Transconflict Serbia | NGO Serbia and the UK

TransConflict is pleased to announce the launch of the Global Coalition for Conflict Transformation (GCCT), comprised of over forty organizations from a variety of countries.

The Global Coalition for Conflict Transformation (GCCT) brings together organizations committed to upholding and implementing the Principles of Conflict Transformation. The main objective of the GCCT is to raise awareness about the principles of – and approaches to – conflict transformation globally, whilst facilitating exchanges of best practice and providing a framework for joint actions.

The Global Coalition is comprised of over forty organizations from a variety of countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Uganda, Northern Ireland, Sudan and Croatia. To explore the composition of the Global Coalition, please click here or visit:

• Africa
• Asia
• Europe
• The Middle East

As Ian Bancroft, executive director of TransConflict, emphasizes, “there are many organizations doing excellent work in the field of conflict transformation whose methodologies and approaches can benefit the work of others. The Global Coalition will not only help strengthen ties between such organizations, but will also help reduce the gap between theory and practice by providing researchers and academics with an important pool of expertise.”

One of the unique aspects of the Global Coalition is that it is grounded in the Principles of Conflict Transformation, which all members have agreed to endorse and pursue. The Principles – which the Coalition will continue developing, and which a variety of other actors will be encouraged to adopt – provide an important guide for individuals and organizations considering how to engage with conflict-affected areas.

To keep right up-to-date with the work of the GCCT, please use one of the following:

• Facebook
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• LinkedIn

For further information about the Global Coalition for Conflict Transformation, please contact Ian Bancroft by clicking here.

The referendum makes clear that the northern Kosovo Serbs reject the imposition of Pristina’s institutions that has been the centerpiece of Quint policy for Kosovo since 2008.

By Gerard M. Gallucci

Through two days of cold, snowbound weather, the Kosovo Serb community north of the Ibar River went to the polls February 14-15 to vote in a “referendum” with one question – do they accept living under Pristina authority or not. According to local figures, of some 35,500 eligible voters, 26,725 voted with 26,524 (99.74%) of those saying “no.”

The north Kosovo referendum had no legal character and called for no actions. It was a poll on popular sentiment, an effort to refute charges that only “criminals” and “extremists” reject the “benefits” of rule from Pristina. Its results were no surprise. Yet politically, it changes everything. It makes clear that the northern Kosovo Serbs reject the imposition of Pristina’s institutions that has been the centerpiece of Quint policy for Kosovo since 2008. The determined and peaceful resistance, since last July, to efforts to impose Kosovo customs in the north, plus this poll, mean that any effort to change circumstances on the ground would have to be implemented through force. And force would not work, it would generate violence and full partition or ethnic flight. In any case, NATO and the EU have no stomach for it. After the poll, it must be clear that the policy of seeking to subject the north to Pristina has nowhere to go.

The referendum also shows that the current government in Belgrade cannot force events in north Kosovo either. Despite all its huffing-and-puffing, the northerners withstood the pressure and held their vote. No matter how much Serbia’s president, Boris Tadic, might want to make a deal with the EU to give up the north, it is clear he could not enforce it. Even if he were willing to cut-off funding for the north, politically he cannot (and the northerners would likely find a way around that anyway). If Belgrade arrested northern leaders to force their community to surrender, that would split the Serbian electorate and not change anything on the ground. The way to impose Pristina institutions does not pass through Belgrade.

The vote also helps make clear that the negotiations are going nowhere. Tadic cannot make deals that he can enforce, not with the north and not during the current election campaign. Pressure on the Thaci government from its critics – most notably Vetevendosje (‘Self-Determination’) and Albin Kurti – likewise means Pristina cannot make and enforce compromise deals, such as on regional representation.

All this clearly suggests that either a deal must be struck on the north acceptable to the Serb majority living there or the conflict will remain frozen. There is no other choice.

It may remain a frozen conflict. The key players could be more comfortable with the current situation than anything that might replace it. Pristina gets to continue to claim the north as an integral part of Kosovo. With its international agents – the ICO and EULEX – it can have an office just north of the Ibar – with its “municipal preparation teams” – and continue to fly its customs officers to the northern crossing points. That the office and teams do nothing and that the customs officials man unused crossing points does not lessen their slight, but still useful, symbolic value. The Quint gets to pretend through its “negotiations” that it is still working on the problem. They also get to use the Pristina-Belgrade “dialogue” to keep President Tadic on edge for the next few months over EU candidacy.

Tadic may not enjoy this outcome but it could be argued that Serbian policy on Kosovo – guided as much by what Washington and Brussels wanted as anything else – brought Belgrade to this end. It gave away its leverage with everyone as the Quint tried to extract too much, too quickly and gave him nothing in return.

All in all, the most stable outcome within reach may be the continuation of the current status quo. Perhaps over time, with some patience, a way can be found to regularize the situation. That would mean, however, recognizing that the northern Kosovo Serbs will not accept being governed from Pristina. That much must be clear by now.

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat and UN peacekeeper. He worked as part of US efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, South Africa and Sudan and as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and as Chief of Staff for the UN mission in East Timor from November 2008 until June 2010. Gerard is also a member of TransConflict’s Advisory Board.

To read TransConflict’s recently-released policy paper, entitled ‘The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo’, please click here.

To read other articles by Gerard for TransConflict, please click here.

To learn more about both Serbia and Kosovo, please check out TransConflict’s new reading lists series by clicking here.

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Reactions to the referendum in the north suggest that it may be time to invite representatives of Serbs in Kosovo to sit at the negotiating table alongside Belgrade and Pristina.

By Jan Muś

The referendum of Kosovo Serbs from the north raises many voices of criticism in Belgrade, but why is this so?

First, there is a tendency for referendums in the Balkans to prompt an almost allergic reaction; unless, of course, the expected results match perfectly with the wishes of the rulers, such as the recent EU referendum in Croatia. Referendums were held shortly prior to the outbreak of the wars of the nineties and the subsequent blood-letting. One may argue that there was no direct link between the referendums held in the past and the tragic events that followed shortly thereafter. Nevertheless, many in the former Yugoslavia are well aware of the votes for independence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia at the beginning of the nineties, and the reasons for not holding such a referendum in Republika Srpska. In other words, to propose referendums on sovereignty – conducted without the respective capital’s involvement – can be compared to (theoretical) demands of the German federal government for an extra-territorial motorway to Russia through Poland, or to (not-that-theoretically) refer to the Armenian Genocide in the middle of international talks with Turkey.

Second, the form and results of the talks between the Kosovo and Serbian authorities directly influence their relations with the EU; the main sponsor of economic, social and political reforms in the region. The referendum causes so many controversies, because it has been organized by Kosovo Serbs in defiance of Belgrade’s stance; not to mention the attitude of Pristina. The four municipalities border with Serbia and, therefore, have a real perspective of joining the motherland. Whilst holding a referendum does not necessarily mean the secession of north Kosovo, it does however complicate Belgrade’s position vis-a-vis its negotiations with Pristina; especially by limiting Serbia’s ability to find a compromise with Pristina.

On the other hand, the referendum also serves to strengthen the ‘nationalistic’ attitudes of a part of Kosovo society. This discontent with ‘disloyal’ Serbs can have either ‘political form’ or – what is truly feared by Kosovo Serbs, especially those living in the enclaves – lead to riots.

Voting has been a hard blow against the Serbian government for yet another reason. Namely, it has become clear that Belgrade does not posses political control over its compatriots in Kosovo. Automatically, a whole set of question arises -who represents the Belgrade government in this struggle? If not the Kosovo Serbs, then should the argument of defending Serbodom still be used? With whom should Pristina conduct talks?

It would not be correct to expect some changes after the referendum. The Kosovo institutions do not exist in the north, and it is very unlikely that they will be established there soon. In fact, Kosovo Serbs have shown their dissatisfaction with, and lack of trust in, political leaders in Serbia. This general disappointment has been caused by the instrumental treatment of their fellow nationals in Kosovo and the protracted state of ethno-political uncertainty and tensions. This sort of physical and mental pressure cannot endlessly persist, but in Kosovo it has lasted, with only very brief interludes, since 1997.

Serbia’s president, Boris Tadić, holds that the referendum is against the interests of the Republic of Serbia; although his compatriots claim that he does not take into account their interests sufficiently. It is difficult to resist the impression that the Serbian authorities are once more using Serbs living in the neighboring countries as part of their political games, whilst ignoring their very interests, as was already the case in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during the nineties. Maybe it is time, therefore, to let the third party to the conflict – Serbs in Kosovo, including those from the north – sit at the negotiating table alongside the respective negotiators from Belgrade and Pristina.

Jan Muś currently teaches courses on contemporary Balkan politics and on history of Balkan conflicts at the Catholic University of Lublin and Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities. Born in Poland, Jan has spent a considerable amount of time in the Balkans as a volunteer in a refugee camp, and later on as a researcher and scholar. He has cooperated with, and worked for, a number of public and private institutions involved in the affairs in South Eastern Europe.

To learn more about both Serbia and Kosovo, please check out TransConflict’s new reading lists series by clicking here.

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The candidacy of Serbia’s foreign minister, Vuk Jeremić, for the presidency of the United Nations General Assembly shows that its foreign policy is not based upon a long-term strategy, but is instead contingent upon daily politics and a lack of vision about how to strengthen its international position.

By Stefan Dragojević

On January 24th, Vuk Jeremić, Serbia’s foreign minister, acknowledged that his country had nominated him as a candidate for president of the sixty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. To understand the motivations for such a move and its future implications, it is necessary to simultaneously consider both Serbia’s internal and foreign affairs.

The upcoming elections had a strong bearing on such a decision, especially given Vuk Jeremić standing as one of the most popular officials of the Democratic Party (DS), particularly amongst “patriotically-oriented” voters. However, though relatively popular with the public, Jeremić is highly criticized by parties from both the governing coalition and opposition. The opposition, especially the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), blame Jeremić and the foreign ministry of leading a policy of deception regarding the defence of Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo; often citing the controversial EU-Serbian resolution in the UN from September 2010 and the Advisory Opinion of the Internatinoal Court of Justice (ICJ). On the other hand, the EU-enthusiasts – the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and a number of high officials of the ruling DS – blame Jeremić for failing to obtain EU candidacy status due to his apparent “strong stance” on Kosovo.

Jeremić’s political figure and his career, however, have never been shaped independently by himself, but have rather been linked to Serbia’s president, Boris Tadić, who was Jeremić’s psychology teacher in high school. It is often rumoured that the main foreign policy strategies and decisions are formulated within Tadić’s cabinet, with Jeremić being their solemn executor. The recent failures of Serbian foreign policy – with respect to both Kosovo and the EU candidacy status – are now compensated by new diplomatic “activities” that might be favourably received by potential voters, and the candidacy for the post of president of the sixty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly is one such activity.

In the world of foreign affairs and international relations, the Serbian bid is indeed controversial. Though a purely technical post, the presidency of the General Assembly carries a certain prestige and responsibility. In order to establish a set criteria for electing a new General Assembly president, several proposals appeared in the past few years; the most recent being issued in 2007 by the Institute for Global Policy. The potential candidate should fulfil four-set criteria – i) availability to devote full-time attention for many months, ii) political independence, iii) multilateral leadership experience and iv) a thorough understanding of the UN Charter. Taking into consideration Jeremić’s current political position, the questions to be considered are whether he would be able to fulfil the unofficial criteria, and what will be the reaction of the international community.

With general elections in Serbia slowly approaching,  it would indeed be peculiar if Jeremić gets elected for the post and at the same time potentially loses his ministerial seat in Serbia; which would only create a further rift between him, a future foreign minister from the opposition and the new government. Moreover, Jeremić’s public duties in Serbia are not solely limited to foreign policy; as president of the Serbian Tennis Association, his position is even more complicated.

Jeremić, however, is not the only candidate for the post, with Lithuania having also nominated a candidate. When comparing the Lithuanian approach to that of Serbia, certain differences are very pronounced. First, Lithuania had informed the states of the Eastern European group of its intention to nominate a candidate back in 2004, and formalized this move on 27th June 2011 by nominating Dalius Čekuolis. Čekuolis, the current permanent representative of Lithuania in the UN, is an experienced diplomat who also held the position of under-secretary of foreign affairs, and served as president of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) from 2007 to 2008. Lithuania anticipated Serbia’s announcement of candidacy by eight months and, by having nominated a highly-skilled candidate, Jeremić’s chances of success are certainly diminished.

In order to be elected, a candidate must attain a majority of the vote in the General Assembly, which is not going to be an easy task for Serbia. The late candidacy means less time for lobbying and diplomacy. Indeed, a number of states have already declared their opposition; most notably, two of Serbia’s neighbours – Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina – with the Croatian foreign minister, Vesna Pusić, explaining that an agreement with Lithuania was reached last summer. Of the great powers, Russia stated its support for Serbian candidacy, whilst the EU leading powers – Germany and France – do not view the candidacy favourably.

If Serbia’s efforts to have a candidate elected for the post fail, Serbian diplomacy will suffer a huge blow which will indirectly affect its already weakened position in the UN – particularly its voice regarding the Kosovo dispute. On the other hand, should Serbia manage to attain the post – yet a change of Government occurs in the meantime – Serbia will not be able to realise the fruits of that position due to a potential conflict between Jeremić and any future government formed by the current opposition.

Serbia’s candidacy demonstrates that its foreign policy is not based on long-term strategy, but is rather contingent on daily politics and a lack of vision about how to strengthen its international position. What Serbia most certainly needs is greater involvement in the UN, including participation in UN-led peacekeeping operations. Such engagement would improve Serbia’s chances of drawing the Kosovo dispute back from the EU to the UN arena, where it can count on the support of more powerful allies, and where UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is likely to be better respected.

Stefan Dragojević was born in the United Kingdom and lived in Italy. He is currently in his final year at the Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade, and has attended conferences and seminars regarding international and legal affairs. Stefan is active in the sphere of politics and student politics. He was the overall winner of the “Monroe E. Price International Media Law Moot Court Competition” at University of Oxford in 2011 alongside his team, and was awarded the “Citizen of the Year” award by the Municipality of Vracar in 2011. Stefan is also a TransConflict Associate.

To learn more about the politics, history and culture of Serbia, please click here.

This article is published as part of TransConflict Serbia’s initiative, ‘Serbia’s Future on the Future of Serbia’.

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