Josip Glaurdic responds to a review of his new book, ‘The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia’, by David B. Kanin, whose own response is also presented below.
By Josip Glaurdic
The twentieth anniversary of Yugoslavia’s breakup came and went without nearly the attention it warranted in the West. Perhaps that is fitting for the crisis which was originally allowed to simmer and boil over by the neglect of the Western powers. My book, ‘The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (Yale University Press, 2011)’, was an attempt to change that trend of indifference, so I am particularly grateful to Prof. Kanin for “lending me a hand” with his thoughtful and knowledgeable review. I am also grateful for his praise, but – in the good tradition of review responses – I have decided to move straight to his substantive critique. After all, that is the best way we can build a constructive dialogue and learn from each other.
It would perhaps be most useful to begin with Prof. Kanin’s suggestion that my analysis lacks “an assessment of why whatever forces – whether military, liberal, or ideologically ‘Yugoslav’ – failed to coalesce as events spun downward.” This is a very good question, which we can answer only after answering two related questions – which (credible) forces are we talking about and when?
If we are talking about the period between the decision of Slobodan Milosevic to marry his brand of socialism with Serbian nationalism sometime in mid-1987 and the collapse of the League(s) of Communists and its/their various defeats at the polls in 1990 – then my book answers that question at least implicitly because it deals extensively with the only credible force that could have stopped Milosevic’s march: the League of Communists itself. The book, thus, discusses the reasons why the rest of the Communist elite failed to collectively respond to Milosevic’s ousting of Ivan Stambolic (they did not want to meddle in Serbia’s internal affairs and they thought Milosevic was just a grey, controllable bureaucrat); it explains why nothing was done once the rallies of the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” started in Serbia (again, because it would have been meddling in the internal affairs of Serbia, because all republican Communist elites used their own nationalisms for the purposes of mobilization, and ultimately because some of them – like the JNA and Macedonia, for example – actually agreed with Milosevic); it suggests a set of plausible explanations for why what was done was done once the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” started to spill over beyond the borders of Serbia (new and weak Communist leaderships in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, miscalculations and spinelessness on the federal level, etc.).
Ultimately, however, the main point is that the Yugoslav Communists were deeply divided over what really constituted a “Yugoslav” platform and, besides, they derived their legitimacy from within their republics. For, say, the Croatian Communist leaders of 1989 – who were all of clearly Yugoslavist orientation – to reach out to someone beyond the borders of their republic in order to build an anti-Milosevic coalition, they would have needed courage, enough likeminded partners, an institutional pathway to oust Milosevic, and real payoffs for such a move in the form of increased legitimacy of their rule. They had none of that. As my book demonstrates, their feeble – but still clearly Yugoslavist – response to Milosevic’s campaign was actually the reason for their electoral defeat.
If, on the other hand, Prof. Kanin’s question is referring to the period between the downfall of the League of Communists in early 1990 and the breakup of the country and war in the second half of 1991 – then the answer is slightly different, partly because we are dealing with different actors, and partly because of increased importance of international signals to the Yugoslav players. As my book argues, the only scenario for a possible survival of the Yugoslav state during this period was dependent on the success of the federal government of Ante Markovic, which commenced its program of shock therapy in December 1989, and the success of the plan for the Yugoslav confederation officially proposed by Slovenia and Croatia in the fall of 1990. Since Prof. Kanin devotes some attention to my treatment of both Markovic and the confederal proposal, it may be useful if I answer his aforementioned question by responding to his critique of how these two episodes were dealt with in my book.
Prof. Kanin suggests that I am minimizing the role Ante Markovic played during this period, that I am ignoring his popularity, devaluing the success of his reforms, and taking him to task for “joining Milosevic in condemning Slovene and Croat movements toward independence after the disastrous Congress of Yugoslavia’s League of Communists in January 1990.” However, none of those suggestions are correct. Ante Markovic gets an extensive treatment in my book, from his appointment in early 1989 and the creation of his economic program (pp. 61-66), to his failure to get Western support (pp. 67-69, 80-81, 121-122), his participation in the elections of 1990 (pp. 102, 115), or his role in the war in Slovenia (pp. 169-170, 173, 177-178, 191-192). I also explicitly mention the level of his popular support (p. 120, p. 344n3). And I treat his reforms fairly, in light of their actual success as measured by a variety of economic indicators (presented in Table 5.1 on p. 122) and in light of the response they garnered in the West. Interestingly, I am not the one who termed Markovic’s reforms “illusory”, as Prof. Kanin suggests. It was the CIA, whose National Intelligence Estimate from October 1990 (and which I quote on p. 109) claimed that the reform achievements of Markovic’s government were “mostly illusory”.
As far as taking Ante Markovic to task is concerned, I take Yugoslavia’s last prime minister to task for three things: for harbouring irrational hopes throughout the crisis that the West would bail him out (p. 68), for aiding and abetting the Yugoslavist wing of the JNA in the war in Slovenia, and for the obstructive role his government played in early Western diplomatic efforts during the war in Croatia (as, for example, in the efforts of the CSCE, p. 187). Those criticisms aside, however, I clearly acknowledge the federal prime minister as “the only political actor who presented a pan-Yugoslav alternative to Milosevic” at the turn of the decade and as someone who may have had a chance to neutralize the Serbian leader (p.69). The problem for Markovic, however – and here lies the answer to Prof. Kanin’s question of why pro-Yugoslav forces did not coalesce around the federal prime minister – is that his reforms were doomed to fail without real financial assistance from the West – assistance Markovic never received.
One could also take Ante Markovic to task – though I do not do that in my book – for failing to support the confederal proposal of Slovenia and Croatia, which was officially presented in October 1990. Prof. Kanin suggests that the confederal proposal was not a truly workable plan, but merely a “slogan” which fooled some Westerners. He also suggests that the Slovenes were not intent on reforming Yugoslavia into a confederation, but were only interested in keeping their money. Moreover, Prof. Kanin questions not only whether the Slovene Communist leadership was committed to the idea of a Yugoslav confederation, but also whether it was committed to the idea of liberal democratization, and he asserts I provide no evidence for such claims in my book.
It is certainly true that the bulk of national/nationalist mobilization in Slovenia in the late 1980s, which was condoned and even fostered by the republic’s Communist leadership, was centred on Ljubljana’s financial contributions to the federal budget. This is hardly surprising, considering the economic environment of extreme austerity akin, perhaps, to what Greece has to go through today. To say, however, that the Slovenes wanted to keep more of their money and that they were committed to the idea or reforming Yugoslavia along confederal lines is not mutually exclusive. On the contrary: the confederation was exactly the institutional device which was – among other things – to allow the Slovenes to keep more of their earnings at home. Whether the confederal proposal of October 1990 was practicable or, as Prof. Kanin suggests, “there is no evidence the Slovenes or anyone else actually considered how such a construction would work” is debatable. The proposal was modelled on the European Community and contained a number of different options which were ultimately to be agreed upon in peaceful negotiations of all six republics. The main point is that this platform for negotiations did not “fool” any Westerners, as Prof. Kanin suggests. As my book demonstrates, the confederal proposal was met with basically uniform derision and disregard from the West in late 1990 and early 1991 (pp. 123-124, 137). Only after the Belgrade protests of March 1991 and the violence in Croatia later that April and May, did the Western governments begin to signal their possible acceptance of a confederal reformation of Yugoslavia, but by that time it was too late. It is rather ironic that a number of provisions of the confederal plan found their way into the proposals of the Carrington Conference in the fall of 1991 – after thousands of dead and wounded, and several hundred thousand refugees in the war in Croatia. Had the confederal plan received Western backing and diplomatic involvement in the fall of 1990 when it needed it, it is entirely possible that war could have been avoided, and that some semblance of a common Yugoslav structure could have been preserved.
When it comes to the question of evidence of Slovenia’s commitment to liberal democracy and to Yugoslavia’s confederal future, I can only recommend that Prof. Kanin re-reads the relevant chapters of my book. Is the fact that the leaders of the Slovenian League of Communists took Mladina’s side in its clash with the JNA in 1988 (pp. 27-29) not evidence of their clear choice to defend that quintessentially liberal idea of the freedom of the press? Are the Slovenian constitutional amendments of 1989, which abandoned the Party’s leading role in society and extended the rights of Slovenian citizens in areas such as freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, right to privacy, and freedom for organized participation in politics (pp. 54-56), also not evidence of a commitment to a liberal-democratic transformation? Is the fact that the Slovenian state-run media and the still ruling League of Communists supported Markovic’s reform program in spite of, as the Ljubljana daily Delo put it, the federal prime minister’s “inability to resist the discreet charms of centralization” (p. 65), not evidence of Slovenia’s commitment to a common Yugoslav future? Is the official platform of the League of Communists of Slovenia for the Fourteenth Congress of the federal Party organization, which – in the words of Milan Kucan – was the platform “undoubtedly for Yugoslavia: a voluntary state of equal republics, free and equal nations, a democratic community of free citizens which measures its socialist content and existence by the criteria of a European quality of life… not a Yugoslavia as an extended Serbia to which – according to its wishes – others can be joined” (p. 70) – is this platform not evidence of a still-present commitment to Slovenia’s future in a reformed and democratized Yugoslavia? Are the proposals put forward by the Slovene delegation at the Fourteenth Congress, which included a series of human rights amendments such as the ban on political trials and torture, and which were defeated by Milosevic’s sizeable bloc in the Party (p. 71), not a sign of the commitment of Slovenia’s Communists to liberal democratization? Last, but not least, is the fact that Slovenia was the first republic to call and hold democratic elections, after which the ruling Communists peacefully surrendered their political offices, not evidence of a commitment to liberal democratization? Prof. Kanin is certainly correct in stating that the Slovenes used their financial upper hand in an attempt to negotiate a better deal with the federal centre and that they had used it for years. They were, however, hardly alone in employing such methods.
The case of Slovenian liberalization and democratization is a good introduction to my response to another important critique by Prof. Kanin – the one regarding my supposed inaccurate use of the term Realpolitik to describe the policies of the Western powers. Prof. Kanin uses the example of Bismarck and his ability to mould the European order according to Prussia’s interests to draw a distinction with the Western leaders of the 1980s and 1990s who were operating “in the thrall of inertia”. None of them, as Prof. Kanin argues, deserve the same label of Realpolitiker that belonged to a statesman such as Bismarck.
It is interesting that Prof. Kanin uses Bismarck’s example to challenge my use of the term Realpolitik, because it was exactly the old Chancellor who was often quoted by the Western anti-interventionists who argued – as he did a century earlier – that “The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.” This quote indeed captures the essence of Western Realpolitik when it comes to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Political realism in international relations is primarily concerned with power (derived from military or economic capacity) and the pursuit of stability. It has no place for ethical or ideological concerns. So, what would the quintessential Realpolitiker have done, had he been in some position of power in the West and confronted with the Yugoslav crisis? Well, he would most likely have noted the dwindling importance of Yugoslavia in the European geopolitical system of the late 1980s and he would have wanted it to remain quiet in order to devote his attention to more pressing interests further up north. He would have had little understanding for the liberalization and democratization agenda of Yugoslavia’s north-western republics, or for the clamouring for human rights by the Kosovo Albanians. He would, on the other hand, most likely have supported those who claimed to be fighting for the country’s preservation and centralization, especially since they happened to be wielding the biggest stick.
As my book repeatedly demonstrates, that was exactly the policy pursued by the Western powers until real war broke out in the summer of 1991. Inertia did play a large role, as Prof. Kanin rightly points out, but it was not the only, or even the most important, factor explaining Western policy. To get back to the case of Slovenian liberalization and democratization – inertia alone obviously cannot explain the fact that the Yugoslav Army received Western signals of support for its possible (and contemplated) intervention in Slovenia at the peak of the Mladina affair in 1988 (p. 28-29), as well as during the crisis with the Slovenian constitutional amendments in 1989 (p. 60). Just as inertia alone could not explain a host of other Western policies toward Yugoslavia during the period covered in my book: from the lack of real Western condemnation of the violence against the Kosovo Albanians in early 1989 (with the notable exception of the US Congress) (pp. 39-42); to Cutileiro’s and Carrington’s blackmail of Alija Izetbegovic with the military might of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs, and with the withholding of the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in March 1992 (pp. 294-300).
The important thing to note is that the foreign policy apparatuses of all Western powers – including Germany – subscribed to this rationale until real war broke out in the summer of 1991. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung may have been making a clear distinction between Yugoslavia’s “democratic northwest” and “Communist Belgrade” (as did a number of other press houses elsewhere in the West), but such distinctions did not have any real effect on Germany’s policy toward Yugoslavia. What changed Bonn’s outlook on the crisis were the extreme violence and the clear aggression, first of the JNA on Slovenia, and then of Serbia on Croatia. As I argue in the concluding chapter of my book (p. 307),
The nature and the aims of the Serbian aggression galvanized some of the most deeply ingrained principled ideas within the German foreign policy community: the idea of peaceful self-determination (which had been the basis for Germany’s reunification), the idea of strong anti-expansionism and anti-irredentism (which stemmed from Germany’s own World War II traumas), and the idea of a strong commitment to the growing capability of European multilateral institutions (which was the foundation of Germany’s post–World War II foreign policy). It was Milosevic’s challenge to these three principled ideas which shifted the spotlight of German foreign policy makers away from their material interests in the continuing existence of Yugoslavia – and if any country had real material interests in the perpetuation of the Yugoslav federation, it was Germany – to the moral interests of self-determination for Yugoslavia’s republics and Europe’s strong resistance to Serbia’s expansionism.
The point is that Germany’s policy shift cannot be, as Prof. Kanin does, viewed outside the context of the extreme violence which was unleashed on Croatia and was threatened to be unleashed on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prof. Kanin’s suggestion that Germany pursued the policy of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia without consideration for what would happen for the rest of the federation is false. As my book shows, Germany had a clear preference for the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Slovenia and Croatia, but was forced to take a back seat due to the intense criticism it was subjected to, primarily by Britain and France. Unsurprisingly, and unfortunately, the Western diplomatic, humanitarian, and military effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus reverted back to the very same mistakes which marred its inglorious beginnings in Slovenia and Croatia. Had my book been longer than the already lengthy 432 pages, and had it continued into the Bosnian war, the analysis would have not only shown Milosevic repeatedly hoodwinking the Westerners, as Prof. Kanin suggests. It would have shown a long record of ultimately unsuccessful Western struggles to shake off their impulses of Realpolitik and appeasement – impulses which culminated with what Prof. Kanin rightfully labels the needless mistake of Dayton.
Dr. Josip Glaurdic is Junior Research Fellow at Clare College, University of Cambridge. He earned his PhD in Political Science in 2009 at Yale University.
An immediate response by David B. Kanin:
Josip,
Thank you very much for taking the time to consider my review and respond to it. I am just about to get on a plane to Istanbul and then other places, so I hope you will not be offended by this very quick response.
First, you mischaracterize just a bit my comments on your treatment of Ante Markovic. In fact, I believe you gave him the right amount of attention and only would quibble with minor points of what you say about him. In fact, I meant to use your appropriate consideration of his shortcomings and failures to take a shot at those who have built up a mythology that he was a would-be liberal alternative to Milosevic and the others who brought Yugoslavia down.
When it comes to Slovenia, the issue is not whether its leaders were sincere about a society more open than Milosevic’s Serbia. The issue is whether – even before Milosevic came to power – they were sincere in their commitment to maintaining Yugoslavia at all. I believe they were not – they knew no re-tinkered “confederation” would hold together and prepared the ground carefully and over time to get out. You believe otherwise – I look forward to more exchanges with you on this point. In my view, part of the problem here is – as I wrote in my review – your narrow focus (1987-1992) just does not cover enough ground to consider the context and follow-on impact of your spot-on assessment of Western disarray and contradictory policies.
As to Bismarck – I agree he knew little about the Balkans, which is why he kept his country out of the region and worried about the implications of how Russia and Austro-Hungary played out their rivalry in the region. I must confess a little disappointment that your comments focused on Bismarck more than my critique of your treatment of Genscher and German policy in 1990-2.
On the later issue, I agree with you entirely that Germany’s policy shift cannot be considered separately from the context of the violence unleashed on Croatia (but not just Croatia). I disagree with your book’s contention that the Germans put the same priority on Bosnia’s independence as on Croatia’s – if that were the case they would not have been ready to drop the issue in reaction to the chaos in the policies of other Europeans until the Americans belatedly stepped in.
These are details, albeit not all minor ones. I want to stress again how valuable I believe your book is – I very much look forward to learning from the fruits of your future research. If I can ever be of any assistance to you, please let me know.
David B. Kanin is an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and a former senior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
I suspect that there are some in the US administration who had originally hoped that the Serbian population of Northern Kosovo would simply up stakes and depart en-masse, when faced with military pressure. After all, traditionally that’s what the Serbs have always done when faced with such a threat. The southern enclaves would have been neutralised, and the Serbian question in Kosovo solved as far as the West and the Albanians were concerned. The fact that that didn’t happen and the Serbs held their ground, now means the approach has to be re-evaluated. The powers that be realise that the Serbs aren’t going anywhere. They must be commended for their bravery and stoicism. NATO can’t be seen to be battling civilians at the barricades. Awfully bad PR. I think they’ll come to an arrangement that allows the Serbs to run their own affairs. Would you agree Mr. Gallucci?
Possible but not certain. Not clear that London is actually trying to play a role in reaching such a negotiated solution. (Being open to it is not the same as working to make it happen.) And the US might simply be allowing London (and Paris?) to spin their wheels until spring.
There are People who think that a good way to allow the Majority Albanian Areas in South Kosovo to be represented in regional forums, is under the name of Serbia’s Territory Of South Kosovo, or STOSK, and that a United Nations Security Council Resolution be made for this after both Parties agree.
It is very important that the words Serbia’s Territory, and not Serbian Territory is used, because Serbia is a Country, and Serbian is a Race, and so there must be no Racism implied in the name.
The terms Serbia and Serbia’s need to be defined several times as the English way of saying the recognized United Nations Country with Belgrade as its Capital, and Kosovo as its Province as United Nation Security Council Resolution 1244 says.
North Kosovo should not be included in this matter, because they and other Serbian Majority Areas will be represented by Serbia.
There needs to be a negotiated agreement to agree on the Reality on the Ground as of December 31 2011, on where those Majority Albanian Areas in South Kosovo are, and where the Majority Serbian Areas in South Kosovo are, and that should be fixed, unless otherwise mutual agreed to in the future.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 allows for hundreds but not thousands of Serbian police and soldiers to return to Kosovo.
We know that the minimum for thousands in 2,000, and that hundreds can be 19.99 hundreds, and so that means that 1,999 Serbian police and soldiers can enter any part of Kosovo to see to it that a Referendum in Northern Kosovo can be delayed for a while, as North Kosovo should directly join Serbian Administration, and not the Evil Racist Criminals in Pristina.
All of South Kosovo will continue to be Serbian Territory, but the Majority Albanian Territories in South Kosovo can be represented as STOSK.
I think that any STOSK Official in any forum should have a Serbian Official for Provincial Affairs be present, so that the World will know that Kosovo belongs to all the People and all the Races of Serbia, and its Province of Kosovo.
The so called International Community and the Kosovo Terrorist Government in Pristina, say that only a few criminals in North Kosovo object to being brutalized and murdered and driven from their homes and land, and they say that a Referendum is not necessary.
Then there are the Bribed Vichy Serbian Politicians in Belgrade who Desperately and Greedily Crave the promise of the European Union Gravy Train with its Mega Millions of Dollars, who say that the Referendum Result is known, and that it should not proceed.
If the Referendum Result is certain, then that would mean that the Serbian Quisling Government should tell EULEX to sign an agreement to leave North Kosovo.
Many Non-Biased and Non-Bribed Legal Academics say that the Kumanovo Agreement is Illegal under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and that it is Illegal under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, and therefore the Illegal Kumanovo Agreement that was signed under American Duress should be scraped.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 allows for hundreds but not thousands to return to Kosovo, and that that means 1,999 Serbian police and soldiers can see to it that a Referendum in Northern Kosovo can be delayed for a while.
Serbia has as President and it has as a Government, a Person and Parliamentarians who are a Disgrace to the Human Race, because they should tell America and all the other European Union Liars that they will not tolerate any more lies against the Serbian People who all informed People of the World know that are the Most Innocent of any Race in the former Yugoslavia.
The Albanians of Kosovo have been scheming to steal Kosovo since the 1878 Prizren Declaration, and the Americans, the Germans, and the Albanians of Kosovo only regret will be that they did not killed more People if they cannot achieve Independence which will be one of the truest ever Euphemisms for Land Theft.
Germany does not want Referendums in Europe, because Hitler never did believe in Referendums for the Sub Humans of Europe, and the People of North Kosovo can print the forms using A4 computer paper, with the Question, and the YES or NO answer, unless the Kumanovo Agreement, and STOSK are agreed to, along with 1,999 Serbian police and soldiers to enter any part of Kosovo to see to it that a Referendum in Northern Kosovo can be delayed for a while.
Serbia has a real advantage here because Germany is desperate to build its Fourth Reich, and Elections and Referendums are not part of the Fourth Reich Scheme.
If Europe had rejected the Lisbon Treaty, then Germany could not have schemed to create the Euro Crisis and the Financial Crisis in order to have another Treaty that Establishes the Fourth Reich.
I hope that Russia insists that Every European Citizen And Every American Citizen Must firstly Be Thoroughly Saturated, and then Thoroughly Oversaturated, and then Thoroughly Oversaturated With The True Knowledge Of Albanians And Kosovo, and the Kosovo Albanians will have to Confess these things Over and Over and Over, before Russia will allow South Kosovo to become a Country.
It Could Be that after European and American have the true knowledge, that Economic Genocide for all the Albanians in Albania, FYROM, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia, along with the Albanians of Kosovo will be that Price that this Criminal Project costs the Albanians.
SOPA stands for Stop Overseas Piracy by America, and the People of North Kosovo should hold their Democratic Life Saving Referendum, because it is their Democratic Right, and it will reverse the Fourth Reich in Europe.
@PEN
Its very interesting how some people call the others in their “bravery”. Isn’t that pathetic? I should remind in some relevant points. Resolution 1244 remains in force, which means no military presence from Serbia in any part of Kosovo because it is not just conflict with Kosovo authorities but also with NATO. Serbs in the north of Kosova have blocked themselves with their barricades. Such situation is impossible for normal life. Nobody says that Serbs will leave Kosovo for a month or so. No, they will do that for years to come. If Serbs in the north of Kosovo continue their “bravery and stoicism” most probably will be much less in years to come. Kosovo authorities don’t need to use force at all because its not necessary. This means that Serbs will be blamed for ethnically clean Kosovo and obviously because of their unrealistic approach as well as their “bravery and stoicism”.
Solution is that Serbs in the north should accept reality as their compatriots from the south did. Serbs in the north of Kosovo have opportunity either to accept Ahtisaari plan or continue living with illusions. If they choose Ahtisaari plan then normal life may continue. If they choose “bravery and stoicism” they will destroy themselves.I am saying this because nobody in the world can blame Kosovo authorities why they want to have their custom officers in the borders.
Having this in mind then Mr. Tadic’s proposal is not acceptable until Serbia recognizes Kosovo.
@Diza Kosovor
You appear to interpret the provisions of Resolution 1244 in a way that suits your agenda. The resolution clearly stipulates the return of a certain number of Serbian security personnel to guard shrines and religious sites. Obviously that is not going to happen given the circumstances on the ground. But don’t make things up as you go along. It’s tedious. The Serbs of Kosovo have not ‘blocked themselves’ as you claim. They are adjacent to their motherland, and come and go as they please. And you’re right ‘Kosovo authorities’ don’t need to use force because a/ they usually get somebody else to their dirty work for them, and b/ they are incapable of achieving their aims without outside help. Finally you may regard the fight for their rights as ‘pathetic’ but I think a lot of neutral observers would commend their resiliance against overwhelming odds. So therefore, given your dismissive comments, I doubt you would understand that.
@PEN
You clearly didn’t read UN SC resolution 1244. As for Serbian security personnel it says “an agreed number will be permitted to return” and clarifies “hundreds not thousands”. So first of all there must be “agreement” for that return and second that personnel may “be permitted”. To my best knowledge there was neither agreement on that issue nor permission to do so.
As for Serbs in Kosovo the question is: who is denying their rights? Is any part in the world that minority has such right as Serbs in Kosovo? If they don’t want using there rights, its their problem. I don’t regard “their fights for their rights” as pathetic but rather your claims, which unfortunately bring to Serbs only suffering.
As for resolution 1244 (again) I don’t interpret anything that is not written there. It is based on legal opinion from the body (ICJ) that is supposed to interpret international legal order. And it did. So rather than speaking in general I like quoting what is said from relevant documents and bodies. I wish to give you advice that rather than Monty Python way of thinking you should choose reality. And reality is that unfortunately Serbs in the North of Kosovo live with their illusions as they are part of “motherland Serbia”. They are not and will not be. If Albanians in the south of Serbia are part of Serbia or Bosniacs in Sandjak are part of Serbia or Hungarians in North Vojvodina are part of Serbia then Serbs in the North of Kosovo are part of the state of Kosovo. This is very simple.
@Diza Kosovor,
What’s very simple is that Vojvodina and Sandjak are components of a universally recognised State not in dispute with its neighbours. Unlike Kosovo. As for the Serbs and their holy places in the rest of the province, they live as an oppressed and threatened minority surrounded by barbed wire and NATO guards 13 years after the end of the conflict. Crimes committed against them such as the recent murders are never solved. If you call that rights, well then I pity you. Again you choose to interpret things that suit your agenda. And finally, I express my opinion without resorting to sarcasm and insults. Something you would do well to learn from if you wish to be taken seriously.
@PEN
Kosovo is a state regardless of whether is recognized universally. As such Kosovo has duties and responsibilities as a state. As for Serbs, where do you see that oppression and threatening? Serbs in Gracanica for instance protested last year as a free people and called that part of Kosovo as “Serbian land”. Nobody even looked at them from Kosovo authorities. Not to speak for any use of force. Fortunately this kind of propaganda for Serbs living “surrounded by barbed wire” can see all the world. Four years after independence of Kosovo there were only 4 cases where Serbs were attacked. Four cases in four years you see as oppression???!! Obviously you have problem understanding what oppression is. Do you know how many incidents were on the same time? Find any state in the world that can guarantee 100% of security. You speak for crimes against Serbs “that are not solved” but apparently you don’t know that these cases are under EULEX mandate. If we speak about solving crimes look at Serbia. How many cases of crimes committed in Kosovo were processed in Serbian courts. There are only three (Suva Reka, Podujevo, Cuska) but where are other hundreds of such cases?
@Diza Kosovar
‘Four years after independence there were only 4 cases where Serbs were attacked.’ That’s a joke right. You can’t be serious. And what of the province wide anti Serb pogrom in 2004. Organised bands of thugs rampaging and looting their way through the last remaining Serb settlements left in Kosovo. Medieval churches gutted and used as toilets. Barbarism that shocked the world. That didn’t happen I suppose. How many KLA have been prosecuted in Pristina. Not by EULEX but by Albanian courts. And how many Serbs have been convicted in Belgrade. I wonder. I think you and I are going to have to agree to disagree.
I would like to know your opinions on re-drawing borders or population exchanges. Rep. Serpska and North Kosovo would go to Serbia. South Kosovo, Presheva Valley, and West Macedonia would go to Albania. Please no history lessons or nationalist propaganda, it’s just a simple question based on current majority population on the ground.
I think it’s a fast and effective solution that would avoid conflict and pave the road for peace and economic development in the region. This option has been suggested at some point by all local ethnic groups, but the international community seems completely against it. Why waste time and energy trying to create a Western multi-ethnic “Balkan paradise”? This approach only seems to postpone conflict, not address it directly. We can be good neighbors, each in their own space. Mr. Gallucci and others, what do you think?
@PEN,
How ridiculous is somebody not understanding very simple thing. For your information, Kosovo declared independence on February 2008, four years from 2004. Yes March 2004 was very bad for Kosovo image since some individuals committed crimes. I should remind you that out of 19 dead people on such occasion 11 of them were Albanians. However who is mentioning that period? Those who are from the most criminal state – Serbia. Serbia committed terrible crimes and genocide in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and lastly in Kosovo. Serbia and those who live in Serbia are least people who should speak about atrocities. In fact Serbia is very fortunate because was not punished as it deserved. Nevertheless Kosovo authorities accepted to give rights to Serbs never seen in any part of the world for minorities. I am repeating to you again since I see that you are totally misinformed – UNMIK in the past and EULEX now have authority to investigate crimes and incidents against communities (minorities). Kosovo Courts can’t deal with such cases. But I am repeating question: why Serbia doesn’t process hundreds of committed crimes in Kosovo, raping and burning of more than 200K houses. Who is charged for forcibly deportation and confiscation personal documents of 800K Albanians? If we continue speaking for these things the story will never end. That’s why I am saying that the past is the past and we should go ahead. In this regard I don’t see any reason that Serbs in the north of Kosovo should have any special rights. Are they more special than other Serbs of Kosovo or Albanians in southern Serbia or Bosniacs in Serbia or Hungarians in Serbia etc?
@another
A question for you: in which planet do you live?
@ Albanian;
There is logic to your suggestion, given the high levels of animosity still remaining between the various ethnic groups. Some would argue that complete seperation is the only formula to eventual reconciliation.
The liberal West of course wouldn’t accept this because they are convinced that the only civilised way to live is together in a multicultural society. That may work for people who have not recently been at war with each other. But it most certainly doesn’t work with those that have. Again the powers that be are against any notion of a ‘Greater’ state, be that Serbian, Albanian, or Croatian.
In my opinion it would be better for people to live together in peace like civilised human beings without any borders or flags. For our children’s sake if for nobody else. But you and I know that isn’t going to happen any time soon. Realistically speaking, if the various Balkan tribes are going to continue persecuting each other in their own republics and arguing over independence, then they should be allowed to re-draw borders peacefully and at a major regional conference with no pre-conditions. If it will bring lasting peace to the region than so be it. Everybody needs to move on.
Territory swaps must be considered an option. But territorial divisions would not be easy as the dividing lines between groups are not always clear. And the people involved would have to agree.
However, many consider the notion of multi-ethnic, democratic states more appropriate to 21st Century Europe. Unfortunately, since the departure of Slovenia from Yugoslavia through to the Kosovo UDI, the Western states have tended to support ethnic states.
The “liberal West” is right. It doesn’t allow neither great Serbia nor great Albania. Nobody would agree which part of Kosovo would go to Serbia or which part of Serbia would go to Kosovo. Then we have a case of Albanians in Macedonia. If north of Kosovo goes to Serbia who can stop Albanians in Macedonia to ask the same. But which part of Macedonia would be part of Albania? Where to draw new borders? Nobody knows that. Serbs in Bosnia would ask being part of Serbia, then Bosniacs in Serbia (with some parts of Montenegro) would ask being independent then Hungarians would see a chance and so on and so forth.
In regard to the situation in north of Kosovo there is a question: In which part of Kosovo Serbs have more reason not to participate in Kosovo institutions? The answer is very clear – those who live south of river Ibar. But why those have more reason on rejecting participation in Kosovo institutions in fact do participate? Where is here logic? Of course Serbs in the north behave as they behave (barricades and so on) because they are supported to do so.
That’s why Ahtisaari plan is optimal solution. There is no single reason why Serbs in the north should have more autonomy than those from the south.
@ Diza Kosovar;
A question for you. (I don’t know whether you actually live in Kosovo, or personally know any Serbs who do) and as you seem to think you know an awful lot about the place, I’d like you to be honest in your reply. Are Serbs able to live, travel, work, and speak their own language free from intimidation and harassment by the Albanian population beyond the safety of their own enclaves. You speak of Kosovo as a democratic society. Well these are some of the pre-requisites for a free country. Freedom of speech and freedom of association for all. Not just Albanians.
I see that you are totally misinformed and subject to propaganda. I live in Kosovo (Pristina) and work with lots of Serbs. I communicate with them in Serbian even today. I know that Serbs from south of Kosovo or those from north come without any single problem in Pristina almost every day. They did not report any single incident from Albanians but this is not the case with criminal “mayors” in the north of Kosovo who threatened them, even their lives if refuse to obey their “orders”.
I must repeat what I said in previous comments – there are just few incidents with Serbs since independence of Kosovo when Kosovo authorities have more responsibilities. There is no single state in the world that can guarantee 100% security. Kosovo is a democratic society and I repeat again the case when Serbs demonstrated in Gracanica (near Pristina) and Kosovo police safeguarded them.
@ PEN
I’m glad you agree on a re-drawing of the borders, assuming you are a Serb? I hope the international community understands that this option would be a lot easier to implement. Judging by the international community’s track record in the Balkans, however, it doesn’t seem us locals are that lucky. The same international community gave us these borders to begin with in 1913.
@ Gerard Gallucci “many consider the notion of multi-ethnic, democratic states more appropriate to 21st Century Europe”
I don’t know many examples of European countries that were multi-ethnic when created. Germany, France, Italy, etc. did not have significant ethnic minorities when they were created. N. Ireland and the Basque country were pacified only recently. Apart from Switzerland, what comes to mind is Belgium, and even this one is falling apart due to ethnic conflict. Then why experiment with this concept in the Balkans, out of all places? Seems totally absurd to me. I agree with the ultimate goal of multi-ethnic co-existence, however this might be appropriate for wealthy Western European countries, but almost impossible in the less-developed, conflict-prone Balkans. I think the West is repeating the same mistakes it made with the borders at the Treaty of London in 1913. They should stop using the Balkans as a laboratory where new political systems are tested and experimented with. Mr. Gallucci, from your experience, how popular is this border-redrawing idea in the diplomatic circles?