer to themselves as Salafis. Discussion on theological, historical and ideational differences between the two is beyond the scope of this article.

2. See Eldar Sarajlić “The Return of the Consuls: Islamic networks and foreign policy perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. (Paper presented at the conference ‘After the Wahhabi Mirage: Islam, politics and international networks in the Balkans’) European Studies Centre, University of Oxford. The paper addresses this issue but in relation to the Islamic Community of Bosnia.

Though an under-explored aspect of contemporary conflict, developments in information technology are fuelling the emergence of new forms of warfare which could pose a unique challenge to state’s critical infrastructure.

By Jovana Jezdimirovic Ranito

The end of the Cold War saw a multiplication of war strategies, fuelled primarily by the emergence of non-state actors and threats – including well-organized political movements, guerilla and terrorist groups – plus new communication and information technologies. The transformation of both the settings and demands of conflict has led to a transformation of the very conflicts themselves.

Military hardware – no matter how sophisticated – is beset by several short-comings; being expensive to produce and always leaving physical traces as to its use. Beside physical and diplomatic battlefields, contemporary battles are instead increasingly being fought virtually (through programmed weapons) and in cyber-space.

The bi-polar tensions of the Cold War reduced and obscured the actions of many actors - such as extreme ethnic groups, non-governmental organizations and private entities – whose re-emergence on the international scene has raised their importance for states. Their impact on, for instance, public opinion – which has been used a valedictory tool for new forms of behaviour and modes of organization, often transcending international laws and norms - has made them an important focus for state policies.

Warfare in this new, multi-polar setting has included – besides battles on the ground and diplomatic measures – strategies created by Information Technology (IT); such as ‘net-’, ‘cyber-’ and ‘virtual-’ war. Cheaper and nearly invisible, these emergent strategies have been used as a supplement to more conventional forms of warfare.

If we consider cyber-attacks to be part of a concerted cyber-war, then they would have several profound consequences – political, economic and psychological. Politically, when organized by states keen to hide their tracks, they have the potential to damage infrastructure – including by provoking a shut-down of the power grid, or causing disturbances in transportation, telecommunications, the banking and financial transactions. The economic consequences of such attacks would be devastating; it is calculated that daily losses would be somewhere between $35m and $150m. Psychologically, the chaos caused would provide a considerable advantage to the state executor of the attacks, whose final goal is to exert pressure at the negotiating table.

If on one side of the scale we have cyber war, on the other is ‘net war’; a strategy that employs soft power and does not have the capability to cause the sort of damage that cyber-war does. The similarities are significant, particularly the common goal to influence ongoing negotiations through the use of virtual space and attacks on key websites. However, the differences relate to the technological capability of the attack, its executioners and the tactics used to achieve its goals.

In the case of netwar, the executioner is the nationalist, extreme ethnic group – not the state itself -which leave traces on the websites targeted and spreads propaganda as a means of influencing foreign policy. These attacks are directed not only at vital infrastructures, but rather at all websites they consider relevant to the cultural identity of the enemy; everything that would garner media attention. Their means are grounded in the posting of, for instance, advertising messages and the blocking of websites.

Attacks between Serbian and Albanian hackers, which can be traced back to the late-nineties, have increased in intensity over the last three years. Attacks on the websites of institutions and those concerned with cultural heritage should serve as a warning to policy-makers in the Balkans, emphasizing the need to better define strategies to combat cyber-attacks. At present, there is a lack of clear and official strategies, even though the respective countries recognize the problem and the very real threat it poses.

In Kosovo, netwar has been used as an addition to conventional war strategies as a consequence of the transformation of the conflict; from on-the-ground battles to diplomatic and net war strategies. This strategy cannot exist independently, and its main goal is to influence the ongoing negotiations and spread propaganda. Globally, combating netwar through law enforcement and counter-intelligence remains weak, suggesting that this will remain a privileged way of attacking critical infrastructure in the future.

The lack of clear and strong legislation among the Balkan states leaves them particularly vulnerable to speculative attacks which – in the case of the Serbia and the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo – are exploited by opportunist, nationalistic, extremist groups with an aim to complement their political dispute. Such cyber-attacks have, until now, not been significant enough to destroy critical infrastructure, though they have certainly disturbed their functioning. The tendency is towards increasing level of attacks, which eventually could reach a level where it is transformed into a cyber-war.

The countries of the region, therefore, need to invest further resources in order to objectively analyse the prevailing situation and address the problem accordingly. Each is increasingly dependent on IT services, and needs to begin seriously investing not only in improving legislation and policies targeting such crimes, but also in network security, incident response, technical training and international collaboration. Without these steps, the possibility of damaging and costly attacks on critical infrastructure remain a distinct possibility.

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The new agreement between Belgrade and Pristina on the crossing points, plus the removal of some barricades, may provide an opportunity to finally end the current crisis in the north that began on July 25th.

By Gerard M. Gallucci

According to various sources, the northern Kosovo Serbs have begun removing barricades after an agreement with KFOR.  At the site in Zubin Potok that was the scene of recent clashes, KFOR will keep a checkpoint that will now include local Kosovo police. It is also reported that barricades on the road to Gate 1 in Leposavic are coming down.  It is not yet clear if all the barricades will be removed or just some.

There is some expectation that the new agreement between Belgrade and Pristina on the crossing points, plus the removal of some barricades, might lead to the EU deciding favorably on Serbia’s EU candidacy.  As long as nothing else negative happens in the next few days, it at least will make it harder for Germany and others to deny Serbia.

The real story, however, may be that finally an opportunity has been created to end the current crisis in the north that began on July 25th.  The decision by the northern Serbs to at least test whether KFOR and EULEX are willing now to return to acting within their UN mandate is a wise and courageous one.  The actions by KFOR and EULEX over the last few months to impose Kosovo customs at the northern boundary have given the local community in the north absolutely no reason to trust them.  However, within the context of the new agreement – which offers a framework for a status neutral approach to the northern crossing points – and to help remove any excuses for Berlin to veto Serbian candidacy, the northerners have apparently decided to act as if they do.  It is now up to KFOR and EULEX to perform their duties as peacekeepers as mandated by UNSCR 1244 and not to seek to further the political agenda of any one side.

Now some words on “status neutral” and “trust.”

Some have questioned the value and meaning of “status neutral.”  The term derives from UNSCR 1244, which does not settle the question of the status of Kosovo but provides for peacekeeping while that status is resolved.  ”Status neutral” does not mean – nor does it prevent – each side claiming that status has been decided.  Pristina and its supporters assert Kosovo independence, whilst Serbia and Serbs deny it.  ”Status neutral” does, however, establish a mandatory approach for those international elements – namely KFOR, EULEX and UNMIK – acting under the UN mandate in Kosovo.  A status neutral framework for the northern boundary would simply mean that both sides accept neutral practical arrangements while the political dispute continues.  Status neutral does not mean either side has given up their views on Kosovo’s political status.

Some question how KFOR and EULEX can be trusted to remain neutral and carry out any agreements reached in a status neutral manner.  Indeed, they have good reason to question these two Quint agents. It is not, however, really a matter of trust.  The northern Kosovo Serbs have demonstrated – by their determined and peaceful resistance to the effort to impose a new political order on them – that they must be part of any process to achieve a stable and peaceful accommodation over the north.  Their actions to protect what they see as the interests of their community are their ultimate guarantee.  Nothing lasting can be done without them.  Hopefully, KFOR and EULEX will not again be used to try and settle the northern issue through force.  Clearly that does not work.

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat and UN peacekeeper. He worked as part of US efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, South Africa and Sudan and as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and as Chief of Staff for the UN mission in East Timor from November 2008 until June 2010. Gerard is also a member of TransConflict’s Advisory Board.

To read TransConflict’s recently-released policy paper, entitled ‘The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo’, please click here.

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Should stalemate in the European integration process not be properly managed both now and in the future, the EU risks a serious loss of credibility – both as a mediator and as “an anchor for change”.

By Massimiliano Gobbato

A series of events from June onwards provides strong evidence that EU-Serbia relations are approaching a turning point. Serbia’s apprehension of Mladic and Hadžić, the commencement of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and the positive opinion of the Commission on EU candidacy represent valuable evolutions. For Serbia, it has improved its European and international standing, boosting its chances of obtaining EU membership. For the EU, it has strengthened its stabilizing role in the Western Balkans.

Though overshadowed by so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’ and, more importantly, by the current Euro debt crisis, the Western Balkans have gone through some valuable changes during the past two years, bringing about a new wave of EU rapprochement. The ICJ’s ruling on Kosovo, the fulfilment of Serbia’s ICTY obligations and the European Council’s green light for Croatia membership, along with Montenegro’s EU candidacy, are clear signs of a propelling force emerging from the region.

However, some persistent unsettled issues and a certain amount of diplomatic indecision are hindering – if not putting at risk entirely – sustainable solutions. Above all, it seems that some of the key actors inside and outside the region are realising that there is much at stake, and that they lack a clearly defined strategy for dealing with the ever-changing situation.

In order to better understand this last point, it is useful to consider the two-fold approach towards the region’s stability and integration. On the one hand, the EU is called upon by the duty of historical legacy and interests to be a reliable, stabilizing factor for the region. On the other, the remaining former-Yugoslav states have to take steps to catch-up with the rest of the transition countries which have already joined, or are inclined to join, the EU.

As frequently highlighted by several observers, the cornerstone of this process is represented by EU-Serbia relations. Aside from historical factors, the inter-relationship between the situation in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and other parts of the Balkans demands a once-and-for-all stabilisation of relations between Belgrade, Pristina and the EU.

Though one could claim that the EU integration process has so far been fairly successful, various controversies remain which will require additional common efforts to reach an acceptable equilibrium. Should this stalemate not be properly managed, however, the EU risks a serious loss of credibility – both as a mediator and, to use EU jargon, as “an anchor for change”.

As far as Belgrade-Pristina relations are concerned, the policy which has viewed Serbia’s and Kosovo integration as parallel processes is no longer applicable in the light of the recent events. The EU’s strategy has shaped its approach within two similar-but-distinct frameworks; deferring the point at which these two processes would inevitably clash.

On the one hand, the EU has encouraged Serbia’s integration progress as with any other potential candidate, whilst on the other, it has engaged Kosovo trough the Stabilisation Track Mechanism, specifically tailor-made for Pristina. This had the dual aim of continuing the enlargement process and delaying the moment at which ‘enlargement fatigue’, disagreement between member states and a predictable deterioration of the situation in northern Kosovo would have left the Union facing a dilemma.

If, to date, the EU has been successful in circumventing inter-relations between the two parties by acting as a neutral actor, the EU is increasingly being forced to reach a common position – or, at least, a coherent integration strategy – despite internal disagreements amongst both member states and its driving institutions.

Though Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, took a firm stance during her last visit to Belgrade, Martin Schulz – leader of the Socialists in the European Parliament and a candidate to become president of the European Parliament - downplayed this hard-line attitude on Kosovo. Indeed, Enlargement Commissioner, Stefan Fule, recently stated in a high-level conference in Brussels that, “Croatia transformed itself because of the reforms undertaken, reforms made possible because Enlargement policy was credible. For Member States, credibility means applying rigourous conditionality towards the applicants, but also providing them with a tangible European perspective as they fulfil the relevant conditions”. Given Serbia’s progress on the reform front, the Kosovo issue could undermine the EU’s credibility.

Consequently, the EU is obliged to face its inconsistencies by finding an agreement on the recognition of Kosovo, or by being prepared to compensate – through diplomacy and charisma – for the fact that the EU is demanding Belgrade to recognize something that the EU itself does not agree upon. Furthermore, it is interesting to note the fact that Serbs in northern Kosovo are requesting the same treatment of Kosovo itself; namely independence under the principle of self-determination.

As EU decision-making processes on foreign and security policy still rest upon the principle of consensus, reaching a common approach and a consistent strategy will be neither straightforward, nor immediate. The recent phenomenon of withdrawal from, and resumption of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, clearly points to some of the challenges faced. The Commission has nonetheless given its approval to Serbia’s candidacy request, though with special conditions attached. Even if the European Council grants Serbia candidate status, the real matter at stake is when and under which approach negotiations will be conducted. This recent pattern of EU-Serbia relations is one of the main reasons for why it is still difficult to predict the EU’s future engagement.

Whilst the EU needs to reset and re-adapt its its integration strategy before making further steps, Serbia itself remains in an uncomfortable position. The country is in arrears – both with respect to reform and foreign direct investment – that inhibit economic development. Even though not hit as severely as other neighbours by the financial crisis, Serbia remains in a steady state; implying that urgent actions are required – for instance, on still-pending privatisations – in order to counter the understandable citizens’ dissatisfaction with low living standards and to avoid any form of ultra-nationalistic revival.

As recently stated by the Economist Intelligence Unit, maintaining fiscal discipline and wage policies to balance the pressure for excessive government spending is the main challenge for policy-makers. These phenomena may lead to social tensions and political frictions that impact on the current EU rapprochement and integration process; undoubtedly one of the main means to improve Serbia’s economic conditions. This virtuous circle of economic reforms and European integration should also help improve citizen’s opinions on EU membership, which are prone to changing. The close relationship between EU integration, economic development and nationalist residuals is, therefore, swiftly fading when compared, for instance, to the case of Croatia.

Though the Serbian ruling elites are aware of this challenge, the political panorama continues to stick to the catch-all position – claiming EU integration as a priority, and Kosovo and Methoija as an integral part of the Republic of Serbia – without sufficiently debating the possible consequences of this stance and its apparent limitations. Though some interesting changes within Serbian nationalists have been observed, particularly their attitudes towards EU integration, and in contrast to Serbia’s progress in areas of the rule of law and democracy, the issue of Kosovo relates to the gloomiest part of the country’s recent history.

This particular pattern continues to hinder the start of EU membership negotiations, due to constant frictions with the Kosovo authorities and the EU, plus the wider repercussions for the region. This current vicious circle threaten the favourable momentum that can help move Serbia, Kosovo and the region down the path of ‘normalisation’, economic growth and political stability. If the EU mismanages this process, then it risks serious losses of credibility; both in the Western Balkans and elsewhere.

Massimiliano Gobbato is a former NGO Volunteer in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. He holds an MA in European Studies from the College of Europe, where he specialised in EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy. Massimiliano published several articles as a freelance writer, and previously worked for the Veneto Delegation to the EU on Croatia’s candidacy and EU-Serbia related issues.

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