Over twenty years on from the onset of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ted Lieverman explores the progress of Sarajevo’s recovery – or not – from the almost four-year long siege.

By Ted Lieverman

Downtown Sarajevo

The corner of Ulica Koturova, Sarajevo

Cemetery for the victims of the siege of Sarajevo

Commemorating Markale Market, where 68 people were killed in 1994

Sarajevo’s contemporary skyline

Markale Market today

The Latin Bridge, am Ottoman bridge over the River Miljacka

Ted Lieverman is a freelance photographer working on issues of conflict and social justice. His photos have been published by Consortium News, Global Post, and several legal publciations. He is a photographer for Northstar Productions in Fairfax, Virginia, and an associate producer for the documentary film ‘Guazapa: Yesterday’s Enemies’.

To view more of Mr. Lieverman’s work, please click here.

‘Sarajevo – beyond the siege’ is presented as part of TransConflict’s TransCulture initiative, which showcases efforts to explore and transcend conflict in the Balkans through a variety of cultural means.

Having achieved its aim of demonstrating that the northern resistance to the imposition of Pristina institutions is a genuine popular response, and not the result of criminal coercion, it is now time to reconsider the planned 15th February referendum.

By Gerard M. Gallucci

A few weeks back, I suggested that the controversy over the “referendum” called by the northern Kosovo Serbs was much ado about nothing. The four Serb-majority municipalities – after initial resistance in the DS-controlled assembly in Leposavic – had agreed to a vote in mid-February about whether they accept or not to be ruled by Pristina. The result would be a foregone conclusion but would have no practical effect. The northern leaders were not calling for a declaration of independence or separation from anything, but simply giving the local Kosovo Serb community an opportunity to clearly go on record and refute the accusations being flung at them that resistance to Pristina and the barricades against EULEX were just the work of “criminals” and “radicals.” I suggested the vote could simply be considered a poll.

Since then the controversy has continued with much of the pressure on the northerners not to carry out their plans coming from the Serbian government itself. Belgrade has told the northerners to cancel the referendum and said that holding it goes against broader state interests. The Tadic government has also suggested that those in the north pushing the referendum are doing so for political purposes. (Three of the four northern municipalities are held by opposition parties, with Leposavic being the exception, and it is likely that some of those behind the referendum do see it as a way of scoring political points against Tadic.) The Serbian parliament will consider the issue.

Some in the north believe recent severe electricity shortages and a delay in paying local salaries are also a form of Belgrade pressure. The Serbian government may be focusing now on getting the Leposavic municipal assembly to break ranks and cancel participation in the referendum, counting on that to stop the entire plan. The mayor of Leposavic reportedly announced Monday that the referendum should be immediately postponed.

It seems that some – in Belgrade and beyond – see in the referendum planned for February an echo of the series of referendums – from Slovenia in 1990 through BiH in 1992 – that ushered in the breakup of Yugoslavia. Belgrade is also anxious to meet the EU’s conditions for candidacy before the question is again taken up in March. The Quint is demanding that the barricades come down and the “parallel institutions” in the north be abolished. They seem to be leaving it to Tadic to interpret this as a demand that the referendum not happen as well.

All of this suggests that perhaps it might be normal to reconsider holding the referendum. Although the vote is just a kind of poll, it has been elevated into an important political fact by all those arranged against it. When facts change, it is wise to reconsider options.

The referendum was originally seen as a way to make the point that the northern resistance to imposition of Pristina institutions is a genuine popular response and not the result of criminal coercion. It seems to have already accomplished that aim. Only Pieter Feith and some extreme polemicists persist in calling the northerners criminals. KFOR has stopped calling the local municipal institutions “parallel.”

A far more important question is the upcoming elections in Serbia and whether they will be held in Kosovo or not. Tadic is trapped on this question. The Quint/EU would not like to see Kosovo included and Belgrade has noted it cannot hold elections there in places where there are no Serbs. To include the north and southern enclaves is the real issue. Tadic would love to please Brussels, but his hands are tied politically and constitutionally. It might be best for everyone to focus now on finding a formula for holding local elections this year that does not foreclose options for broader compromise solutions. The UN may be able to play a key bridging role here.

One more note. As the northerners have been refusing to drop the referendum, they have also been rejecting Tadic’s four-point plan – which still has not seen the light of day – for being a simple reiteration of the Ahtisaari Plan. This may be just a bargaining ploy as I know some of those doing the “rejecting” have actually been thinking seriously of the options. Finding a way to implement the Ahtisaari Plan in the north in a way acceptable to everyone – but especially to the northerners – might not be the best of all possible worlds, but it would be far from the worst.

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat and UN peacekeeper. He worked as part of US efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, South Africa and Sudan and as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and as Chief of Staff for the UN mission in East Timor from November 2008 until June 2010. Gerard is also a member of TransConflict’s Advisory Board.

To read TransConflict’s recently-released policy paper, entitled ‘The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo’, please click here.

To read other articles by Gerard for TransConflict, please click here.

To learn more about both Serbia and Kosovo, please check out TransConflict’s new reading lists series by clicking here.

To keep up-to-date with the work of TransConflict, please click here. If you are interested in supporting TransConflict, please click here.

Lucas Oldwine’s short film, ‘Syntagma’, explores the protests that gripped Athens in the summer of 2011; a vociferous and cohesive response against social injustices exposed and created by the economic crisis.

Background

Economic crisis can become the real ground for a real social movement in which opinions and viewpoints are shaped. In June 2011, hundreds of thousands of people of all ages, nations and social backgrounds gathered outside the parliament of Athens to protest against social injustice. For some it was simply a new experience or trend, while for others it became the only way to express themselves and demonstrate their stance.

The Balkans Beyond Borders Film Making Workshop in Athens was taking place during that time, giving ten young participants from throughout Europe the opportunity to shoot with their camera the real crisis as it was experienced in its heart, in the capital of Greece.

“For the protestors that decided to remain in Syntagma square there was no turning back, simply because there was nothing left to go back to. They were young students that lost their vision for the future anymore, unemployed, homeless immigrants and drifters. Joined by their common hope for change, they organized a tented community in the middle of the Syntagma Square”, says Lucas Oldwine, a participant of the workshop and creator of the film.

From the issue of crisis in all its forms, this year’s Balkans Beyond Borders Short Film Festival tackles the issue of multilingualism and communication in the region and beyond. The title of the Festival is “TALK TO ME”.

“TALK TO ME” is a call-to-action for young people to engage actively. It is about communication in all its forms: either through language or other means of expression. The Balkans are known for their culture, traditions and multilingualism so show us the Balkan diversity that surrounds you in your everyday life. Grab your camera and talk to your parents, your friends, your lover, your neighbour, your enemy, talk to the Balkans and talk to the world. Multilingualism and communication are around us and beyond us. Let them inspire you.

So don’t lose time and TALK TO ME

Young artists up to the age of 30 from the Balkan region and beyond (Southeast Europe) are once again invited to create their own short film related to this year’s topic. The deadline for submissions is 1st April, and the festival will take place in Tirana in May 2012.

The main objective of the project is to motivate young people to create short films through which they reflect on their region’s past, current and future situation. The aim is to get a better grasp of how they relate to communication in general, as well as to the region’s cultural and linguistic diversity.

Language – apart from being a means of communication – can be considered a means of identification. Our mother tongue shows who we are, where we came from. It is part of our identity.

‘Syntagma’ is presented as part of TransConflict’s TransCulture initiative, which showcases efforts to explore and transcend conflict in the Balkans through a variety of cultural means.

Self-congratulatory remarks by the International Civilian Representative for Kosovo juxtaposes oddly with demonstrations on both the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian sides that underscore that the situation is anything but normal.

By David B. Kanin

The substance of Pieter Feith’s comments last week is unimportant.  The attitude they represent matters more.  Kosovo now has been promised the chance of being declared “normal” by its erstwhile international supervisors.  Speaking for the 25-nation International Steering Group (USG), Mr. Feith, the International Civilian Representative for Kosovo (ICR) said the new state has made such progress that an end of the ISG-monitored “supervised independence”(is that not an oxymoron?) should be possible by the end of 2012.  The ICR solemnly declared that this happy event will “normalize Kosovo as a normal European state.” (Agence France Press, 24 January).

In the spirit of so many previous generations of Western imperial, mandatory, or trustee officials with vice-regal powers, the ICR awarded himself and his group credit for this happy event.  “Together with my colleagues, we have given the young state of Kosovo…a start in life.  We have established the institutions and now, from the end of the year, Kosovo will be like any other European state.” (Emphasis mine)  The ICR lay before Kosovo the prospect of coming closer to the European Union if it can build on its supervisors’ gifts, develop domestic institutions and serve as a stable, reliable partner in the region.

There exists an academic literature on the topic of how West Europeans since the Enlightenment have rationalized their self-asserted hegemony by relegating the status of whatever others they claim to supervise to rungs on an invented, asserted developmental ladder well below the exalted position of the civilized supervisors.  (Larry Wolff and Marco Cipolloni are two leading contemporary thinkers in the field.)  The ICR’s condescending rhetoric falls well within the universe of this scholarship and the pattern established by representatives of the Powers since the days of the 19th Century Concert of Europe.  The Council of Europe’s latest lecture to Bosnia falls in the same category.

Kosovo, however, is something of an anomaly.  The ICR’s insistence on repeating versions of the word “normal” underscores the point that the state/province is anything but.  It is one thing when all the Great Powers agree for a while on the diplomatic status, borders, government, and other aspects of a place on which they have imposed their writ.  It is another when this is not the case.  The usual rhetorical hyperbole does not wash when it serves ironically to underscore the contingency of an untenable status quo that satisfies no contestant.

I already have posted a comment on the shoddy US-led diplomacy that created the current diplomatic situation.  In this context, the ICR’s strange self-congratulations juxtaposes oddly with demonstrations on both the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian sides that underscore that the situation is anything but normal.  Washington’s failure to engineer an internationally agreed-upon replacement to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and decision to impose a unilaterally declared Kosovar state created a fragile, highly contested condition.  The continuing legal existence of the security annexes to 1244 gives Serbia a viable legal reed to rest on; the fact that 85 countries have recognized the state of Kosova despite 1244 puts boundaries on the reach of that resolution but does not give the new state more than partial international status.  This situation satisfies no one and so cannot constitute be a “final” status.

Therefore, neither Boris Tadic’s latest proposal, nor the Ahtisaari Plan it is drawn from, will lead to a lasting solution to the Kosova/o imbroglio.  Tadic knows this; his rhetorical posture is meant simply to attract the positive international attention he needs to gain the brass ring of EU candidate status, the key to his hope for an electoral victory this spring.  (When you read “Ahtisaari,” think “Invincible,” or “Vance-Owen.”)

The two protagonists are looking in opposite directions.  Those Serbs who cling to dreams of Kosovo gaze back to a largely invented past which involves the province as the heart of their identity.  Never mind that Serbs were on both sides in 1389, or that they have been leaving the place in large numbers at least since least the trek of the Vojvods at the end of the 17th century.  Forget that Kosovo and the modern Serbian were joined only from 1913 until 1999.  Tito’s territorial adjustments also can be conveniently forgotten.

More important, those Serbs seeking to re-impose themselves on a hugely Albanian place ignore (or excoriate) the many co-nationals living south of the Ibar who are adapting themselves to the reality of being a permanent minority in a foreign country.  It is easy for the heroes in the north to sing the old songs, throw rocks at and build roadblocks against ineffectual EU “rule of law” mavens and their KFOR protectors, and thumb their noses at a government in Belgrade they nevertheless rely on.  These public performances do nothing for the much more numerous Serbs living from day to day in Kosova.

As the ICR praised his performance, his ISG demanded that Serbia stop “interfering” and withdraw its clandestine security forces from Kosovo. (Reuters, January 24)  The ICR warned that the process of ending supervised independence should not be held hostage by the nasty things he said “continue to dominate the situation” in the north.  Good luck with that.

In contrast, the Kosovars are wrestling with a very fluid future.  Development of the nascent Kosovar state is part of the central question in the southern Balkans:  into how many states and under what political context will Albanians organize themselves?  The current status quo reflects temporal limnality – the eventual relationship among Albanians in Albania, Kosova, Macedonia, Montenegro, and the rump of Serbia remains an open question no matter Western rhetoric.  This context of contingency would not disappear even in the unlikely event that all these counties join the EU suddenly and soon.  The only constant – the communal and material heartbeat of the Balkans – is and will be the business done across the lines by patronage networks on all sides.

The recent demonstrations by Serbs living in the municipalities still making up a Serbian Kosovo and by Albin Kurti and Vetevendosja should be seen in this context.  The anger from both groups represent a combination of opportunity and fear in a situation where everyone knows someone eventually is going to force or negotiate another new “final” status.  Peoples in the Balkans have seen this before (often within a relatively short time after the supervising Power of the day has declared the extant political snapshot to be a permanent condition).  The Mayors in the north and those Kosovar Albanians desiring more than the sort-of state they now have are not marginal actors; they represent the larger knowledge that – one way or another – things are going to change.  Any citizens of the notional state of Bosnia paying attention to events farther south in the former Federation know the feeling.

While Kosovo’s Serbian mayors are attempting to restore a constructed past, Albin Kurti is a little ahead of himself.  Vetevendosje’s effort to stop – even temporarily – the import of goods from Serbia into Kosova had to fail.  It ignored both Kosova’s continued dependence on transportation routes going through the rump of Serbia and the likelihood that many Kosovars – like many in Serbia – do not wake up every day eager to fight.  Kurti overhyped his plans.  His actions were easily brushed aside.  The international overseers have no clue how to resolve Balkan disputes, but they do have the muscle to deal with direct kinetic challenges.

There will be further international lectures and local demonstrations.  States and their foreign supervisors will churn out elections and constitutions.  None will matter much.  Patronage networks (some are called “political parties”) will dole out the jobs and other forms of subsistence far more important to most peoples’ everyday lives.  The resulting inertia will reinforce cynicism in the region and frustration outside it.  The danger in this is that all of us are likely to be distracted by the minutiae this throws up and could be surprised when conditions or talented political entrepreneurs produce the next big change.

David B. Kanin is an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and a former senior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

To read other articles by David for TransConflict, please click here.

To learn more about the Balkans, please refer to TransConflict’s reading list series by clicking here.

To keep up-to-date with the work of TransConflict, please click here. If you are interested in supporting TransConflict, please click here.

With the ISG saying it plans to leave by the end of 2012, even whilst outstanding issues – including the north – remain, the UN must be prepared to play an essential buffering role between the two sides in the status dispute.

By Gerard M. Gallucci

The International Steering Group (ISG) met on January 24 in Vienna to consider its 2012 program for Kosovo. The forum issued a communique calling upon the government of Kosovo to continue to implement the Ahtisaari Plan, aiming to complete outstanding elements so that the period of “supervised independence” could terminate by the end of this year. The ISG reaffirmed its commitment to Kosovo’s “territorial integrity within its existing borders.” The ISG also called upon Serbia to “abide by its international commitments and refrain from interfering in Kosovo, including by withdrawing its police, security, and other state presences, and supporting efforts by international actors and the institutions of Kosovo to promote the rule of law.” The group also demanded that Belgrade “ensure that its local elections are not extended into northern Kosovo.”

The ISG has, in effect, demanded that Serbia pull out from Kosovo and assist in bringing the north under the administration of Pristina. It called the continued presence of Serbian institutions there “interference” and not in line with Serbia’s “international commitments.” Who is the ISG speaking for here? The answer can only be that it speaks for itself, a self-chosen group of 25 countries brought together – in another of those Bush-era “coalitions of the willing” – to legitimate Pristina’s unilateral declaration of independence.

The ISG does not speak for the international community and certainly not for the United Nations or the Security Council. It speaks for those countries – led by the Quint – that saw fit in 2008 to step outside UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and to take on the political and financial costs of shepherding the new state through a shaky start-up. Politically, the ride has been rougher than expected, with recognitions even now from less than half of the UN membership and many internal problems remaining. So now, the Quint is in a hurry to cut the costs and split. The ISG speaks very much for itself and certainly not for the people of Kosovo.

The ISG – really the US, Germany and Brussels – are tired of Kosovo and impatient to leave. This is dangerous. Being in a hurry may lead the Quint to make mistakes. Right now, Washington, Berlin and Brussels appear to be looking to diplomatic pressure on Belgrade. If Serbia’s president, Boris Tadic, wants EU candidacy enough, he’ll accept surrender on the ISG’s terms. Comments reportedly made by the EU’s enlargement commissioner, Stefan Füle, make that clear. He emphasized that Serbia’s chances to receive candidacy next month hinge on accepting further concessions in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and bringing down the barricades in the north.

What happens if the “diplomatic” pressures fail to produce the desired effects? It’s possible that recent British and French comments indicate a possible opening for a negotiated, compromise solution for the north. Is that opening real, however, or simply wheel-spinning till spring? The Self-Determination party is already adding to the pressure on the Kosovo administration to do something about the north by making it crack down against barricades in the south.

It must be clear by now that there is no military solution to the north. Any determined use of force against the northern Kosovo Serbs by anyone will likely lead to violence and partition. Tadic cannot make this any less so. The ISG saying it plans to leave by the end of 2012, however, implies a threat to ensure the implementation by then of Kosovo’s “rule of law.”

As noted previously, the end of “supervised independence” also raises another issue. If the ICO and EULEX leave or substantively end their missions while outstanding issues – including the north – remain, who assumes the essential buffering role between the two sides in the status dispute? This can only be the UN, which still has the peacekeeping responsibility under 1244. The UN should be developing plans now for a stepped up presence – including police – for the north. Without political agreement – discounting a simple breakdown into renewed war – it will still need to do what the Security Council sent it to Kosovo to do, keep the peace.

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat and UN peacekeeper. He worked as part of US efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, South Africa and Sudan and as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and as Chief of Staff for the UN mission in East Timor from November 2008 until June 2010. Gerard is also a member of TransConflict’s Advisory Board.

To read TransConflict’s recently-released policy paper, entitled ‘The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo’, please click here.

To read other articles by Gerard for TransConflict, please click here.

To learn more about both Serbia and Kosovo, please check out TransConflict’s new reading lists series by clicking here.

To keep up-to-date with the work of TransConflict, please click here. If you are interested in supporting TransConflict, please click here.

The recent “four-point proposal” by Serbia’s president, Boris Tadic, may provide the foundation for a lasting solution; one that could be accommodated within the framework of the Ahtisaari Plan.

By Gerard M. Gallucci

Perhaps the events of last year – Pristina’s failed attempt in July to seize the northern boundary and the mangled efforts by EULEX and KFOR to support that effort – have finally convinced at least a few of the Quint that force won’t work?  Recent statements by the UK and France (Italy already would go along with anything) indicate readiness to accept less than Serbia simply surrendering the north to Pristina.  The two EU members have greeted positively president Tadic’s recent “four-point proposal,” suggesting it could be accommodated within the framework of the Ahtisaari Plan.

Tadic suggested an approach leaving aside the question of Kosovo’s status but including a special solution for the Serbian Orthodox monasteries, special guarantees for the southern Kosovo Serbs, resolution of Serbian property claims and a special solution for northern Kosovo.  The British ambassadors in Belgrade and – more to the point – in Pristina both reportedly said the proposals are in-line with the Ahtisaari Plan and London supports the approach.  The French ambassadors to Belgrade and Pristina took the same line, reportedly suggesting that the proposals offer “a solid foundation” that “could open the door to a lasting solution.”

Both the French and British repeated the standing formula that Kosovo’s “territorial integrity” had to be respected.  The British – echoed by the US – reaffirmed the demand that the barricades in the north must come down, “parallel institutions” be dismantled and progress made in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.  The British statements, however, as reported, offer some interesting nuances as well.  The British ambassador to Belgrade reportedly clarified that the “parallel institutions” in the north were not expected to be abolished “soon” but would “begin to function properly in time.”  His colleague in Pristina noted that the Ahtisaari Plan provides for the formation of a new municipality for north Mitrovica and expressed confidence that “a number of issues regarding the north can be resolved by expanding the jurisdictions and responsibility, all in keeping with the Ahtisaari plan.”  ”In keeping” is an interesting formulation.  It is also heard that some in London have been studying the recent outline of how the Ahtisaari Plan might be implemented in the north.

The UK/France and US may be playing a variation of “good cop/bad cop.”  While the two EU members point to a possible Ahitsaari-based approach to the north, the US claims it has “no specific position” on the Tadic proposal.  The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, however, called Tadic this weekend and surely said something more than the publicly acceptable line about being ready to help Serbia and Kosovo “normalize” their relations.  The net affect may be to provide Belgrade space to engage on a “status-neutral” approach to Ahtisaari while also not fencing in too closely Pristina’s bargaining space.

On the ground, KFOR has stopped calling the local Serbian institutions “parallel” but has not given-up entirely trying to force EULEX past the barricades.  EULEX has itself still refused to commit to a status neutral approach to the boundary crossings (i.e., to not bringing Kosovo Albanian customs to the Gates).  NATO says it is helping to “create room” for a “political solution” for the north.  For such room to exist, everyone will have to be open to compromise and resist the temptation to force events by trying to bully the northern Kosovo Serbs into submission.  Has the Quint really taken on board that reality?

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat and UN peacekeeper. He worked as part of US efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, South Africa and Sudan and as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and as Chief of Staff for the UN mission in East Timor from November 2008 until June 2010. Gerard is also a member of TransConflict’s Advisory Board.

To read TransConflict’s recently-released policy paper, entitled ‘The Ahtisaari Plan and North Kosovo’, please click here.

To read other articles by Gerard for TransConflict, please click here.

To learn more about both Serbia and Kosovo, please check out TransConflict’s new reading lists series by clicking here.

To keep up-to-date with the work of TransConflict, please click here. If you are interested in supporting TransConflict, please click here.

The music of Johann Sebastian Bach, particularly his organ music, redresses the balance from a bleak view of human affairs to a saner and more hopeful perspective.

To help support the project, ‘Mediation through Monasteries in Kosovo’, you can bid for a signed-copy of Reverend Reeves’s autobiography.

By Reverend Donald Reeves MBE

During ten years of peace-building in the Balkans, I have been nourished by the music of Johann Sebastian Bach, particularly his organ music, which I perform. Playing his music is helping to change the ways in which I see the world. It redresses the balance from a bleak view of human affairs to a saner and more hopeful perspective.

Discovering the connections be­tween my work and the music I play is enriching because the music is im­measurably life-enhancing, satur­ated with images of hope. Peace-building is like a journey towards an ever-receding horizon. In this journey, we are called to imagine our­selves in a relationship with our enemies.

The fundamental inspiration for peace-building is found among those who take the risk of sitting together with their enemies.

Such lofty ideas informed my work in Bosnia, as a group of us encour­aged the rebuilding of a Sinan mosque in Banja Luka. This work was to be a sign of Muslim-Christian col­lab­oration. Now in Kosovo, we are be­ing invited to bring together Orthodox Serbs in the monasteries of Deèani and Pecææ with the Kosovo Al­banians who live around them. While involved in these tricky endeavours, I have persisted with Bach.

Listening to music is one thing; learning and playing is another; and performing yet another. After years of impatience with technical details, I am slowly realising that to overcome them is like opening a door to a house containing many treasures. As com­plex passages begin to feel more or less safe under fingers and feet, so more doors open, each one reaching deeper into the heart of the music, tracking the stream of Bach’s genius to its source.

In Albert Schweitzer’s study of Bach, published in 1911, he writes to those who are performing Bach’s cantatas: “Only he who sinks himself in the emotional world of Bach, who lives and thinks with him, who is simple and modest as he is, is in a position to perform him properly.” This is true for organists, too.

I am immersed in the 18 Leipzig Chorale Preludes. In Lutheran wor­ship, the congregation sit while sing­ing, and first listen to an improvisa­tion, which leads into the hymn. Bach inherited and extended this tradition.

The average length of each chorale prelude is five minutes. But they are miniatures in length only. The music is condensed and complex, but emotionally direct, speaking from the heart to the heart.

The music, like a mirror, reflects back with some clarity that hope which is essential in the long and difficult processes of bringing former enemies together. Hope easily evapor­ates; it steals away in the face of cynicism, apathy, and sometimes sheer wickedness.

Bach’s life was punctuated by the devastation of death. Orphaned at the age of ten, thereafter one member of his family died after the other. So much of his music expresses a long­ing for death, as if his death were a way of escaping his grief and of being reunited with those he has loved. I can relate this to the longing and hope for peace, for union with God.

Bach had a particular affection for the Gloria. Schweitzer wrote: “Bach never forgets the melody is supposed to be angel’s song.” Angels herald a new order. They are here, and then they are gone.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu once said: “Never underestimate a hand­shake.” When that happens it is a glimpse of such a new order. Two of the chorale preludes, inspired by the Gloria, are ravishing in their lightness and sparkle.

Others are exuberant, even defiant. A fantasia, celebrating the gift of the Spirit at Pentecost, is like a whirlwind, a breathless agitation of a 16-note figure. It ends with two flourishes of hallelujah, as if to say: “That’s that!” whatever the cynics might say.

Yet the music also reflects the despair and the tragedy of the human predicament. One of the chorale pre­ludes is a music drama: with searing chromaticism, it descends to the depths; then it opens up joyfully to a triumphant and spacious con­clusion, all within three pages.

Bach’s music is a testimony to the gift of hope. There is expectation and unfolding, as the music moves forward to a resolution. One setting of the Advent hymn “Come now, the heathens’ Saviour” is a heart-stop­ping meditation on the longing for the coming of Christ. The pedals de­pict a steady tread, leading the listener into the mystery of the incarnation, to that moment when heaven and earth are united, and peace, for a few seconds, becomes a reality.

At a presentation about the experi­ence of mediation to Soul of Eur­ope, the organisation I founded with a group of friends to help those in post-war situations, I described how the survivors of a killing camp at Omarska in north-west Bosnia — all Muslims — together with the Serbs who had run the camp, had agreed, after months of delicate, highly charged conversa­tions, on a memorial for those murdered at the camp.

At the end of this process, these former enemies came together to celebrate, and I then performed the chorale prelude: “Now thank we all our God”, an energetic, joyful piece.

A woman in the audience said afterwards: “As you played, I could just see all those people walking with flags and banners to the place where the memorial would be.”

Peace-building is not glamorous work. It demands boundless patience and persistence. Setbacks are fre­quent. The fundamental inspiration for peace-building is found among those who take the risk of sitting together with their enemies.

Bach’s music is also an inspiration. His elaborate counterpoint reflects the complexity of our endeavours, as his music weaves its way to a logical, simple, and graceful conclusion. That is why I enjoy learning, playing, and performing his music – while working for peace.

Reverend Donald Reeves MBE is the founder of the Soul of Europe. The Soul of Europe works as catalysts and mediators to ensure a peaceful resolution to conflicts, particularly in the Balkans.

To learn more about ‘Mediation through monasteries in Kosovo’, please click here.

To learn more about both Serbia and Kosovo, please check out TransConflict’s new reading lists series by clicking here.

To keep up-to-date with the work of TransConflict, please click here. If you are interested in supporting TransConflict, please click here.

Whether or not relations with Russia are an obstacle to Serbia’s EU integration will depend, in part, on the EU’s ability to find a solution that will allow it to integrate both Serbia and Kosovo.

By Milan Milenković

After Serbia finalized cooperation with the Hague Tribunal in July 2011, and following violence in Kosovo in the same month, the EU’s conditionality towards Serbia has crystallized. During her visit to Belgrade in August 2011, Chancellor Merkel stated that Serbia must abolish the so-called ‘parallel structures’ in north Kosovo, allow EULEX to operate undisturbed in the entire territory of Kosovo and to continue dialogue with Priština.

The Serbian authorities, however, almost unanimously rejected the condition to cancel the parallel structures that present rare symbols of Serbian statehood in Kosovo. Merkel’s visit reminded Belgrade that Serbia’s path towards the EU was paved with numerous conditions, of which certainly the most problematic was the issue of Kosovo. The message is increasingly clear – the EU will not import new problems. All EU member states support the current negotiations on technical issues between Belgrade and Priština, under the EU’s patronage. Serbia is aware that its slogan, “both Kosovo and EU”, may soon echo back as an official stand from the EU as “either Kosovo or the EU”; or in the most extreme case, “neither Kosovo, nor the EU”.

In relations with the EU and major EU states, the Kosovo issue is the biggest problem for Serbia’s integration process. At the same time, however, this issue provides a crucial political link between Serbia and Russia. Recent violent events in Kosovo proved once again that situation on the ground is controlled by NATO and the EU, while Russia excluded itself from this process after it had withdrawn troops from Kosovo in 2003. In spite of not having direct influence in Kosovo, Russia is a crucial ally in Serbia’s attempts to prevent Kosovo’s statehood.

Recognition of Kosovo by Serbia – bad news for Russia

During the process of determining Kosovo’s final status, Russia – openly invited to help its “Orthodox brother” – insisted that any solution had to be acceptable to both parties, not imposed, and would be applicable to other regions of the world. An imposed solution would be the legitimization of NATO’s 1999 intervention that Russia “had so vehemently opposed”. Russia itself, however, was indirectly affected because of its own restless regions and those in its “near abroad”, particularly those of strategic importance. By standing firm, Moscow was “upholding” international law, and reinforcing the role of UN Security Council, thereby achieving important foreign policy goals.

After major Western states largely ignored Russia’s position – primarily because they considered its opposition to Kosovo’s independence as a kind of bluff – Russia used the ‘Kosovo precedent’ in its own backyard by recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states in August 2008. During the conflict, and in the period immediately after recognition, Russian officials often mentioned NATO’s 1999 intervention and the unilateral recognition of Kosovo by major Western powers as a prime justification of its actions.

The importance of the brief August 2008 war for Russia is best described by Aleksandar Lukin, who argues that that the military action “has undermined the model of Russian-Western relations that arose in 1990s and created a new situation in the world – one real, rather than declared multipolarity”. Lukin added that this “new situation in Georgia” was also a “discouraging lesson for some countries” regarding their behavior toward Russia.

If Serbia recognizes Kosovo, Russian crucial political link to Serbia – as the main opponent to Kosovo’s independence – would disappear and also the claim that Russia had merely “copied” the West’s behavior toward Kosovo would be diluted.

Another reason for Russia’s interests in Serbia not being conditioned to recognize Kosovo is the question of Serbia’s membership in NATO. The unwritten rule that one post-communist European country must first join NATO and then enter the EU, could be made a condition for Serbia before joining the EU. On the other hand, once being left without any chance to keep Kosovo, the Serbian authorities might completely turn toward European integrations, meaning that NATO membership might become more realistic and attractive as kind of a shortcut to the EU. During his visit to Belgrade in March 2011, Putin threatened the Serbian political elite with a Russian reaction if Serbia joins NATO, using the same rhetoric of the “Russian missile threat” as he used to warn the Ukraine about the consequences of its possible NATO membership. Russian officials repeated several times that if Serbia joined NATO, Russia would recognize Kosovo.

This kind of strong objection is rooted in several facts. The first is certainly the year 1999 and NATO airstrikes of Yugoslavia. If Serbia would join NATO, it would definitely legitimize that intervention. Membership of Serbia in NATO might lead to another serious “cooling down” between the “Slav brothers”; one that would be even deeper than after 2000, but probably not as serious as it used to be in 1948. Another reason for Russia’s objections to Serbia’s NATO membership is that Serbian military equipment is of Soviet/Russian origin and needs to be modernized. In a document created by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, entitled “Programme for efficient use of Foreign policy on systematic basis as means for long-term development of the Russian Federation”, it was stated that Russia should continue its military-technical cooperation with Serbia.

The Konuzin effect

During the period of recent tensions in north Kosovo, Russia’s ambassador in Belgrade, Aleksandr Konuzin, stoked-up the anti-EU and anti-NATO mood. First, he described the actions of KFOR and EULEX as being part of “another huge anti-Serb campaign”, adding that the EU was blackmailing Serbia with Kosovo, and that its mission in Kosovo was “aggressively violating the international law and applying double standards in the implementation of the same principle”. Later on, in September, he held his now infamous speech at the Belgrade Security Forum, when he accused the Serbian authorities for being indifferent toward the issue of Kosovo, and that EU and NATO were opposing Serbia’s national interest.

Taking into account the public disposition in Serbia about European integrations, Konuzin picked the perfect moment to deliver the Kremlin’s message. In the last quarter of 2011, support for EU membership has never been so low; dropping below 50% in September for the first time since 2000. The Eurozone crisis, events in north Kosovo and the apparent conditioning of Serbia’s EU integration with the Kosovo issue will certainly not improve this percentage. Besides, it is not so difficult to trigger anti-Western sentiment in Serbia, with issues such as the ICTY, NATO airstrikes and Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence are sufficient for the “patriotically-orientated” part of the Serbian population to justify abandoning EU integration. Russian officials has used these sentiments quite well by always reminding about the 1999 NATO airstrikes, the unfairness of the ICTY towards Serbs and Russian support on the Kosovo issue.

How deep is Russian influence in Serbia?

Russia has a solid base from which to exert influence over Serbia, where public opinion considers Russia as Serbia’s main ally. Visits by the highest Russian officials always create more excitement than those from other states. A greater number of magazines in Serbia now write positively about Russia – its economic and political strength, cultural and religious heritage – whilst glorifying Serbian-Russian friendship throughout history. Political discourse is also very positive on Russia, especially from the parties to the right of the political spectrum, such as the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). Indeed, other parties – like the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and, in part, the Democratic Party (DS) – also share, but to a lesser extent, the tendency to evaluate cooperation with Russia as one of the most important priorities. Economic parameters show that Russia is the biggest import partner of Serbia, but also the country with whom Serbia has the largest trade deficit. Serbia is almost completely dependent on Russian energy, but they both share an interest in realization of the South Stream project.

Russian influence on elections was demonstrated during the extremey tight presidential elections of January-February 2008, when the Kremlin supported Boris Tadić because he was seen as a better partner for realizing Russian economic interests; namely, the energetic agreement that was proposed by Russia in mid-December 2007. Although the then leader of the SRS, Tomislav Nikolić, played the Russian card in campaigning, the Kremlin’s support went to his opponent. On that occasion, Putin sent Tadić a letter congratulating him on his fiftieth birthday, but also reminding him about energy-sector cooperation. This letter was used in Tadić’s election campaign as a clear sign of support from Putin. The signing of energy agreements between Russia and Serbia in Moscow took place between the two rounds of the elections, when besides Tadić and Koštunica, Putin and Medvedev were also present. This occasion definitely gave a small but much needed advantage to Tadić.

As in 2008, Moscow has its own calculations for the 2012 elections. On the third anniversary of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in Niš at the end of October, Ambasador Konuzin appeared and even gave a political speech, whose content can be characterized as open support for the SNS. It seems that Moscow would like to see Nikolić as a leading figure in the next Serbian Government that would be a reliable partner for equal – and even favourable – treatment of Russian capital and investments, a Government that would not pursue NATO integration, nor be ready to give up easily Serbian interests in Kosovo. The slogan – “both Kosovo and the EU” – on which Tadić won the 2008 elections today seems quite unrealistic, and the current Serbian authorities are sending signals that they might be prepared to reconsider it. On the other side, the SNS are employing a metaphor of Kosovo and the EU as two sons whom Serbia will never give up. So far, voices from Moscow are supporting this policy.

Brussels on the move

Though the attractiveness of EU integration in Serbia rises when there are signs of progress, the magnetism of membership has been seriously shaken by the EU’s internal crisis, events in north Kosovo and frequent statements from EU member states connecting further progress to the Kosovo issue. There is some kind of consensus among the main political parties about joining the EU, after Nikolić managed to diminish the SRS as an electoral force. Serbia is the EU’s backyard, rather than an EU exclusive zone, so the future of Serbia’s EU integration will depend mainly on Brussels, and less on Moscow.

The integration of Serbia and the issue of Kosovo are of a great importance for the EU, mainly because EU credibility to act on the global stage depends on its ability to resolve problems in its own backyard, and Balkan instability will definitely affect the EU’s own stability. On the other hand, the Western Balkans, and particularly Serbia, are far from the main priorities of Russian foreign policy. Another factor is that EU member states are the most important economic partners for both Serbia and Russia. Whether or not relations with Russia are an obstacle to Serbia’s EU integration depends upon the EU’s capacity for creating a solution that will integrate both Serbia and Kosovo, whilst not in the process humiliating Serbia, nor pressing Belgrade to join NATO. The EU, however, lacks such a grand strategy; using instead the same pattern of pressure and conditions “spiced” with some “carrots”. Unfortunately the EU doesn’t have a coherent foreign policy, and most of the gaps that appear in relations with Belgrade will be filled with additional Russian presence in Serbia and beyond.

Milan Milenković holds MA in International Relations acquired at the University of Bologna and the Saint Petersburg State University (Interdisciplinary Research Studies on Eastern Europe – MIREES program). Also he graduated International Relations from the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade and graduated at the Department for Advanced Undergraduate Studies – “The European Union and the Balkans Programme” of Belgrade Open School.

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The departure of EULEX from Kosovo would leave a vacuum in the international framework for rule of law which – in the absence of changes to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 – the UN would be required to fill.

By Gerard M. Gallucci

The Kosovo government has begun pressing its internationals – the five Western powers that supported its unilateral declaration of independence, the Quint – to get ready to leave by telling them this is the last year of “supervised independence.”  This would entail the departure of the European Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) and the International Community Office (ICO).  EULEX, however, also exercises the UN’s rule of law mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.  If it leaves, who take that over?

Kosovo’s prime minister, Hashim Thaci, started the debate over the future of the international missions at the turn of the year by suggesting it was time for “complete independence.”  It may be that his comments were in hope of future electability but they have sparked further discussion against the backdrop of already announced ICO plans to wind down its mission this year, and the planned departure of US NATO forces in 2013.

The ICO has long been moribund and its departure would be hardly noticed by anyone.  The bigger question is EULEX.  The Kosovo government apparently sees its role being reduced to dealing with war crimes and international crime.  Pristina sees itself taking responsibility for justice and policing with little need for EULEX.

EULEX has responded to the current speculation by noting that while a “strategic review” is taking place on its future, “no decisions have been made regarding any future, potential re-shaping of the mission.”  EULEX chief, Xavier de Marnhac, is quoted as saying that any decision would have to be approved by EU members.

A potential decision to withdraw international supervision of Kosovo raises various issues, including whether Kosovo can indeed stand on its own at this point, whether the existing elements of minority protections and participation south of the Ibar would be maintained without international supervision and how any changes could be squared with the continued existence of UNSCR 1244.  To be sure, some actors – certainly the Kosovo Albanians and the US – do not see the continued relevance of the UN mandate for Kosovo.  That mandate still exists, however, and has the force of international law (as confirmed by the ICJ in 2010).

The continued relevance of 1244 is most specific in the area of rule of law.  In November 2008, the UN Security Council allowed the Secretary General to transfer UNMIK’s responsibility for rule of law in Kosovo to EULEX.  Under the accepted terms, EULEX was to take the place of UN police and justice and act in a status neutral fashion.  EULEX has not generally acted in a status neutral fashion but it does represent at present the sole international element linking the local justice and police functions exercised in northern Kosovo to a Kosovo-wide framework.

The EULEX statement on its “strategic review” makes no mention of the need to also consult with the UN.  If EULEX simply exits Kosovo, there would be a vacuum in the international framework for rule of law.  Pristina might wish to fill that space but without any agreement with Belgrade and local Kosovo Serbs, that probably would lead to conflict.  Without some agreed formula for the north, if no one took EULEX’s place, that would be a form of partition.

Without modifying or replacing UNSCR 1244, the responsibility for rule of law in Kosovo – and most specifically in the north – would revert to the UN should EULEX leave.  This might mean the need to return UN police and judges to the north.  Many might view this situation as difficult to accept.  The Quint’s unilateral decision to impose Kosovo independence in 2008, however, left a host of difficult and unsettled questions.  It would be unfortunate if the Five decided they didn’t exist and simply departed.  It would be even worse should the Quint and its agents – KFOR and EULEX – seek again to try use of force after the winter snows clear.

Some in the Pristina media are speculating that Serbia’s president, Boris, Tadic may seek to help the Quint meet Thaci’s deadline by somehow removing the barricades and replacing the “illegal” municipal leaders.  Some are still wringing their hands over the “refendum” called for February.  However, there are also signs the UK and perhaps even the US are open to some “broader” Ahtisaari Plan for the north.  In any new compromise approach to the north, however, the UN may still have a role.

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat and UN peacekeeper. He worked as part of US efforts to resolve the conflicts in Angola, South Africa and Sudan and as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008 and as Chief of Staff for the UN mission in East Timor from November 2008 until June 2010. Gerard is also a member of TransConflict’s Advisory Board.

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The process of ethnic-nationalization witnessed in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina is incompatible with the very norms, values and conditions of European membership.

By Bedrudin Brljavac

“I have been thinking about the notion of perfect love as being without fear, and what that means for us in a world that’s becoming increasingly xenophobic, tortured by fundamentalism and nationalism”

Bell Hooks

According to the European Commission’s Monitoring Report for 2011, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress in EU reforms lags behind that of other countries in the Western Balkans. Since the end of the war, the country’s ethnic politicians – returned in each election except 2000 – have paid insufficient attention to European integration reforms, focusing instead on securing short-term ethno-nationalist interests. In other words, for the ruling nationalist elites, the EU integration project imposes high adoption costs because it undermines their own power bases, which are entirely built on the predominance of ethnic identity. As Chivvis and Dogo point out, relations between the three ethnic groups are more polarised than at any time since the fighting ended. In short, Bosnia risks falling out of step with its neighbours and missing the train to Europe. A return to violence remains possible, but is not likely. The process of substantial ethnic-nationalization is, however, incompatible with the process of Europeanization.

Bosnia’s Europeanization process

Although the EU played an extremely passive role during the war, despite it being a close neighbour, it has since developed a more strategic approach towards the western Balkans. This integration shift emerged with the EU’s clear 1999 commitment towards the region’s EU membership, primarily through the Stabilization and Association Process. SAP has been a fundamental force for integration with EU member states. The main objective of the SAP is to strengthen democratic transition by implementing substantial political, legal, and economic reforms. Following successful and effective reforms in a variety of spheres (democracy, rule of law, education, economy, media, and administration), Bosnia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in June 2008. The SAA is a pre-accession tool designed as a first step towards eventual EU membership (Vucheva, 2008). The previous EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn called it, “a milestone that marks a new stage in our relations” and “a gateway for [EU] candidacy.”

For more than a decade, Bosnia has been going through a deep and all-embracing modernization and transformation process, widely referred to as “Europeanization”. Even though it is not an easy task to make a proper definition of the term, ‘Europeanization’ is often used in studies and explanations of the influence and impact of the EU on the domestic political, legal and economic structures of aspiring members. Thus, Radaelli argues that, “Europeanization consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies”.

Bosnia is currently one of the potential candidate countries, with aspirations to join the political and economic structures of this supranational organization. While the country is supposed to be going through this deep transformation process, adopting EU legal norms or the acquis communautaire, it is instead much more intent on pursuing its massive ethno-nationalist projects and preserving short-term ethnic interests; which could ultimately revive some of the terrible inter-ethnic conflicts from the early nineties.

Ethno-nationalisation

However, the Europeanization process the country has so far undergone has not amounted to a significant democratic transition, creating social cohesion and economic well-being. What’s more, there has been a rising chorus of opinion among the ethnic political elites and hard-liners which has turned towards the political and legal model based fundamentally on ethno-nationalistic divisions. These now constitute systemic attempts to make changes in political, legal, and economic governance based upon ethno-nationalist principles and norms of ethnic exclusion. As Asim Mujkic puts it:

“I call a community characterized by the political priority of the ethnic group(s) over the individual that is implemented through democratic self-legislation, and a community characterized by the political priority of the ethnic group’s right to self-determination over the citizen’s right to self-determination where the citizen’s membership in a political community is determined by her or his membership in ethnic community, Ethnopolis. And I call the political narrative and practice intended to justify this ethnically-based social construct, ethnopolitics.”

Thus, the public sphere in Bosnia is almost completely dominated by an ethno-nationalist dynamic of chauvinistic discrimination. Atajic further explains, “everything – from the greeting you use to the dialect you speak and the newspaper in your coat pocket – is judged, commented upon and categorized in terms of an omnipresent, mythicized ‘ethnicity’. Under such circumstances, defining oneself as a citizen of the BiH state is tantamount to a betrayal of one’s national identity” (2002:118).

The best example is the insistent attempts to establish a third federal unit or entity in the country, in which Bosnian Croats would constitute the majority. Despite the fact that some ethnic communities are discriminated against in certain parts of the country, it is hard to accept the proposal that one ethnic group should realize its democratic rights through attempts at ethnic apartheid. Keeping in mind the fact that each political project of territorial separation in the early nineties after the dissolution of Yugoslavia has resulted in massive ethnic cleansing, it is essential to search for a political and legal governance model which will be built on democratic principles of multi-ethnic coexistence and social inclusion. Any new effort in the direction of a partition of Bosnia would restart war, precipitate ethnic cleansing, and cause untold human suffering.

Ethno-nationalist segregation in Bosnia can only lead to the serious marginalisation of the universal values of tolerance, dialogue and trust, whilst increasing ethnic homogenization is swiftly dissolving the very idea of state citizenship itself. Public discourse in BiH is to a large extent marked by the domination of the so-called ‘constituent nations’, thereby openly discriminating against citizens of the so-called ‘Others’, who are minority groups in the country. The most stark example of this is the case of Jews and Roma, whose members are legally not allowed to exercise their legitimate rights and freedoms. Although Bosnia joined the Council of Europe on 24th April 2002, there has been increasing discrimination against minorities in the country. Citizens from minority communities – such as Roma, Turks or Jews – are granted only a limited degree of freedom and self-administration. The post-war political and social space has been largely dominated by three ethnic groups, leading to the institutional marginalization of minority groups and their members.

In post-Dayton Bosnia the majority of citizens are in a position of homo duplex, or a divided humanity, since they are in a struggle between being a genuine human being and a loyal ethnic being. In fact, political space has become limited and ever more unwelcome for groups such as those who see themselves as Yugoslav, Bosnian and so forth. As Touquet and Vermeersch point out:

“These people have now been excluded from mainstream accounts of the outcomes of the recent conflict: it is not possible to be a Yugoslav, a Bosnian or an Eskimo in a situation in which ethnic nationalism has transcended all else and in which there are intensely localized variations in identity and ‘national’ sentiments”.

What’s more, the paradigm of ethnic-nationalism in BiH completely predominates over the principle of citizenship, as the idea of nationalist collectivity has supremacy over a democratic model based upon individual rights and freedoms. Indeed, the social supremacy of collectivity over individual action is resulting in the steady, deep ghetto-isation of the three ethnic communities, paving the way for a regime in which members of different ethnic communities live side-by-side but still profoundly alienated from each other. Pasic argues that, “not only are there physical entity and cantonal borders, but ethnicity is also institutionalized in all aspects of political life in BiH. The ethnic segregation is evident when it comes to living areas, government, voting, education and even languages, and what is intelligible”. As a result, separated territories – or ethnically pure “ghettos” – have developed (Flottau and Kraske 2005), thereby seriously undermining the idea of unity in diversity.

It is important to note that widespread ethnic and religious polarization has been proven to increase the risk of civil war. From the signing of the Dayton accords, local politicians and the media have, from time-to-time, mentioned war as a possible option (Whitlock, 2009). Although such a terrible scenario currently seems unreal, fifteen years into the peace-building process, local hard-liners can and do invoke the military option when they feel it necessary. In fact, most wars in the world have started because of the short-sighted ideological and political interests of political elites. As we know too well, once the atmosphere of fear and mistrust has been created, it is not difficult to push ordinary people into war. This is why it is so important that local political elites dedicate their political will towards developing policies and legal structures which will ensure the same rights and obligations for all citizens of Bosnia.

Post-war Bosnia has largely been closer to a process of ‘Balkanization’, which is understood as contrary to what may be deemed ‘western’ norms and values. In fact, domestic factors have largely contributed to the EU’s failure in Bosnia. The consociational model established by the Dayton Agreement, with its multiple veto points and recalcitrant nationalist elites, has hindered EU-led reforms.

It is easy to understand that ethnic elites repeatedly use the card of inter-ethnic fear in order to win elections and continue their ‘nationalistic hegemony’. Most Bosnian political leaders are aware that Europeanisation will not bring them the votes of their respective ethnic groups. However, paradoxically, a majority of Bosnian citizens from each of the three ethnic communities strongly supports the country’s path towards the EU, whilst still preferring the ethnic-nationalist programmes of the political elites. As the ethnic-nationalist model of policy-making has not worked for the previous twenty years of democratic transition, it is obvious that Bosnia must look for an alternative model of governance.

The Integration of European countries

As a possible model for Bosnia’s ethnic groups, it is important to remember how six European countries decided to establish the European Community (from 1991, the EU) in the aftermath of the second world war, aimed at preventing further nationalistic projects across Europe. Following one of the most devastating wars in history, Europeans agreed to build an ‘Even Closer Union’ between European states. The transformation was to be developed through a process of ‘evolution by which formerly hostile nation states would be drawn together until they could become integrated in a single political, economic and social entity’. Although EU states have recently been confronted with a deep financial crisis, the idea of European integration is a good example of a form of organization which tends to create a stable and secure supra-national community through political, economic and legal integration. Due to its capacity to transform state sovereignty and its integrating potential, the EU is often perceived as the perfect example of cosmopolitanism in practice (Rifkin, 2004).

The present-day image of the EU, rather far from resembling the original idea of a federation, can neverthless be defined as a ‘political, economic, social and legal hybrid with a combination of federal, confederal, supranational and intergovernmental features’ (Winer, 2004: 40). Political integration among the EU states has deepened to such an extent that European leaders accepted, with the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the idea of European citizenship.

The idea of European citizenship creates the right for citizens of EU member states to vote in whatever EU state they find themselves at the time of European Parliament elections. As Fligstein (2008: 139) argues, people will “come to see each other less as Italian and French, and thus foreign, and more and more as sharing common interests, a process that eventually will lead to seeing themselves more as Europeans and less as having merely a national identity”.

Although European the integration model has its shortcomings and deficiencies – such as the powerful role of its richer countries such as France and Germany – it is currently the best political model of a supranational character with the potential to reduce nationalist animosities and increase levels of solidarity. The core supranational bodies of the EU are just as necessary as ever.

It is now critical that political elites in Bosnia do as Schumann, Monnet and Adenauer did in the past, and bravely accelerate a European integration process that can make the country part of a democratic and free Europe. The choice is increasingly between a form of ethnic apartheid that is likely to result in a new ethnic conflicts or a European democracy which can guarantee long-term political stability and peaceful coexistence.

Bedrudin Brljavac is a PhD candidate at the department of political science at the University of Sarajevo. His doctoral project is titled, “The European Union as a Global Civilian Power (GCP) – its Impact on the Transformation of Modus Operandi of International Relations”. He has regularly written columns for national and international magazines and daily newspapers, such as Dnevni Avaz, Novi Horizonti, Turkish Weekly and Open Democracy.

This article is published as part of TransConflict’s new initiative, ‘Bosnia’s Future on the Future of Bosnia’, further information about which is available by clicking here.

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