Josip Glaurdic responds to a review of his new book, ‘The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia’, by David B. Kanin, whose own response is also presented below.
By Josip Glaurdic
The twentieth anniversary of Yugoslavia’s breakup came and went without nearly the attention it warranted in the West. Perhaps that is fitting for the crisis which was originally allowed to simmer and boil over by the neglect of the Western powers. My book, ‘The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (Yale University Press, 2011)’, was an attempt to change that trend of indifference, so I am particularly grateful to Prof. Kanin for “lending me a hand” with his thoughtful and knowledgeable review. I am also grateful for his praise, but – in the good tradition of review responses – I have decided to move straight to his substantive critique. After all, that is the best way we can build a constructive dialogue and learn from each other.
It would perhaps be most useful to begin with Prof. Kanin’s suggestion that my analysis lacks “an assessment of why whatever forces – whether military, liberal, or ideologically ‘Yugoslav’ – failed to coalesce as events spun downward.” This is a very good question, which we can answer only after answering two related questions – which (credible) forces are we talking about and when?
If we are talking about the period between the decision of Slobodan Milosevic to marry his brand of socialism with Serbian nationalism sometime in mid-1987 and the collapse of the League(s) of Communists and its/their various defeats at the polls in 1990 – then my book answers that question at least implicitly because it deals extensively with the only credible force that could have stopped Milosevic’s march: the League of Communists itself. The book, thus, discusses the reasons why the rest of the Communist elite failed to collectively respond to Milosevic’s ousting of Ivan Stambolic (they did not want to meddle in Serbia’s internal affairs and they thought Milosevic was just a grey, controllable bureaucrat); it explains why nothing was done once the rallies of the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” started in Serbia (again, because it would have been meddling in the internal affairs of Serbia, because all republican Communist elites used their own nationalisms for the purposes of mobilization, and ultimately because some of them – like the JNA and Macedonia, for example – actually agreed with Milosevic); it suggests a set of plausible explanations for why what was done was done once the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” started to spill over beyond the borders of Serbia (new and weak Communist leaderships in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, miscalculations and spinelessness on the federal level, etc.).
Ultimately, however, the main point is that the Yugoslav Communists were deeply divided over what really constituted a “Yugoslav” platform and, besides, they derived their legitimacy from within their republics. For, say, the Croatian Communist leaders of 1989 – who were all of clearly Yugoslavist orientation – to reach out to someone beyond the borders of their republic in order to build an anti-Milosevic coalition, they would have needed courage, enough likeminded partners, an institutional pathway to oust Milosevic, and real payoffs for such a move in the form of increased legitimacy of their rule. They had none of that. As my book demonstrates, their feeble – but still clearly Yugoslavist – response to Milosevic’s campaign was actually the reason for their electoral defeat.
If, on the other hand, Prof. Kanin’s question is referring to the period between the downfall of the League of Communists in early 1990 and the breakup of the country and war in the second half of 1991 – then the answer is slightly different, partly because we are dealing with different actors, and partly because of increased importance of international signals to the Yugoslav players. As my book argues, the only scenario for a possible survival of the Yugoslav state during this period was dependent on the success of the federal government of Ante Markovic, which commenced its program of shock therapy in December 1989, and the success of the plan for the Yugoslav confederation officially proposed by Slovenia and Croatia in the fall of 1990. Since Prof. Kanin devotes some attention to my treatment of both Markovic and the confederal proposal, it may be useful if I answer his aforementioned question by responding to his critique of how these two episodes were dealt with in my book.
Prof. Kanin suggests that I am minimizing the role Ante Markovic played during this period, that I am ignoring his popularity, devaluing the success of his reforms, and taking him to task for “joining Milosevic in condemning Slovene and Croat movements toward independence after the disastrous Congress of Yugoslavia’s League of Communists in January 1990.” However, none of those suggestions are correct. Ante Markovic gets an extensive treatment in my book, from his appointment in early 1989 and the creation of his economic program (pp. 61-66), to his failure to get Western support (pp. 67-69, 80-81, 121-122), his participation in the elections of 1990 (pp. 102, 115), or his role in the war in Slovenia (pp. 169-170, 173, 177-178, 191-192). I also explicitly mention the level of his popular support (p. 120, p. 344n3). And I treat his reforms fairly, in light of their actual success as measured by a variety of economic indicators (presented in Table 5.1 on p. 122) and in light of the response they garnered in the West. Interestingly, I am not the one who termed Markovic’s reforms “illusory”, as Prof. Kanin suggests. It was the CIA, whose National Intelligence Estimate from October 1990 (and which I quote on p. 109) claimed that the reform achievements of Markovic’s government were “mostly illusory”.
As far as taking Ante Markovic to task is concerned, I take Yugoslavia’s last prime minister to task for three things: for harbouring irrational hopes throughout the crisis that the West would bail him out (p. 68), for aiding and abetting the Yugoslavist wing of the JNA in the war in Slovenia, and for the obstructive role his government played in early Western diplomatic efforts during the war in Croatia (as, for example, in the efforts of the CSCE, p. 187). Those criticisms aside, however, I clearly acknowledge the federal prime minister as “the only political actor who presented a pan-Yugoslav alternative to Milosevic” at the turn of the decade and as someone who may have had a chance to neutralize the Serbian leader (p.69). The problem for Markovic, however – and here lies the answer to Prof. Kanin’s question of why pro-Yugoslav forces did not coalesce around the federal prime minister – is that his reforms were doomed to fail without real financial assistance from the West – assistance Markovic never received.
One could also take Ante Markovic to task – though I do not do that in my book – for failing to support the confederal proposal of Slovenia and Croatia, which was officially presented in October 1990. Prof. Kanin suggests that the confederal proposal was not a truly workable plan, but merely a “slogan” which fooled some Westerners. He also suggests that the Slovenes were not intent on reforming Yugoslavia into a confederation, but were only interested in keeping their money. Moreover, Prof. Kanin questions not only whether the Slovene Communist leadership was committed to the idea of a Yugoslav confederation, but also whether it was committed to the idea of liberal democratization, and he asserts I provide no evidence for such claims in my book.
It is certainly true that the bulk of national/nationalist mobilization in Slovenia in the late 1980s, which was condoned and even fostered by the republic’s Communist leadership, was centred on Ljubljana’s financial contributions to the federal budget. This is hardly surprising, considering the economic environment of extreme austerity akin, perhaps, to what Greece has to go through today. To say, however, that the Slovenes wanted to keep more of their money and that they were committed to the idea or reforming Yugoslavia along confederal lines is not mutually exclusive. On the contrary: the confederation was exactly the institutional device which was – among other things – to allow the Slovenes to keep more of their earnings at home. Whether the confederal proposal of October 1990 was practicable or, as Prof. Kanin suggests, “there is no evidence the Slovenes or anyone else actually considered how such a construction would work” is debatable. The proposal was modelled on the European Community and contained a number of different options which were ultimately to be agreed upon in peaceful negotiations of all six republics. The main point is that this platform for negotiations did not “fool” any Westerners, as Prof. Kanin suggests. As my book demonstrates, the confederal proposal was met with basically uniform derision and disregard from the West in late 1990 and early 1991 (pp. 123-124, 137). Only after the Belgrade protests of March 1991 and the violence in Croatia later that April and May, did the Western governments begin to signal their possible acceptance of a confederal reformation of Yugoslavia, but by that time it was too late. It is rather ironic that a number of provisions of the confederal plan found their way into the proposals of the Carrington Conference in the fall of 1991 – after thousands of dead and wounded, and several hundred thousand refugees in the war in Croatia. Had the confederal plan received Western backing and diplomatic involvement in the fall of 1990 when it needed it, it is entirely possible that war could have been avoided, and that some semblance of a common Yugoslav structure could have been preserved.
When it comes to the question of evidence of Slovenia’s commitment to liberal democracy and to Yugoslavia’s confederal future, I can only recommend that Prof. Kanin re-reads the relevant chapters of my book. Is the fact that the leaders of the Slovenian League of Communists took Mladina’s side in its clash with the JNA in 1988 (pp. 27-29) not evidence of their clear choice to defend that quintessentially liberal idea of the freedom of the press? Are the Slovenian constitutional amendments of 1989, which abandoned the Party’s leading role in society and extended the rights of Slovenian citizens in areas such as freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, right to privacy, and freedom for organized participation in politics (pp. 54-56), also not evidence of a commitment to a liberal-democratic transformation? Is the fact that the Slovenian state-run media and the still ruling League of Communists supported Markovic’s reform program in spite of, as the Ljubljana daily Delo put it, the federal prime minister’s “inability to resist the discreet charms of centralization” (p. 65), not evidence of Slovenia’s commitment to a common Yugoslav future? Is the official platform of the League of Communists of Slovenia for the Fourteenth Congress of the federal Party organization, which – in the words of Milan Kucan – was the platform “undoubtedly for Yugoslavia: a voluntary state of equal republics, free and equal nations, a democratic community of free citizens which measures its socialist content and existence by the criteria of a European quality of life… not a Yugoslavia as an extended Serbia to which – according to its wishes – others can be joined” (p. 70) – is this platform not evidence of a still-present commitment to Slovenia’s future in a reformed and democratized Yugoslavia? Are the proposals put forward by the Slovene delegation at the Fourteenth Congress, which included a series of human rights amendments such as the ban on political trials and torture, and which were defeated by Milosevic’s sizeable bloc in the Party (p. 71), not a sign of the commitment of Slovenia’s Communists to liberal democratization? Last, but not least, is the fact that Slovenia was the first republic to call and hold democratic elections, after which the ruling Communists peacefully surrendered their political offices, not evidence of a commitment to liberal democratization? Prof. Kanin is certainly correct in stating that the Slovenes used their financial upper hand in an attempt to negotiate a better deal with the federal centre and that they had used it for years. They were, however, hardly alone in employing such methods.
The case of Slovenian liberalization and democratization is a good introduction to my response to another important critique by Prof. Kanin – the one regarding my supposed inaccurate use of the term Realpolitik to describe the policies of the Western powers. Prof. Kanin uses the example of Bismarck and his ability to mould the European order according to Prussia’s interests to draw a distinction with the Western leaders of the 1980s and 1990s who were operating “in the thrall of inertia”. None of them, as Prof. Kanin argues, deserve the same label of Realpolitiker that belonged to a statesman such as Bismarck.
It is interesting that Prof. Kanin uses Bismarck’s example to challenge my use of the term Realpolitik, because it was exactly the old Chancellor who was often quoted by the Western anti-interventionists who argued – as he did a century earlier – that “The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.” This quote indeed captures the essence of Western Realpolitik when it comes to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Political realism in international relations is primarily concerned with power (derived from military or economic capacity) and the pursuit of stability. It has no place for ethical or ideological concerns. So, what would the quintessential Realpolitiker have done, had he been in some position of power in the West and confronted with the Yugoslav crisis? Well, he would most likely have noted the dwindling importance of Yugoslavia in the European geopolitical system of the late 1980s and he would have wanted it to remain quiet in order to devote his attention to more pressing interests further up north. He would have had little understanding for the liberalization and democratization agenda of Yugoslavia’s north-western republics, or for the clamouring for human rights by the Kosovo Albanians. He would, on the other hand, most likely have supported those who claimed to be fighting for the country’s preservation and centralization, especially since they happened to be wielding the biggest stick.
As my book repeatedly demonstrates, that was exactly the policy pursued by the Western powers until real war broke out in the summer of 1991. Inertia did play a large role, as Prof. Kanin rightly points out, but it was not the only, or even the most important, factor explaining Western policy. To get back to the case of Slovenian liberalization and democratization – inertia alone obviously cannot explain the fact that the Yugoslav Army received Western signals of support for its possible (and contemplated) intervention in Slovenia at the peak of the Mladina affair in 1988 (p. 28-29), as well as during the crisis with the Slovenian constitutional amendments in 1989 (p. 60). Just as inertia alone could not explain a host of other Western policies toward Yugoslavia during the period covered in my book: from the lack of real Western condemnation of the violence against the Kosovo Albanians in early 1989 (with the notable exception of the US Congress) (pp. 39-42); to Cutileiro’s and Carrington’s blackmail of Alija Izetbegovic with the military might of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs, and with the withholding of the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in March 1992 (pp. 294-300).
The important thing to note is that the foreign policy apparatuses of all Western powers – including Germany – subscribed to this rationale until real war broke out in the summer of 1991. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung may have been making a clear distinction between Yugoslavia’s “democratic northwest” and “Communist Belgrade” (as did a number of other press houses elsewhere in the West), but such distinctions did not have any real effect on Germany’s policy toward Yugoslavia. What changed Bonn’s outlook on the crisis were the extreme violence and the clear aggression, first of the JNA on Slovenia, and then of Serbia on Croatia. As I argue in the concluding chapter of my book (p. 307),
The nature and the aims of the Serbian aggression galvanized some of the most deeply ingrained principled ideas within the German foreign policy community: the idea of peaceful self-determination (which had been the basis for Germany’s reunification), the idea of strong anti-expansionism and anti-irredentism (which stemmed from Germany’s own World War II traumas), and the idea of a strong commitment to the growing capability of European multilateral institutions (which was the foundation of Germany’s post–World War II foreign policy). It was Milosevic’s challenge to these three principled ideas which shifted the spotlight of German foreign policy makers away from their material interests in the continuing existence of Yugoslavia – and if any country had real material interests in the perpetuation of the Yugoslav federation, it was Germany – to the moral interests of self-determination for Yugoslavia’s republics and Europe’s strong resistance to Serbia’s expansionism.
The point is that Germany’s policy shift cannot be, as Prof. Kanin does, viewed outside the context of the extreme violence which was unleashed on Croatia and was threatened to be unleashed on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prof. Kanin’s suggestion that Germany pursued the policy of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia without consideration for what would happen for the rest of the federation is false. As my book shows, Germany had a clear preference for the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Slovenia and Croatia, but was forced to take a back seat due to the intense criticism it was subjected to, primarily by Britain and France. Unsurprisingly, and unfortunately, the Western diplomatic, humanitarian, and military effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus reverted back to the very same mistakes which marred its inglorious beginnings in Slovenia and Croatia. Had my book been longer than the already lengthy 432 pages, and had it continued into the Bosnian war, the analysis would have not only shown Milosevic repeatedly hoodwinking the Westerners, as Prof. Kanin suggests. It would have shown a long record of ultimately unsuccessful Western struggles to shake off their impulses of Realpolitik and appeasement – impulses which culminated with what Prof. Kanin rightfully labels the needless mistake of Dayton.
Dr. Josip Glaurdic is Junior Research Fellow at Clare College, University of Cambridge. He earned his PhD in Political Science in 2009 at Yale University.
An immediate response by David B. Kanin:
Josip,
Thank you very much for taking the time to consider my review and respond to it. I am just about to get on a plane to Istanbul and then other places, so I hope you will not be offended by this very quick response.
First, you mischaracterize just a bit my comments on your treatment of Ante Markovic. In fact, I believe you gave him the right amount of attention and only would quibble with minor points of what you say about him. In fact, I meant to use your appropriate consideration of his shortcomings and failures to take a shot at those who have built up a mythology that he was a would-be liberal alternative to Milosevic and the others who brought Yugoslavia down.
When it comes to Slovenia, the issue is not whether its leaders were sincere about a society more open than Milosevic’s Serbia. The issue is whether – even before Milosevic came to power – they were sincere in their commitment to maintaining Yugoslavia at all. I believe they were not – they knew no re-tinkered “confederation” would hold together and prepared the ground carefully and over time to get out. You believe otherwise – I look forward to more exchanges with you on this point. In my view, part of the problem here is – as I wrote in my review – your narrow focus (1987-1992) just does not cover enough ground to consider the context and follow-on impact of your spot-on assessment of Western disarray and contradictory policies.
As to Bismarck – I agree he knew little about the Balkans, which is why he kept his country out of the region and worried about the implications of how Russia and Austro-Hungary played out their rivalry in the region. I must confess a little disappointment that your comments focused on Bismarck more than my critique of your treatment of Genscher and German policy in 1990-2.
On the later issue, I agree with you entirely that Germany’s policy shift cannot be considered separately from the context of the violence unleashed on Croatia (but not just Croatia). I disagree with your book’s contention that the Germans put the same priority on Bosnia’s independence as on Croatia’s – if that were the case they would not have been ready to drop the issue in reaction to the chaos in the policies of other Europeans until the Americans belatedly stepped in.
These are details, albeit not all minor ones. I want to stress again how valuable I believe your book is – I very much look forward to learning from the fruits of your future research. If I can ever be of any assistance to you, please let me know.
David B. Kanin is an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and a former senior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
I am of the opinion that Serbia`s EU membership remains a strategic inevitability. Beacuse Serbia`s EU membership is of mutual benefit: for the EU and for Serbia.
Of course, “one size does not fit to all” and Serbia has to make its own history by trying to resolve immediately the bottleneck with Kosova in guideline with the European conditionality for EU membership.
Serbia has done more then it’s share to arrest it’s own people, to stop crime and to make life the way the fake region of the EU want’s.. Now stop and look at what the EU really is? Just a name covering a few nations that only care about Power and Money, here religion means nothing, here people mean nothing. They bombed Serbia in it’s own territory for over 70 days killing innocent people and saying it was a mistake. A mistake? Kosovo is Serbia and the Albanian population if they don’t like living there well they have their own nation just to the west go back home! It’s all about money and power that is it, Politicians of the EU, Serbia, USA or Albania do not care about you or I we work to give them taxes to pay them to open our eyes to pay them to put food on the table. Every nation should remain it’s own this way we can keep our religions, our cultures, our language..
Kosova, has never been, it is not and won`t be Serbia.
History comes with its assertive facts: the Slavic Barbarian Tribes came to the Illyrian Empire land in the Vth century A.C.
Then the history and the identity of this region is what we experience after London Conference of Ambassadors in 1913.
Important is the future of the Balkans: will ever be peace, stability and security in this region?
Is the Euro-Atlantic integration path pursuing in the right way? Why is Europe so silent towards what is happening in Mitrovica? Or there are other economic interests included?
Danny, George…stop both of you. Chega! (Portuguese)
People, listen to us, we do not want to join EU. We will never recognize “Kosova”. Kosovo and Metohija are ours. Is it clear?
I am afraid that certain politicians didn’t perform their best in the timely manner or their best wasn’t good enough. The question is should any of them continue to play the role they are given in this tragic comedy play. This opens up some other questions as well. How some of them didn’t realise that there are much more things to be done rather than just paper work and pure words?
Thus the same goes for the case of Kosovo. Although I am disappointed with the way certain people treat Mr B Djelic resignation having in mind the obvious reasons under which the same happened. I would also like to state that Borislav Stefanovic can’t perform at it’s best since his hand are tied by his own political party which makes the whole situation much worse. so, form my comment, you may conclude that certain highly qualified professionals are being destroyed in a way by their own political party
I’m convinced Kostunica would have done a far better job
than Tadic, Tadic is not realistic
He wants Serbia in the EU but the EU does not want Serbia
He should have spent three years working on BRIC membership
Vasa
To the Albanians posting here. Please stop talking about your “Illyrian heritage”. Just because you say it does not make it so. Fact is that despite years of trying and millions spent on finding the “smoking gun” you have proven nothing. Illyrians are an ancient group that lived all up and down the Adriatic coast. When other groups came to the Balkans those Illyrians assimilated into whatever group was close by. If memory serves me Albanians did not even have a written language until the last century or so.Hard to keep factual historical records without an alphabet don’t you think? You can name all of your kids Ilir that you want but it means nothing. I wonder how it is that Albanians have no problem with the idea of a greater Albania or “natural Albania” as they like to call it. They would have no problem taking land from Greece, Montenegro, Macedonia, heck they already have 15% of Serbia and would love to get even more if they could, Because they believe that where ever they live it must be historically Albanian and therfore theirs because they are after all “Illyrians”. Great logic huh? Yet in Kososvo for example they will not agree to let the north rejoin Serbia proper.So they can rule over Serbs but not the other way around. Don’t get me wrong, I’m all for ethnic seperation in the Balkans, but if the Albanians want all of their people in one state then they have to alow all others the same right, even if it is at their own expense. We can keep digging into history all we want to justify why different peoples have a right to this or that, but until hypocracy on all sides subsides there will never be peace in that region. We have to deal with the reality on the ground not some ancient claim to this or that, and that goes for Serbs as well. History has demonstrated that the people there can not live together for long without strife. The west in particular has played a big role in fanning the flames of hate. By using Titos administrative borders as a basis for division it was a sure fire recipe for disaster.They pick one side over the other by oversimplifying the conflict as good vs evil, but in reality there is enough blame to go around no angels or devils. Allowing Serbia to be chopped up while waxing poetically of Bosnias territorial integrity is a bad joke at best. There are clearly two sets of rules at play here, one for Serbs and one for everyone else. BTW what exactly does Kosova mean in Albanian? If the land is truly yours then your name of Kosova must have a meaning in your language.In Serbian Kosovo is derived from the word Kos. That is a black bird common to the area. Kosovo or even Kosova has no meaning in Albanian whatsoever. Taking a Serb word and adding an A to the end does not change a thing. If it did then Serbs would have added an “ovich” suffix to all things Albanian and claimed it for their own. I’m not anti-Albanian per se but everyone needs to break out of their nationalistic comfort zone in order to find a real solution to the problems there. In the end Serbs and Albanians alike want a normal life to live free and leave a better place for their childern then the one they found.Greetings to all people of good will.
The US State Department and the Germans hate Serbs, that they cannot purchase and give orders to. This will always be true of our Overlords. They only wish to control / strip / steal in order bleed us for their gain. They portrayed us as the instigators and aggressors. Any legitimate argument we may have is not given even the slightest grain of worth. Our history of 700 years of slavery and willingness to stand against Nazi’s and their islamic supporters is only our nationalistic evilness in their view. I live in the US and I find the people have no idea of the real historical events of the region and quite frankly do not care. There is no such thing as a Kosovar, that is not even a real word. There are no bosniacs. The people who live there are Serbs and Croats who were converted to their Islamic counterparts when the lovely Turks came and converted as many as they could. Kosovo is a Serbian word and the land is our Jerusalem. They will continue to kill us, destroy our churches and deny any legitimate issue or law that we in reality deserve. They believe we should collectively pay forever, they will never consider us their friends. My only wish in life is that Serbia have a great leader like Benjamin Netanyahu! If only Bibi were a Serb, no offense to legitimate leader Kustunica.
“If memory serves me Albanians did not even have a written language until the last century or so.Hard to keep factual historical records without an alphabet don’t you think? ” Bad Memory!
The first Albanian document dates 1268, is the Baptism Psalm.
The first Albanian dictionary dates on around 1400,is that of Frang Bardhi.
I don`t share the opinion of a Greater Albania or a Greater Serbia, or Greece. The fact is that the solution of Greater states in the Balkans represents an extremist nationalistic view. And I don`t share the opinion that the thoponyms should have a sense to be declared legitimately that they belong to a country.
I strongly believe that we should put a stone over this and continue to think about our future, about the future of our next generations.
As well I share the first opinion of Migena. EU and Serbia need each-other. Serbia needs to accept its fate and Europe has to be more concretely involved in the Euro-atlantic future of the region.
In my view, it is not important for the EU to have Balkan states “in.” What is important is for the EU–finally–to be able to demonstrate it can manage that lively region. Since at least the Maastricht Treaty, the development of European institutions has paralleled the collapse first of Yugoslavia and then of serial “status quos” the EU and US have attempted to impose or hold together. For 20 years the cheeerleaders of Europe have focused on the Balkans as the place where they would prove the EU matters as a security power. Events have done anything but proven this case. The EU–which has yet to demonstrate it can get its financial house in order (the deal last week is more smoke and mirrors) also has not demonstrated it can get a handle on conditions in the Balkans that continue to change no matter its lectures and conditions. Even in the best of circumstances, membership is many years away for Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosova and so not anything for any of these states to hang their tattered hats on.
EU has it benefits of expansion in the Western Balkans.
Amongst the benefits that EU-Western Balkans relation will bring to the EU are the following: Future survival of the union ( =the ideology survivalof the union.); political and security benefits; economic benefits.
History has proven that hegemony expansion of a union of states is driven from policies and actions that the union undertakes to establish itself as the pre-eminent power in international affairs. The Cold War is one of the many examples: The West (USA and WE) and USSR (Soviet Union) with its allies, where both blocs used their “spheres of influence” of geographic entities ensuring as a consequence their national security.
European Union was created on 1950 as a necessity to unite the Western Europe politically in juxtaposition to the Soviet “spheres of influence” created with the beginning of the Cold War (1947). Today EU being politically matured with a universalistic concept of conducting domestic and foreign policy promotes the member- states` interests and serve as a model of governing based on the neo-liberal ideology of institutions operating together. In fact ideology is an indispensable tool to create and maintain a connection between states.
EU ideology is linked to power and threat opportunity. From this relationship derives a second relationship: domestic political culture linked to strategy, diplomacy, war and peace. From the second relationship derives the third and last one: military capabilities to diplomatic initiatives. These relationships altogether explain the fluidity and the maturity of the political, security and economic conditions for the Union survival, that are going to be explained in the next sub-sections.
…of this long timely relationship.
First of there was not Albania in 1200s or 1400s George Sand is a liar, first about his name then about his goal… Serbia has existed for 1500 centuries, Albanians came around 1600s as an Ottoman sheephearing tribe. That is the truth, accept it or you are an extremist,it’s that simple since history can not be changed for reasons of your hatred to Slavic and Greek people.
Serbia has agricultural treasures that many countries dream of, the only reason it’s not prosperous is the goverment AND EU coruption. The goverment is payed by Pollacs to try and ruin Serbian raspberry same as Milosevics regimee did for Serbian cherry. EU shoud be afraid since we’ll burn down all their embassies once we burn the parliament. Enough is enough, polititians must go. Humanity has been throo kings, emperors, tzars, soltans now it’s presidents that need to fall! It’s not freedom, democracy is a lie! A freedom is when all countries people vote and decide like the corrupt polititians in parliament. We have them saying “don’t mix politics and sports” yet it’s the minister of sport that says so. Political parties are more important then people and ideologies then prosperity. It’s not religion,like those atheists-masons,like to tell us,no the problem is politics. We do not need them and the world is starting to fight for freedoom!
I am more sorry and I feel pitty for you Nikola, although you hold the name of a Saint: Saanto Nikola. I feel pitty for the your young age that is fed with extremism and blindness.
It is obvious that your hurt feelings put a stone and mud on everything, this made you confusing dates and telling to people liars, burning embassies and behaving as barbars.
If you think that you will gain something with this satanic behaviour, I am sorry but you are planting only desert identity for the next generations of Serbia to come.
I have not read about and I have not seen a single nation in this world that wants to write its history being based on legends as Serbia is doing. It is pitty, since in the middle of Belgrade there is the Skadarlija ulica, that witness of good and respectful relationships that existed between the two nations.
It is more than surprising that Serbia still continues to put supremacy through violence and committing crimes. This is what has always happened in the wars conducted from Serbia through centuries.
This does not work. I invite you to see the future with tollerance, patience and love. To give something for your children, if you plant hate you will live and be hated.
There is no right answer to this debate. Both sides will lay claims and looking into the depths of history for support. We all know this history is poor inaccuracy as we date back.
What we all know (Serb and non-Serb) is that since the break of Yugoslavia apart from Slovenia, all the other states are worse off. Like in the 90s, today the topic of Serbia’s Kosovo or Albania’s Kosovo won’t be decided by logic, common sense or by the truth. It will be decided by men in suits behind closed doors which are backed my lobbyists of some questionable affiliations. The decisions will be made not on how can we improve the lives of the people but how can we benefit our own interests.
I am deeply disappointed at all the hate and lack of common sense I see in fellow readers comments. We often forget, that in Kosovo pain and suffering does not discriminate between Serb or Albanian. Fact is that when people choose to work together they prosper.
Also George Sand, you are right. Serbia has committed crimes, but so have all the other states. There is no clean hand in the Balkans. In WW2, Muslims for Kosovo joined the Nazis and ran concentrations camps. In 1998 KLA was a terrorist organisation according to CIA, but then in 1999 got reclassified. This KLA was then accused of capturing non-Muslim inhabitants and harvesting their organs. They also destroyed 300 Churches.
The reason the sorry state that the Balkans is in is due to the contribution of all the ethnic inhabitants. Using Serbia as an escape goat is not the answer and is the recipe for future conflicts.
Thank you for reading.