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Amidst a profound economic and financial crisis, Europe’s leaders must not ignore the rising popularity of extreme right-wing parties and radical anti-immigrant movements, and the threat they pose to multi-culturalism.

By Bedrudin Brljavac

“Extremists and populist movements are exploiting people’s fear of those who are not like us. We can see the consequences in the form of terrorism and racially motivated violence”

Kjell Magne Bondevik

The EU is slowly approaching the end of the integration process which started in the aftermath of World War Two. A significant number of member states are facing a damaging financial crisis, which is destabilizing and fragmenting the EU as a whole. With Italy, Spain and even Portugal all facing a fate similar to that of Greece, the future of the European idea is at stake. As the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, pointed out, Europe is threatened with its gravest modern crisis and the EU’s future is uncertain. There is, however, a greater challenge to the idea of a democratic, open and multicultural Europe; namely, the emergence of extremist political parties and movements across the continent.

When Europe’s leaders decided to establish the European Community in the fifties, a prime aim was not only to prevent further war, but to marginalize extremist political forces through mutual dialogue and institutional integration. Many Western scholars and policy-makers shared the belief that democratization and integration would eventually render nationalism obsolete. With a number of international organizations upholding and protecting human rights and freedoms, European governments have declared zero tolerance towards extremist parties and movements. However, the European Council president, Herman Van Rompuy, recently issued a stark warning against growing nationalism, populism and anti-democratic forces, suggesting that the threat to peace in Europe remains a key issue.

Several EU member states have seen growing support for right-wing populist groups. Analysing the European elections in 2009, Waterfield claims that “as well as picking up two seats in Britain, anti-immigrant, extremist and previously fringe parties stepped into the political vacuum with significant gains in the Netherlands, Austria, Hungary, Finland, Greece and Romania”. Trends show that, amidst the current economic crisis, far-right extremist parties are exploiting the anti-immigrant, islamophobic and xenophobic card, and are playing an increasingly important role in government decision-making. As Goodwin notes in the ‘New British Fascism: The Rise of the British National Party (BNP) (Extremism and Democracy)’:

“contrary to assumptions in the 1980s and 1990s that the emergence of PEPs [populist extremist parties] in Europe could be nothing more than a flash in the pan, these parties continue to rally large and durable levels of support. They have joined national coalition governments. They have surfaced in countries with a tradition of extremist politics, as well as those that were previously thought immune. They emerged before the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the recent financial crisis.”

Even in Sweden, one of the world’s leading democracies, a far-right party won parliamentary seats for the first time in the 2010 elections. The Sweden Democrats (SD) – renowned for their anti-immigrant and anti-Islam views – received 6% of the vote, or 20 of the 349 seats. In the Netherlands, the two biggest winners in the 2009 European Parliament elections were the two most outspoken parties – Geert Wilders’ nationalist anti-EU party, and the firmly pro-EU social-liberal party, D66 (Kievit, 2009). Furthermore, in the June 2010 Dutch elections, Wilders’ party more than doubled its share, becoming the third largest party in the Dutch parliament. Ian Traynor argues that:

“Similar shifts have already occurred in Austria with the late Joerg Haider, with the Danish People’s party in Copenhagen, with the Northern League in Italy or the National Front in France, where the political mainstream has moved to the right to accommodate the extreme right and co-opt some of their supporters”.

The European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, claims that the growing popularity of xenophobic parties creates a negative environment, but that too few leaders are prepared to stand-up for diversity and tolerance. Indeed, several of Europe’s most influential leaders have made statements that multiculturalism in Europe is an unworthy and impossible project. Addressing a meeting of young members of her Christian Democratic Union in October 2010, Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, concluded that, “this [multicultural] approach has failed, utterly failed”. British prime minister, David Cameron, meanwhile, at a security conference in Munich in February 2011, stated that the “doctrine of multiculturalism” has failed in a Britain that encourages “different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream”. Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, went as far as to declare that multiculturalism was dead.

One problem is that many of Europe’s leaders have failed to identify deficiencies in the integration model they adopt. Referring to France, Chrisafis points out that:

“Under the republican model, multiculturalism is seen as taboo. In France, once a French citizen you leave cultural and ethnic differences at the border and are theoretically seamlessly assimilated into the republic. Everyone is equal before a state that is blind to colour, race and religion. Ethnic minorities do not officially exist as it is illegal to classify and count people by ethnicity. But the glaring gap between the theory and the reality of discrimination is becoming a problem in France.”

Claude Dilain, the Socialist mayor of Clichy, said the problems of marginalisation in diverse French suburbs had not been addressed and that more urban rioting could occur at any time. Following the terrorist attacks in Norway in July 2011, the leader of Germany’s center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), Sigmar Gabriel, stated that, “in a society where anti-Islam and the discrimination of others has become acceptable again, and in which the middle class applauds the likes of (controversial author) Thilo Sarrazin, there will naturally be lunatics on the fringes of society who feel legitimized in taking stronger action”.

As Lagendijk points out, a large majority of European citizens still do not vote for extremist parties. Mile Lasic, meanwhile, insist that, “we should ask ourselves whether possible answers are hidden perhaps in the complex EU’s political, cultural, and economic workshop in the form of a new political culture regarding the questions about prematurely proclaimed death of multiculturalism?”. Can indeed the EU provide a model for coexistence of different cultures, nations and religions?

Should the EU eventually disintegrates, it will be because of the dynamism and popularity of extreme rightist political parties and radical anti-immigrant movements, rather then because of the Eurozone’s problems. It is, therefore, more important for Europe to manage its cultural, national and religious pluralism than to focus all its energy on financial affairs. Whilst the economic crisis will bring negative material repercussions, the rise of extremist movements across Europe would only confirm Samuel Huntington’s thesis, outlined in the ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, that people’s cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post- Cold War era. Europe’s leaders and citizens must, therefore, explore new models of integration; otherwise the idea of multiculturalism as a universal ideal will be seriously challenged.

Bedrudin Brljavac is a PhD candidate at the department of political science at the University of Sarajevo. His doctoral project is titled, “The European Union as a Global Civilian Power (GCP) – its Impact on the Transformation of Modus Operandi of International Relations”. He has regularly written columns for national and international magazines and daily newspapers, such as Dnevni Avaz, Novi Horizonti, Turkish Weekly and Open Democracy.

This article is published as part of TransConflict’s Understanding Extremism initiative, further information about which is available by clicking here.

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It is the emergence of homogeneous thought and dogmatism – impermeable to dialogue with anyone perceived to be outside the group, and built around rigid understandings of identity and enmity – that fuels the threat of terrorism.

By Sara Silvestri

Whilst throughout the past decade European policy makers were occupied, rather obsessively, with the threats of ‘radicalisation’, ‘alienation’ and lack of ‘integration’ of Muslim youth, an ‘autochthonous’ Norwegian criminal was able to breed his evil plan and spread his propaganda unchecked. The events of last July have shown that it is possible for non-Muslim members of the so-called mainstream society to isolate themselves and to act as violently and indiscriminately as al-Qaeda.

For quite some time specialists and community activists had been concerned with the potentially dangerous consequences of right-wing views taken to the extreme, but these claims went largely dismissed. In Britain, for instance, it was only with the Government counter-terrorism strategy of 2009 that broader societal grievances and multiple forms of ‘radicalisation’ outside Muslim circles were acknowledged. These concerns were later downplayed in the new Contest strategy published only days before the Norway incidents proved the opposite.

The fear of Muslim ‘radicalisation’ has gone hand-in-hand with a discourse on the crisis of multiculturalism, a grievance that was also central to Breivick’s manifesto. This lament has certainly not been helpful in healing ruptured relations in our societies or in addressing the malaise provoked by social transformations. This language has probably provided ammunition for Breivick’s rationale and for connecting with like-minded people on the internet. Yet, it would be naïve to hold the anti-multiculturalism discourse responsible for ‘influencing’ people like the Norwegian killer, or to assume that everybody who is proud to be Christian or votes or sympathises for parties and movements on the right of the political spectrum are also potential killers.

Responding to crises through reifying categories and Manichean visions of the world is dangerous. There is no clearly definable or curable ‘pattern’ of radicalisation and I really doubt religion has anything to do with this. I repeated this endlessly in security consultations in the past, and I repeat it now. It is more helpful to think of the phenomenon as a process, which involves a rational choice and cannot be put down simplistically to factors such as religiosity, insanity, poverty or ‘lack of integration’: terrorism experts have conducted countless biographical examinations of convicted terrorists without ever finding clear profiles that would allow us to detect in advance the next likely perpetrator of a similar violence.

Rather than concerning ourselves with another debate on ‘multiculturalism’, ‘radicalisation’ or ‘extremism’, we ought to be alarmed by the spreading of enclosed exclusivist mentalities, of ‘tunnel thought’. Breivik’s reference to the golden past of Medieval Christendom chimes with the rhetoric of terrorist groups on the opposite side of the spectrum, who have been calling for the restoration of the Caliphate. Al-Qaeda and the Norwegian criminal have in common a dangerous mindset, despite purportedly professing ideologies at the opposite side of the spectrum. Commentators of Norway’s tragic events have compared al-Qaeda and Breivick’s tactics, weaponry, use of the internet and claims to a ‘religious inspiration’. Of course terrorists learn tactics from each other and tend to chose their targets selectively. Terrorists, however, seek above all publicity and taking human lives is only instrumental in their cold-blooded mind. They are focused on projecting a message of confrontation. The two plans are comparable not because of the use fertiliser to make bombs but because of the langue of hate towards an idealised ‘other’ and for the murderous intention to ‘correct’ the perceived corruption of society with an alternative Weltanschauung and political system. Beside the symbolic attack on the institutions of Norwegian society, the killing served to maximise media coverage and to attract public opinion.

The enemy we need to fight has no particular nationality, religious, cultural or political background – it is the emergence of homogeneous thought and dogmatism, impermeable to dialogue with anyone else perceived to be outside the lucky tribe, and built around rigid understandings of identity and of enmity. These mindsets have been spreading everywhere - from Europe to American, to Arab to Asian countries – regardless of religion, culture, education, and economic status. This is how al-Qaeda works, this is how Breivick and his fellow Templar Knights (assuming his claims of belonging to such a group are true) have been waging war to humankind and to the common good.

Sara Silvestri is a senior lecturer in religion and international politics, City University London

This article, which was originally published by UN Global Experts, is presented as part of TransConflict’s Understanding Extremism initiative, further information about which is available by clicking here.

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With on-line journalism increasingly fostering a spirit of intolerance and unaccountability, more effective regulation – including the licensing of on-line journalists - needs to be considered as a potential remedy to hate speech on-line.

By Dusan Babic

Though the democratic character of the Internet has long been considered as something inherent to it, its destructive potential has been widely ignored, or at least regarded as collateral damage. Regarded as an unregulated frontier due to its dichotomy – a global medium, yet locally regulated – there is limited data about the Internet’s real range and impact. What is clear, however, is that online journalism is already widespread and constitutes the very future of journalism.

It is widely recognized by media experts that neither media independence, nor ethics, can be measured. The same is true of the level of neutrality and degree of balance. What exists, however, is a journalistic driving force – bona fide, or good faith. Both journalists and media owners should strive to improve professional standards, media pluralism and independence.

The complexity of the media environment, particularly in the transition countries of south eastern Europe, makes it almost impossible to make a clear distinction between professional and unprofessional journalism. The crucial point is the public interest and the way a sound media environment facilitates the full exercise of the public’s right to know. Though commercial media needs to be profit-driven, it must be fully responsible to the public in order not to affect its long-term credibility. This is especially the case with online journalism.

A distinguished colleague, the late Claude-Jean Bertrand, developed the new concept of ‘media accountability systems’ (MAS) – or the “social responsibility” of the media – where ethics equals quality. Generally speaking, the region’s media is not led by ethics; whilst in online journalism, it is almost totally ignored.

This detrimental trend was the rational for an international conference on combating hate speech in south eastern Europe, entitled ‘Living Together’, held in Sarajevo in mid-November 2011; which was organized by the Council of Europe, the Press Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a self-regulatory body for print and online media, and the Association of Bosnia-Herzegovina Journalists (BiH Novinari).

Although the conference encompassed a wide range of issues dealing with hate speech – including legal frameworks in-line with European standards, national regulation and practice, and the role of self-regulation in combating hate speech – the prevailing conclusion was that the Internet was largely to blame for spreading hate speech.

In 2010, I conducted monitoring of hate speech on the most visited websites – colloquially called ‘portals’ – in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This analysis demonstrated that whilst there are glaring examples of hate speech, they are not yet a mass phenomenon. The situation has, however, deteriorated since then; both in terms of the number and extent of the examples of hate speech, mostly ethnically-motivated and a legacy of the wars of the nineties.

This study, entitled ‘The Internet – Freedom Without Boundaries?’, was a pioneering attempt to elucidate the basic trends concerning the range and impact of the Internet in the region. Over the centuries, it has become apparent that technology develops faster than the perception of its range and impact. This is particularly obvious with respect to media regulation, which significantly lags behind the pace of change, especially where the Internet is concerned.

Hate speech is real

There is no global definition of “hate speech”. What is prohibited in Europe, for example, such as denying the holocaust or propagating Nazism or Fascism, is permitted in the United States under the letter and spirit of the First Amendment. The Council of Europe defines hate speech as “all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.” Aside from child pornography, however, a consensus is unlikely to emerge about what constitutes illegal content, particularly where hate speech is concerned.

An additional problem is that legal provisions are often vague and open to wide or subjective interpretation. Differing views on the limits to freedom of expression have resulted in different legal responses to hate speech in Europe. According to some so-called ‘memory laws’, genocide denial, for example, constitutes a legal offense in some European countries. One should also not ignore the restrictive impact on press freedom of principles found in Article 10, Section 2, of the European Convention on Human Rights.

However, according to a new UN Report on Internet Regulation Around the World, only child pornography, incitement to violence or genocide and hate speech can be censored on the Internet. This classification additionally hampers efforts to combat hate speech effectively. Thus, how should these sensitive issues be addressed properly? Is self-regulation of online media the only remedy?

Self-regulation does not work properly

The very idea of self-regulation is rooted in the conviction that decision-making processes related to the media are extremely complex and, therefore, cannot be left to state bureaucrats, but instead require a specialized body of independent experts. Modern self-regulation is an American invention dating back to the twenties. The European model of self-regulation rests on a press council formula, which started in the fifties in Britain and, later, in Germany. Decisions made are based on a Code of Ethics for Journalists, but they are not legally binding. If a publication is criticized, for instance, it is called upon to publish the criticism, but it cannot be sanctioned if it refuses to do so.

In most European countries press councils have extended their remit, assuming responsibility for on-line publications too, provided they are of a journalistic nature. This is a contentious issue – how to draw a clear line between authentic journalism and its pseudo-forms which are so widespread in cyberspace? At the same time, it raises the question of who can be considered a journalist in the digital age?

The Press Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina, created in 2000, represents something of a success story in this regard. Since recently it also includes online publications, however, only a few of the most influential portals have joined to date. The Council was modelled on the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) formula, which itself is currently the subject of intense debate – about the need for its reform, its replacement with an effective self-regulatory body or even its abolishment – following the phone-hacking scandal.

It is increasingly apparent that self-regulation does not work properly, and with respect to online journalism it almost does not work at all. Many media experts argue, mostly off-the-record, that press councils should expand their mandate to include even imposing fines for blatant breaches of the Code of Ethics. Of course, this contradicts the core of self-regulation, meaning that it would then become more of a hybrid- or co-regulation system.

Globally, it is extremely difficult to envisage how modus operandi could be harmonized in order to combat online hate speech. The First Amendment to the US Constitution represents a safe haven for hate speech websites, whilst the prevailing sentiment in Europe is that it is up to citizens to decide what they wish to access and view on the Internet. Filtering of online content by governments is largely unacceptable, and should only be installed by users themselves. Any policy of filtering conflicts with the principle of free flow of information.

This is a paraphrased fragment from the 2005 Joint Declaration of the OSCE and Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), a Paris-based media watchdog, subtitled ‘Guaranteeing Media Freedom on the Internet’. Six years later, this document remains only a piece of paper. As mentioned above, the second paragraph, Article 10, of the European Convention on Human Rights, affords states a broader margin of appreciation, including exercising control over unsuitable content, which now implies dissemination through the Internet, in particular.

The OSCE Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media recently published a study of legal provisions and practices related to freedom of expression, the free flow of information and media pluralism on the Internet in OSCE participating states. The study focuses on Internet content regulation; a sensitive, complex and tricky issue. Basically, participating states decide what is legal and illegal, bearing in mind their “different cultural, moral, religious, and historical differences and constitutional values.” It was admitted in the study that “such state-level differences complicate harmonization of laws and approaches at the international level.” The spirit of the restrictive paragraph 2, Article 10, is reformulated as, “any restrictions need to be necessary in a democratic society, and the state interference should correspond to a ‘pressing social need’”. “Pressing social need” is, however, a very imprecise phrase, subject to broader interpretation and therefore to abuse by state authorities.

I am not, however, a press freedom absolutist. Freedom of opinion is absolute, but freedom of expression is not. More than a decade ago I publicly stated that the Internet cannot remain an unregulated frontier, adding that what is illegal in traditional media must be illegal online, since message matters, not the medium. Four decades ago, the Declaration of Journalists’ Duties and Rights was adopted in Munich. The document is widely known as the Munich Charter and is still considered the journalists’ Magna carta libertatum, with its ten duties and five rights clearly indicating the profession’s priorities. Unfortunately, this is not the case with online journalism, which is increasingly fostering a spirit of intolerance and unaccountability; a trend which is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

In 2004, I presented a paper, entitled “A Global Code of Online Journalism Ethics”, at a conference in Warsaw, “The Internet with A Human Face – A Common Responsibility”, organized by the Council of Europe. I knew perfectly well that my idea was unrealistic at the time; close to cyber-utopia, a term developed by the young and prolific Evgeny Morozov in his book “The Net Delusion: How Not to Liberate The World“. However, last year I discovered that my idea was partly embraced, with UNESCO sponsoring a process to develop a code of global information ethics. Despite being strongly contested by many media experts and journalists, in particular, the licensing of on-line journalists should be seriously considered as a potential remedy to instances of hate speech on-line.

Dusan Babic is a Sarajevo-based media researcher and analyst

This article is published as part of TransConflict’s Understanding Extremism initiative, further information about which is available by clicking here.

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Over twenty years on from the onset of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ted Lieverman explores the progress of Sarajevo’s recovery – or not – from the almost four-year long siege.

By Ted Lieverman

Downtown Sarajevo

The corner of Ulica Koturova, Sarajevo

Cemetery for the victims of the siege of Sarajevo

Commemorating Markale Market, where 68 people were killed in 1994

Sarajevo’s contemporary skyline

Markale Market today

The Latin Bridge, am Ottoman bridge over the River Miljacka

Ted Lieverman is a freelance photographer working on issues of conflict and social justice. His photos have been published by Consortium News, Global Post, and several legal publciations. He is a photographer for Northstar Productions in Fairfax, Virginia, and an associate producer for the documentary film ‘Guazapa: Yesterday’s Enemies’.

To view more of Mr. Lieverman’s work, please click here.

‘Sarajevo – beyond the siege’ is presented as part of TransConflict’s TransCulture initiative, which showcases efforts to explore and transcend conflict in the Balkans through a variety of cultural means.