Josip Glaurdic responds to a review of his new book, ‘The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia’, by David B. Kanin, whose own response is also presented below.
By Josip Glaurdic
The twentieth anniversary of Yugoslavia’s breakup came and went without nearly the attention it warranted in the West. Perhaps that is fitting for the crisis which was originally allowed to simmer and boil over by the neglect of the Western powers. My book, ‘The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (Yale University Press, 2011)’, was an attempt to change that trend of indifference, so I am particularly grateful to Prof. Kanin for “lending me a hand” with his thoughtful and knowledgeable review. I am also grateful for his praise, but – in the good tradition of review responses – I have decided to move straight to his substantive critique. After all, that is the best way we can build a constructive dialogue and learn from each other.
It would perhaps be most useful to begin with Prof. Kanin’s suggestion that my analysis lacks “an assessment of why whatever forces – whether military, liberal, or ideologically ‘Yugoslav’ – failed to coalesce as events spun downward.” This is a very good question, which we can answer only after answering two related questions – which (credible) forces are we talking about and when?
If we are talking about the period between the decision of Slobodan Milosevic to marry his brand of socialism with Serbian nationalism sometime in mid-1987 and the collapse of the League(s) of Communists and its/their various defeats at the polls in 1990 – then my book answers that question at least implicitly because it deals extensively with the only credible force that could have stopped Milosevic’s march: the League of Communists itself. The book, thus, discusses the reasons why the rest of the Communist elite failed to collectively respond to Milosevic’s ousting of Ivan Stambolic (they did not want to meddle in Serbia’s internal affairs and they thought Milosevic was just a grey, controllable bureaucrat); it explains why nothing was done once the rallies of the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” started in Serbia (again, because it would have been meddling in the internal affairs of Serbia, because all republican Communist elites used their own nationalisms for the purposes of mobilization, and ultimately because some of them – like the JNA and Macedonia, for example – actually agreed with Milosevic); it suggests a set of plausible explanations for why what was done was done once the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” started to spill over beyond the borders of Serbia (new and weak Communist leaderships in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, miscalculations and spinelessness on the federal level, etc.).
Ultimately, however, the main point is that the Yugoslav Communists were deeply divided over what really constituted a “Yugoslav” platform and, besides, they derived their legitimacy from within their republics. For, say, the Croatian Communist leaders of 1989 – who were all of clearly Yugoslavist orientation – to reach out to someone beyond the borders of their republic in order to build an anti-Milosevic coalition, they would have needed courage, enough likeminded partners, an institutional pathway to oust Milosevic, and real payoffs for such a move in the form of increased legitimacy of their rule. They had none of that. As my book demonstrates, their feeble – but still clearly Yugoslavist – response to Milosevic’s campaign was actually the reason for their electoral defeat.
If, on the other hand, Prof. Kanin’s question is referring to the period between the downfall of the League of Communists in early 1990 and the breakup of the country and war in the second half of 1991 – then the answer is slightly different, partly because we are dealing with different actors, and partly because of increased importance of international signals to the Yugoslav players. As my book argues, the only scenario for a possible survival of the Yugoslav state during this period was dependent on the success of the federal government of Ante Markovic, which commenced its program of shock therapy in December 1989, and the success of the plan for the Yugoslav confederation officially proposed by Slovenia and Croatia in the fall of 1990. Since Prof. Kanin devotes some attention to my treatment of both Markovic and the confederal proposal, it may be useful if I answer his aforementioned question by responding to his critique of how these two episodes were dealt with in my book.
Prof. Kanin suggests that I am minimizing the role Ante Markovic played during this period, that I am ignoring his popularity, devaluing the success of his reforms, and taking him to task for “joining Milosevic in condemning Slovene and Croat movements toward independence after the disastrous Congress of Yugoslavia’s League of Communists in January 1990.” However, none of those suggestions are correct. Ante Markovic gets an extensive treatment in my book, from his appointment in early 1989 and the creation of his economic program (pp. 61-66), to his failure to get Western support (pp. 67-69, 80-81, 121-122), his participation in the elections of 1990 (pp. 102, 115), or his role in the war in Slovenia (pp. 169-170, 173, 177-178, 191-192). I also explicitly mention the level of his popular support (p. 120, p. 344n3). And I treat his reforms fairly, in light of their actual success as measured by a variety of economic indicators (presented in Table 5.1 on p. 122) and in light of the response they garnered in the West. Interestingly, I am not the one who termed Markovic’s reforms “illusory”, as Prof. Kanin suggests. It was the CIA, whose National Intelligence Estimate from October 1990 (and which I quote on p. 109) claimed that the reform achievements of Markovic’s government were “mostly illusory”.
As far as taking Ante Markovic to task is concerned, I take Yugoslavia’s last prime minister to task for three things: for harbouring irrational hopes throughout the crisis that the West would bail him out (p. 68), for aiding and abetting the Yugoslavist wing of the JNA in the war in Slovenia, and for the obstructive role his government played in early Western diplomatic efforts during the war in Croatia (as, for example, in the efforts of the CSCE, p. 187). Those criticisms aside, however, I clearly acknowledge the federal prime minister as “the only political actor who presented a pan-Yugoslav alternative to Milosevic” at the turn of the decade and as someone who may have had a chance to neutralize the Serbian leader (p.69). The problem for Markovic, however – and here lies the answer to Prof. Kanin’s question of why pro-Yugoslav forces did not coalesce around the federal prime minister – is that his reforms were doomed to fail without real financial assistance from the West – assistance Markovic never received.
One could also take Ante Markovic to task – though I do not do that in my book – for failing to support the confederal proposal of Slovenia and Croatia, which was officially presented in October 1990. Prof. Kanin suggests that the confederal proposal was not a truly workable plan, but merely a “slogan” which fooled some Westerners. He also suggests that the Slovenes were not intent on reforming Yugoslavia into a confederation, but were only interested in keeping their money. Moreover, Prof. Kanin questions not only whether the Slovene Communist leadership was committed to the idea of a Yugoslav confederation, but also whether it was committed to the idea of liberal democratization, and he asserts I provide no evidence for such claims in my book.
It is certainly true that the bulk of national/nationalist mobilization in Slovenia in the late 1980s, which was condoned and even fostered by the republic’s Communist leadership, was centred on Ljubljana’s financial contributions to the federal budget. This is hardly surprising, considering the economic environment of extreme austerity akin, perhaps, to what Greece has to go through today. To say, however, that the Slovenes wanted to keep more of their money and that they were committed to the idea or reforming Yugoslavia along confederal lines is not mutually exclusive. On the contrary: the confederation was exactly the institutional device which was – among other things – to allow the Slovenes to keep more of their earnings at home. Whether the confederal proposal of October 1990 was practicable or, as Prof. Kanin suggests, “there is no evidence the Slovenes or anyone else actually considered how such a construction would work” is debatable. The proposal was modelled on the European Community and contained a number of different options which were ultimately to be agreed upon in peaceful negotiations of all six republics. The main point is that this platform for negotiations did not “fool” any Westerners, as Prof. Kanin suggests. As my book demonstrates, the confederal proposal was met with basically uniform derision and disregard from the West in late 1990 and early 1991 (pp. 123-124, 137). Only after the Belgrade protests of March 1991 and the violence in Croatia later that April and May, did the Western governments begin to signal their possible acceptance of a confederal reformation of Yugoslavia, but by that time it was too late. It is rather ironic that a number of provisions of the confederal plan found their way into the proposals of the Carrington Conference in the fall of 1991 – after thousands of dead and wounded, and several hundred thousand refugees in the war in Croatia. Had the confederal plan received Western backing and diplomatic involvement in the fall of 1990 when it needed it, it is entirely possible that war could have been avoided, and that some semblance of a common Yugoslav structure could have been preserved.
When it comes to the question of evidence of Slovenia’s commitment to liberal democracy and to Yugoslavia’s confederal future, I can only recommend that Prof. Kanin re-reads the relevant chapters of my book. Is the fact that the leaders of the Slovenian League of Communists took Mladina’s side in its clash with the JNA in 1988 (pp. 27-29) not evidence of their clear choice to defend that quintessentially liberal idea of the freedom of the press? Are the Slovenian constitutional amendments of 1989, which abandoned the Party’s leading role in society and extended the rights of Slovenian citizens in areas such as freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, right to privacy, and freedom for organized participation in politics (pp. 54-56), also not evidence of a commitment to a liberal-democratic transformation? Is the fact that the Slovenian state-run media and the still ruling League of Communists supported Markovic’s reform program in spite of, as the Ljubljana daily Delo put it, the federal prime minister’s “inability to resist the discreet charms of centralization” (p. 65), not evidence of Slovenia’s commitment to a common Yugoslav future? Is the official platform of the League of Communists of Slovenia for the Fourteenth Congress of the federal Party organization, which – in the words of Milan Kucan – was the platform “undoubtedly for Yugoslavia: a voluntary state of equal republics, free and equal nations, a democratic community of free citizens which measures its socialist content and existence by the criteria of a European quality of life… not a Yugoslavia as an extended Serbia to which – according to its wishes – others can be joined” (p. 70) – is this platform not evidence of a still-present commitment to Slovenia’s future in a reformed and democratized Yugoslavia? Are the proposals put forward by the Slovene delegation at the Fourteenth Congress, which included a series of human rights amendments such as the ban on political trials and torture, and which were defeated by Milosevic’s sizeable bloc in the Party (p. 71), not a sign of the commitment of Slovenia’s Communists to liberal democratization? Last, but not least, is the fact that Slovenia was the first republic to call and hold democratic elections, after which the ruling Communists peacefully surrendered their political offices, not evidence of a commitment to liberal democratization? Prof. Kanin is certainly correct in stating that the Slovenes used their financial upper hand in an attempt to negotiate a better deal with the federal centre and that they had used it for years. They were, however, hardly alone in employing such methods.
The case of Slovenian liberalization and democratization is a good introduction to my response to another important critique by Prof. Kanin – the one regarding my supposed inaccurate use of the term Realpolitik to describe the policies of the Western powers. Prof. Kanin uses the example of Bismarck and his ability to mould the European order according to Prussia’s interests to draw a distinction with the Western leaders of the 1980s and 1990s who were operating “in the thrall of inertia”. None of them, as Prof. Kanin argues, deserve the same label of Realpolitiker that belonged to a statesman such as Bismarck.
It is interesting that Prof. Kanin uses Bismarck’s example to challenge my use of the term Realpolitik, because it was exactly the old Chancellor who was often quoted by the Western anti-interventionists who argued – as he did a century earlier – that “The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.” This quote indeed captures the essence of Western Realpolitik when it comes to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Political realism in international relations is primarily concerned with power (derived from military or economic capacity) and the pursuit of stability. It has no place for ethical or ideological concerns. So, what would the quintessential Realpolitiker have done, had he been in some position of power in the West and confronted with the Yugoslav crisis? Well, he would most likely have noted the dwindling importance of Yugoslavia in the European geopolitical system of the late 1980s and he would have wanted it to remain quiet in order to devote his attention to more pressing interests further up north. He would have had little understanding for the liberalization and democratization agenda of Yugoslavia’s north-western republics, or for the clamouring for human rights by the Kosovo Albanians. He would, on the other hand, most likely have supported those who claimed to be fighting for the country’s preservation and centralization, especially since they happened to be wielding the biggest stick.
As my book repeatedly demonstrates, that was exactly the policy pursued by the Western powers until real war broke out in the summer of 1991. Inertia did play a large role, as Prof. Kanin rightly points out, but it was not the only, or even the most important, factor explaining Western policy. To get back to the case of Slovenian liberalization and democratization – inertia alone obviously cannot explain the fact that the Yugoslav Army received Western signals of support for its possible (and contemplated) intervention in Slovenia at the peak of the Mladina affair in 1988 (p. 28-29), as well as during the crisis with the Slovenian constitutional amendments in 1989 (p. 60). Just as inertia alone could not explain a host of other Western policies toward Yugoslavia during the period covered in my book: from the lack of real Western condemnation of the violence against the Kosovo Albanians in early 1989 (with the notable exception of the US Congress) (pp. 39-42); to Cutileiro’s and Carrington’s blackmail of Alija Izetbegovic with the military might of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs, and with the withholding of the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in March 1992 (pp. 294-300).
The important thing to note is that the foreign policy apparatuses of all Western powers – including Germany – subscribed to this rationale until real war broke out in the summer of 1991. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung may have been making a clear distinction between Yugoslavia’s “democratic northwest” and “Communist Belgrade” (as did a number of other press houses elsewhere in the West), but such distinctions did not have any real effect on Germany’s policy toward Yugoslavia. What changed Bonn’s outlook on the crisis were the extreme violence and the clear aggression, first of the JNA on Slovenia, and then of Serbia on Croatia. As I argue in the concluding chapter of my book (p. 307),
The nature and the aims of the Serbian aggression galvanized some of the most deeply ingrained principled ideas within the German foreign policy community: the idea of peaceful self-determination (which had been the basis for Germany’s reunification), the idea of strong anti-expansionism and anti-irredentism (which stemmed from Germany’s own World War II traumas), and the idea of a strong commitment to the growing capability of European multilateral institutions (which was the foundation of Germany’s post–World War II foreign policy). It was Milosevic’s challenge to these three principled ideas which shifted the spotlight of German foreign policy makers away from their material interests in the continuing existence of Yugoslavia – and if any country had real material interests in the perpetuation of the Yugoslav federation, it was Germany – to the moral interests of self-determination for Yugoslavia’s republics and Europe’s strong resistance to Serbia’s expansionism.
The point is that Germany’s policy shift cannot be, as Prof. Kanin does, viewed outside the context of the extreme violence which was unleashed on Croatia and was threatened to be unleashed on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prof. Kanin’s suggestion that Germany pursued the policy of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia without consideration for what would happen for the rest of the federation is false. As my book shows, Germany had a clear preference for the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Slovenia and Croatia, but was forced to take a back seat due to the intense criticism it was subjected to, primarily by Britain and France. Unsurprisingly, and unfortunately, the Western diplomatic, humanitarian, and military effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus reverted back to the very same mistakes which marred its inglorious beginnings in Slovenia and Croatia. Had my book been longer than the already lengthy 432 pages, and had it continued into the Bosnian war, the analysis would have not only shown Milosevic repeatedly hoodwinking the Westerners, as Prof. Kanin suggests. It would have shown a long record of ultimately unsuccessful Western struggles to shake off their impulses of Realpolitik and appeasement – impulses which culminated with what Prof. Kanin rightfully labels the needless mistake of Dayton.
Dr. Josip Glaurdic is Junior Research Fellow at Clare College, University of Cambridge. He earned his PhD in Political Science in 2009 at Yale University.
An immediate response by David B. Kanin:
Josip,
Thank you very much for taking the time to consider my review and respond to it. I am just about to get on a plane to Istanbul and then other places, so I hope you will not be offended by this very quick response.
First, you mischaracterize just a bit my comments on your treatment of Ante Markovic. In fact, I believe you gave him the right amount of attention and only would quibble with minor points of what you say about him. In fact, I meant to use your appropriate consideration of his shortcomings and failures to take a shot at those who have built up a mythology that he was a would-be liberal alternative to Milosevic and the others who brought Yugoslavia down.
When it comes to Slovenia, the issue is not whether its leaders were sincere about a society more open than Milosevic’s Serbia. The issue is whether – even before Milosevic came to power – they were sincere in their commitment to maintaining Yugoslavia at all. I believe they were not – they knew no re-tinkered “confederation” would hold together and prepared the ground carefully and over time to get out. You believe otherwise – I look forward to more exchanges with you on this point. In my view, part of the problem here is – as I wrote in my review – your narrow focus (1987-1992) just does not cover enough ground to consider the context and follow-on impact of your spot-on assessment of Western disarray and contradictory policies.
As to Bismarck – I agree he knew little about the Balkans, which is why he kept his country out of the region and worried about the implications of how Russia and Austro-Hungary played out their rivalry in the region. I must confess a little disappointment that your comments focused on Bismarck more than my critique of your treatment of Genscher and German policy in 1990-2.
On the later issue, I agree with you entirely that Germany’s policy shift cannot be considered separately from the context of the violence unleashed on Croatia (but not just Croatia). I disagree with your book’s contention that the Germans put the same priority on Bosnia’s independence as on Croatia’s – if that were the case they would not have been ready to drop the issue in reaction to the chaos in the policies of other Europeans until the Americans belatedly stepped in.
These are details, albeit not all minor ones. I want to stress again how valuable I believe your book is – I very much look forward to learning from the fruits of your future research. If I can ever be of any assistance to you, please let me know.
David B. Kanin is an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and a former senior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
In regards to partition of kossovo, if it is a real possibility for only 100,000 serbs…I can only imagine what the hungarians in Vojvodian are thinking, or maybe the ethnic Albanians in Southern Serbia are patiently waiting to say. I seriously contend your ability as an author in the poltical spectrum, without realizing the domino effect of your claim, that which is a true reality for the rewards of ethnic genocide by a people who only maintain their identity through murder and hatred. Must Europe endure the same mistakes of the San Stefano treaty? Further note; Mr Gallucci please refrain from your language that includes words such as surrender, and conquest. It only adds to your bias and obvious support for a brutal and genocidal idealogy of Pan Slavacism.
have a nice day.
I am curious why it is that you brought up the “special autonomy” of the Serbian enclaves in the northern part of Kosovo but have not advocated for special autonomy in the Presevo Valley and Sandzak regions of Serbia. In those regions ethnic Serbs form the minority and the majority populations – Albanians and Bosniaks respectively would like to have their own states or at the very least their own autonomous administrative regions. The Serbian government has so far refused to grant them the autonomy they seek. Why is it acceptable to you that the Serbs living in Kosovo get autonomy within the state while the Albanians and Bosniaks and other minority groups in Serbia are not allowed to have their own autonomous regions within the state? It seems to me that the Serbs always want to have some special status in any country they have minorities living in but refuse to grant those rights to the minorities living in Serbia. These double-standards are not fair and are unacceptable.
you albanians on here are very funny for 1 vojvodina is over 75% Serbs and growing your dreams are gone there and second albanians i southern serbia have decreased to about 50,000 and lowering and 3rd the bosniaks are also decreasing in the sandzak region its 50-50 now and the serbs are not a minority maybe look at the 2010 and 2011 and forget about the 1950s and beyond maybe look at albania now if you dont know over 35% of albania are none albanians look it up and thats where your going to have problems very soon so the facts are its 2010 and going on 2011 where you like to live a hundred years back lol
I agree with most of the article but have some disagreement with the commentors.
When Czechoslovakia split up they had some small border changes. But nobody suggested that because the border between the Czeches and the Slovaks had been moved the border between Hungary and Slovakia should also move (there is a Hungarian-majority area in the southwest of Slovakia). So unlike nardi and Rob-Roy I see no reason why ethnic borders between Kosovo and Serbia should be bad. On the contrary: if you conclude that it is necessary to separate Serbs and Albanians in separate states it seems to me the decent way to do it so that as much people as possible live in their “own” state.
I’d like to be clear that I am not advocating for partition of Kosovo. As I noted at the outset, finding a way to keep the north as part of Kosovo would be, overall, the best solution. I am simply noting that adjusting borders is a practical issue that can be considered from a practical basis. History and current reality seem to show that that multi-ethnicity works only in very rich countries where there is enough “pie” for everyone. Not in post-conflict ones where people still identify primarily by nationality. In some circumstances, co-habitation may be the only feasible way. But then some outside actor has to be around to make sure everyone plays by the rules or else there is the risk of further conflict.
In principle, there is no good reason to be against Kosovo and Albania uniting if they wish. But also – re Wim’s point – no need to drag the north into that either. Power sharing may work in Macedonia long term if the EU actively embraces it. Albanians in Serbia, Greece and Montenegro are a harder case. But where they are a minority and likely to remain so, then minority rights within a European context should work. No need to have an one-size-fits-all approach. Each case can be treated as a practical matter.
The EU could change the entire game by bringing all of the former Yugoslavia into the EU at once. Pulling the whole region into the wider EU context would be more serious than insisting that ethnically partitioning overwhelmingly Albanian Kosovo out of Serbia was a unique case.
Great article. Always good stuff from Galucci. You did a great job while in Kosovo, you shouldn’t have left.
Partition isn’t a bad idea. Candidly, Albanians I’ve spoken to in Kosovo are more than happy to get rid of the North so that they can focus on other issues. Plus it will give the Serbian government something that they can take back to the population with at least something. This will keep Serbia on track towards the EU and a lot more calm in the Balkans.
@ tom.
I will try to answer your pseudo-factual and lack of a better word “response” as best as I can, and I will be kind enough not to comment on the limits of ones mental capacity. I believe that everyone with your type of learning disability should have a fair opportunity to be part of any discussion if they feel they need be, I applaud your courage and desire.
“you albanians on here are very funny”
Yes we are, with such an array of actors and comedians, it brings to mind one in particular by the name of James Belushi…quite nice of you to recognize our light hearted nature.
“vojvodina is over 75% Serbs”
O’ contrere! Serbs make up a total of 65% of the total population in the province of Vojbodina, and the Hungarians make up approx 15% total, which equals to 300,000, that is triple the total of Serbs in the country of Kossovo. Could partition be a real possibility? you decide.
Further more you have based your number on those who use Serbian as their native tongue, not to what ethnic class they identify themselves with.
“albanians i southern serbia have decreased to about 50,000 and lowering”
The real number is at approx 65,000 Albanians in present day Serbia, and where do you come up with the idea it is lowering? here is a bit of info, it takes 2.2% birth rate to maintain a population. Im sure you can do the math on that one. if not you can ask me.
“and 3rd the bosniaks are also decreasing in the sandzak region its 50-50 now and the serbs are not a minority maybe look at the 2010 and 2011 and forget about the 1950s and beyond”
please refer to the inforamtion I posted above about birth rates.
“albania now if you dont know over 35% of albania are none albanians”
This is an interesting number you have posted. I think that if you place a decimal in the right spot you would have a far more accurate number of minorities. Based on the CIA Fact Book as well as The Watson Inst for Int. Studies the total number of minorities in present day Albania is no more then 3.5%. With the largest minority being that of Greek ethnicity which makes up 60,000.
In conclusion, The problems I can only foresee, “lie” with the ignorant and redundant attacks on the truth. If one could only live with the voice of reality and not the ghost of propganda’s past talking inside ones head.
have a nice day.
@ Win Roffel
“But nobody suggested that because the border between the Czeches and the Slovaks had been moved the border between Hungary and Slovakia should also move (there is a Hungarian-majority area in the southwest of Slovakia).”
I think you just solved the greatest Serbian paradigm. congrats! How do the hungarians in Slovakia do it? Let the Serbs follow that same example and apply it to the Serb Minority in Kossovo? Eureka! Then there will be no more talk of border changes and partitions and finally the Serbs can live with in the Nation of Kossovo as equal citizens, and begin to worry about issues that are important to them and stop being used as pawns for political gains of others, inside and outside the borders of Kossovo.
have a nice day.
What are the problems with partition? It seems like there is much acrimony over that would ease from partition. Could it be implemented with a reasonable border? If yes, then why not? Eventually once the ethnic feuds die down then the reduction of the borders would hopefully occur.
It is true that minorities in other countries may make claims but perhaps in some cases they are valid (and precedents already exist). For example Karabakh Armenians clearly should be part of Armenia and not Azerbaijan.
Would be interesting if (though almost certainly will not happen) one day the Western Balkans and Eastern Balkans found commonality and new dawn witnessed the founding of a new Dalmatian-Illyrian-Thracian-Moesian-Macedonian-Hellenic League..
I just do not understand why the Kosovo Albanians want to rule the majority population in N. Mitrovica. What is that all about? Is it that they would like to rule over the Serbs now, like the Serbs ruled over them for so many years? Is it a monetary issue, border revenue, mineral mines, what exactly is it? The Albanians wanted to split from Serbia because of ethnicity, why do the Albanians not afford the same to the Serbs? The Serbs in the North do not want to be dictated to by Pristina. Is that so hard to understand? My personal opinion, Pristina distracts their under achievements in Kosovo’s progress, both socially and economically, by deferring to the North, and not on the overwhelming rest of Kosovo.
I entirely agree with Winston.
@Nardi
People always manipulate with figures.
Simply referring to the “CIA Fact Book as well as The Watson Inst for Int. Studies” doesn’t mean it’s true…
It is a notorious fact that so many manuals, books,booklets etc were printed with wrong data…US tends to change the facts and the history for its own benefits.
Regards.
@LZ
“What are the problems with partition? It seems like there is much acrimony over that would ease from partition. Could it be implemented with a reasonable border?”
In the case of Kosovo. Partition is a reality. It parted itself from the artificial country of Serbia and became independent. It only took a century of bloodshed and the failed attempts of genocide against the Albanian people. In this case we believe it was valid.
Why is partition is an only option when Serbs are involved? Is this a double standard? Hippocritical? even Racist? I believe the solution is not partition, but the re-education and the introduction of modern civility to the Serbian people.
Simply amazing. Please explain oh dear Albanians how you became the majority in Kosovo Metohija. It’s a fact that Kosovo is the cradle of Serbian nation and also the home of our church. Serbs have built Kosovo into a modern province while Albanians have only contributed to it’s destruction. It is a fact that the term “ethnic cleansing” was first used to describe the plight of Serbs from Kosovo due to illegal Albanians crossing into Kosovo and driving Serbs out. Serbs will NEVER accept a illegal, immoral independent Kosovo. Just isn’t going to happen. The west isn’t as powerful as it once was and as soon as Tadic is voted out of office, Kosovo will be liberated once again. It took us 500 years to be free from the Turks so we can wait just a couple years to free ourselves from western bondage!
Nardi, I have seldom come across a blind nationalist as yourself. Were you possibly rejected by a beautiful Serbian girl, to have such hostility towards a nationality? Enjoy your hatred, I am glad I am not suffering like you.
@nardi
I think both Albanians and Serbians should get fair treatment and their claims should be analyzed and as fair as possible a solution implemented. I am not an expert on the situation and just read about it and other political events across the world out of interest.
The Albanian majority parts of Kosovo will very likely remain independent. The main question is how reasonable is it to try to keep the primarily Serbian populated region in the north as part of a unified Kosovo. Ideally, there would be cooperation among the peoples of the Western Balkans rather than the types of hideous conflicts that have occurred in recent history.
Most of the Balkan people seem to be closely related in many ways and have common ties dating back thousands of years. From what I have read and examined about the region it appears that at various points in history some countries now against each other were at various points part of the same culture group or very closely related culture groups. If the factors that turned so many within the populations against each other could be extinguished.. If the region were not so divided and could somehow reach for a new era of commonality (not erasing unique cultures though) then it would experience a great advance.
Unfortunately the present situation is characterized by acrimony and conflict.
Since it seems that the Serbians in northern Kosovo wish to remain part of Serbia it would seem to be easy to just partition the area. Then Albanian Kosovo will receive recognition from Serbia.
A quote:
“Why is partition is an only option when Serbs are involved? Is this a double standard? Hippocritical? even Racist? I believe the solution is not partition, but the re-education and the introduction of modern civility to the Serbian people.”
I think that there are several cases where partition and readjustments are valid. Sudan (the partition of this country is coming next year in a referendum), Kurdish areas, Karabakh (Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict), and there others. I am not saying that no multi-national or multi-ethnic states can exist. But in some cases it seems that adjustment is the main readily apparent solution.
The Albanians absolutely deserve fair fulfillment of their national rights as do the Serbians. Hopefully both will see success in the future.
By the way, since Western countries were heavily involved in the partitioning of Kosovo from Serbia it would not be true that no one in these countries supports partition only when Serbs are involved.
I meant to write, “…it would not be true that no one in these countries supports partition except when Serbs are involved.”
A clearer version would be, “…so there are at least some in these countries who support partition in cases where non-Serb ethnic groups are involved.”
While I doubt most Western publics are very concerned with the issue they probably, if/when the think about the issue or know what is going on, are concerned about the fate of the Albanians (and the Serbians).
Some of the politicians? Hmm..hard to say what they are thinking.
Dardania is a great name by the way. If the area becomes a bi-zonal federation maybe the name could be Dardania-Kosovo or if partitioned then Dardania for south and Kosovo for north.
This may sound like a chorus from us Serbians, but still, just to make it clear: WE WILL NEWER, EVER, UNDER NO AMOUNT THREATS OR BRIBES ACCEPT SECESSION OF KOSOVO. That said, I personally am not against finding some middle ground-for example that Serbia informally stop lobbying against Kosovo in UN for exchange of north. Anyway, town of Kosovska Mitrovica and its environs were administratively within Raska region and not Kosovo until communists changed administrative border in the late forties. That is I believe a functional and rational offer.
On the other hand if Albanians get some crazy ideas for “cleansing” of Serbs by force like they tried back in 2004. then Serbian Army should definitely intervene in order to preserve lives and property of citizens. Hell, I would gladly volunteer for that one.
Kosovo needs to be Daytonized like Bosnia. It’s not clean, it’s not pretty, but it works. If Kosovo’s borders are not to be changed by the international community, and if the Albanians insist on this unhealthy fixation on trying to lay claim to a piece of territory north of the Ibar they have never controlled, and don’t appear to have any idea what to do with, then as Mr. Galucci says, the north needs to be given wide degrees of autonomous self-administration akin to Republika Srpska in Bosnia with direct ties to Belgrade. Let Kosovska Mitrovica be Kosovo’s Banja Luka. It’s the only way the rest of the Serb enclaves south of the Ibar can have any formal insitutional representation and be able to survive in Kosovo.
“… Meanwhile Kosovo-Albanian politicians in unison refused this proposal. Apart from a moral approach regarding the years long terrible suppression of the Serbian apartheid regime in Kosovo, there is also a practical reason to do so: Besides a further shrinking territory and the economic future of Kosovo, the mining industry, also the main water reserves of the country are located in its northern part. … ”
http://technorati.com/politics/article/europe-day-in-kosovo-no-reason/
@ Obilic
You should know better than to refer to history. We both know that we will never agree with your “historical facts”. Wasted effort on your part.
@ Winston. “I just do not understand why the Kosovo Albanians want to rule the majority population in N. Mitrovica”
I (and many Albanians) think that Kosovo’s territorial integrity is a concept that has been imposed on Albanians by the international community. The current Kosovar leadership has been told to forget Presheva and rule N. Kosovo. Being that their independence was due to NATO, they are reluctant to go against NATO’s will. In reality most Albanians would be happy to give away North Kosovo, BUT ONLY IF Presheva Valley joins Kosovo or if there is a population exchange. Why would they let 65,000 Albanians in Presheva be ruled by Serbia AND give away N. Kosovo at the same time? N. Kosovo and Presheva Valley are two sides of the same coin, one country cannot have both.
The international community is trying to apply a level of democracy, that isn’t even available in the West, in a region that has recently seen the worst atrocities in Europe since WWII. The result is the creation of ineffective states that are bound to fail and remain on EU aid for a long time. Co-existence between old enemies is great, but it should be implemented at the EU level when the region joins the EU. Country borders won’t matter soon, but country governments should be able to implement laws without having to deal with parallel structures and informal borders within their own country. Too much time and energy is being spent on these issues in both Kosovo and Serbia, when both countries should just focus on improving their economy and standard of living.