Solving the Syrian conflict starts with shutting up

Can a decentralised transitional power model – as proposed in ‘Solving the Syrian conflict starts with building trust’ – really be carried out by western diplomats who have already demonstrated the deficiencies of their knowledge of Syria?

What are the principles of conflict transformation?

By Estella Carpi

Today I would like to share my views about the article, ‘Solving the Syrian conflict starts with building trust’, which is just a prototype of many on the internet nowadays. It is, to my mind, a disguised version of the several typical standardisations of peacebuilding process, according to which such “intervention models” – polluted by their own very nature – are applicable everywhere regardless of local specificities.

I remain quite sceptical about this article for a number of reasons. First, the author proposes decentralising and localising potential “transitional ruling elites” in order to avoid what is somewhat peculiarly considered a “sudden” change of central power change (‘sudden’ despite it being two years since the beginning of the revolution). Can such a decentralised transitional power model really be carried out in proper terms with the help of western diplomats? As far as I’m aware, the latter has never accumulated a fine-grained knowledge of – or experienced field work in – Syria. They have largely demonstrated such an incapacity throughout the revolution: split between silence, the suspension of ethical judgement suspension, fake engagement – while immobilising the status quo – or tout court detachment. How then would they be able to implement such specific plans on the local level in Syria? What should the external actors’ role be in such an abstract scenario? Or, if they’ll pretend to impartially assist local processes, would their only possible role of donors be really meaningful and harmless?

Moreover, in light of the author’s considerations – “asking Assad to leave now is likely not a good idea given that he represents a large group of Syrians; though the opposition might demand that lower level officials be replaced” – I frankly wonder:

1) Where is this “large group” still staunchly sustaining Assad with full awareness and political consciousness – and not as a result of complex psycho-social dynamics that a long-standing dictatorship engenders, such as overarching social fear and terror for the unknown, or as support to the regime to exorcise their trauma? (maybe this perception of mine is biased by my inevitably ideologised knowledge of Syria, but what’s wrong with that if de-ideologising means winking at war criminals?).

2) Has the author ever spoken to one of the “rebels” or people closely affiliated to them? Does he really think they would simply give up on the main goal of Assad’s immediate departure? Is, consequently, such a proposed scheme materially feasible?

Behind the unwavering position of the two parts there is still a symbolism that feeds the trust and support of the “masses” – or their bewilderment – that cannot be overlooked in proposing a real peacebuilding plan for Syria. The symbolism of the merciless and imperative need for the departure of Assad’s sanguinary regime, on the one side, and the end of Western supported terrorists destroying a solid country on the other. Now, I wonder, does the author truly believe such a symbolism can easily be dismantled for the sake of western intervention programs?

Furthermore, with respect to the notion that “elections won’t help. They would just assert who will be the winner and the loser”, it is highly unlikely that the aftermath of future elections will run smoothly. Yet, I would sincerely invite Roffel to explain how and when democracy can be deployed in concrete terms and represent the grassroots, if he has decided to discourage the election process in the transitional stage?

Last, but not least, the author’s consideration that “sidelining Assad means sidelining that group, thereby undermining the possibility of compromise” raises concerns. Why, for instance, do we persist in conceiving of reconciliation as something we should try to build between powerful elites and macro-levels? He purports to criticise any top-down approach to peacebuilding process, while he’s reasserting it too by forgetting that the Syrian people’s current division has been caused throughout the years by ‘divide-and-rule’ regime strategies, as well as by the  consequence of a domino effect and a reflection of polarised macropolitics at odds with each other. That is to say, individuals and political leaders do claim a different approach to reconciliation and trust building.

In a nutshell, if this is the best plan we are able to come up with, well, let’s get back to sipping our Western afternoon tea and let’s shut up.

Estella Carpi is a PhD student at the University of Sydney and PhD Fellow at the American University of Beirut. Estella is conducting research entitled “Everyday Local Responsiveness to Humanitarian Intervention in Beirut’s Southern Suburbs and a Village in Akkar: an Ethnographic Comparative Study.”

This article was originally published on Mabisir, which insights into Middle Eastern affairs, and is available by clicking here. 

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