Josip Glaurdic responds to a review of his new book, ‘The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia’, by David B. Kanin, whose own response is also presented below.
By Josip Glaurdic
The twentieth anniversary of Yugoslavia’s breakup came and went without nearly the attention it warranted in the West. Perhaps that is fitting for the crisis which was originally allowed to simmer and boil over by the neglect of the Western powers. My book, ‘The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (Yale University Press, 2011)’, was an attempt to change that trend of indifference, so I am particularly grateful to Prof. Kanin for “lending me a hand” with his thoughtful and knowledgeable review. I am also grateful for his praise, but – in the good tradition of review responses – I have decided to move straight to his substantive critique. After all, that is the best way we can build a constructive dialogue and learn from each other.
It would perhaps be most useful to begin with Prof. Kanin’s suggestion that my analysis lacks “an assessment of why whatever forces – whether military, liberal, or ideologically ‘Yugoslav’ – failed to coalesce as events spun downward.” This is a very good question, which we can answer only after answering two related questions – which (credible) forces are we talking about and when?
If we are talking about the period between the decision of Slobodan Milosevic to marry his brand of socialism with Serbian nationalism sometime in mid-1987 and the collapse of the League(s) of Communists and its/their various defeats at the polls in 1990 – then my book answers that question at least implicitly because it deals extensively with the only credible force that could have stopped Milosevic’s march: the League of Communists itself. The book, thus, discusses the reasons why the rest of the Communist elite failed to collectively respond to Milosevic’s ousting of Ivan Stambolic (they did not want to meddle in Serbia’s internal affairs and they thought Milosevic was just a grey, controllable bureaucrat); it explains why nothing was done once the rallies of the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” started in Serbia (again, because it would have been meddling in the internal affairs of Serbia, because all republican Communist elites used their own nationalisms for the purposes of mobilization, and ultimately because some of them – like the JNA and Macedonia, for example – actually agreed with Milosevic); it suggests a set of plausible explanations for why what was done was done once the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” started to spill over beyond the borders of Serbia (new and weak Communist leaderships in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, miscalculations and spinelessness on the federal level, etc.).
Ultimately, however, the main point is that the Yugoslav Communists were deeply divided over what really constituted a “Yugoslav” platform and, besides, they derived their legitimacy from within their republics. For, say, the Croatian Communist leaders of 1989 – who were all of clearly Yugoslavist orientation – to reach out to someone beyond the borders of their republic in order to build an anti-Milosevic coalition, they would have needed courage, enough likeminded partners, an institutional pathway to oust Milosevic, and real payoffs for such a move in the form of increased legitimacy of their rule. They had none of that. As my book demonstrates, their feeble – but still clearly Yugoslavist – response to Milosevic’s campaign was actually the reason for their electoral defeat.
If, on the other hand, Prof. Kanin’s question is referring to the period between the downfall of the League of Communists in early 1990 and the breakup of the country and war in the second half of 1991 – then the answer is slightly different, partly because we are dealing with different actors, and partly because of increased importance of international signals to the Yugoslav players. As my book argues, the only scenario for a possible survival of the Yugoslav state during this period was dependent on the success of the federal government of Ante Markovic, which commenced its program of shock therapy in December 1989, and the success of the plan for the Yugoslav confederation officially proposed by Slovenia and Croatia in the fall of 1990. Since Prof. Kanin devotes some attention to my treatment of both Markovic and the confederal proposal, it may be useful if I answer his aforementioned question by responding to his critique of how these two episodes were dealt with in my book.
Prof. Kanin suggests that I am minimizing the role Ante Markovic played during this period, that I am ignoring his popularity, devaluing the success of his reforms, and taking him to task for “joining Milosevic in condemning Slovene and Croat movements toward independence after the disastrous Congress of Yugoslavia’s League of Communists in January 1990.” However, none of those suggestions are correct. Ante Markovic gets an extensive treatment in my book, from his appointment in early 1989 and the creation of his economic program (pp. 61-66), to his failure to get Western support (pp. 67-69, 80-81, 121-122), his participation in the elections of 1990 (pp. 102, 115), or his role in the war in Slovenia (pp. 169-170, 173, 177-178, 191-192). I also explicitly mention the level of his popular support (p. 120, p. 344n3). And I treat his reforms fairly, in light of their actual success as measured by a variety of economic indicators (presented in Table 5.1 on p. 122) and in light of the response they garnered in the West. Interestingly, I am not the one who termed Markovic’s reforms “illusory”, as Prof. Kanin suggests. It was the CIA, whose National Intelligence Estimate from October 1990 (and which I quote on p. 109) claimed that the reform achievements of Markovic’s government were “mostly illusory”.
As far as taking Ante Markovic to task is concerned, I take Yugoslavia’s last prime minister to task for three things: for harbouring irrational hopes throughout the crisis that the West would bail him out (p. 68), for aiding and abetting the Yugoslavist wing of the JNA in the war in Slovenia, and for the obstructive role his government played in early Western diplomatic efforts during the war in Croatia (as, for example, in the efforts of the CSCE, p. 187). Those criticisms aside, however, I clearly acknowledge the federal prime minister as “the only political actor who presented a pan-Yugoslav alternative to Milosevic” at the turn of the decade and as someone who may have had a chance to neutralize the Serbian leader (p.69). The problem for Markovic, however – and here lies the answer to Prof. Kanin’s question of why pro-Yugoslav forces did not coalesce around the federal prime minister – is that his reforms were doomed to fail without real financial assistance from the West – assistance Markovic never received.
One could also take Ante Markovic to task – though I do not do that in my book – for failing to support the confederal proposal of Slovenia and Croatia, which was officially presented in October 1990. Prof. Kanin suggests that the confederal proposal was not a truly workable plan, but merely a “slogan” which fooled some Westerners. He also suggests that the Slovenes were not intent on reforming Yugoslavia into a confederation, but were only interested in keeping their money. Moreover, Prof. Kanin questions not only whether the Slovene Communist leadership was committed to the idea of a Yugoslav confederation, but also whether it was committed to the idea of liberal democratization, and he asserts I provide no evidence for such claims in my book.
It is certainly true that the bulk of national/nationalist mobilization in Slovenia in the late 1980s, which was condoned and even fostered by the republic’s Communist leadership, was centred on Ljubljana’s financial contributions to the federal budget. This is hardly surprising, considering the economic environment of extreme austerity akin, perhaps, to what Greece has to go through today. To say, however, that the Slovenes wanted to keep more of their money and that they were committed to the idea or reforming Yugoslavia along confederal lines is not mutually exclusive. On the contrary: the confederation was exactly the institutional device which was – among other things – to allow the Slovenes to keep more of their earnings at home. Whether the confederal proposal of October 1990 was practicable or, as Prof. Kanin suggests, “there is no evidence the Slovenes or anyone else actually considered how such a construction would work” is debatable. The proposal was modelled on the European Community and contained a number of different options which were ultimately to be agreed upon in peaceful negotiations of all six republics. The main point is that this platform for negotiations did not “fool” any Westerners, as Prof. Kanin suggests. As my book demonstrates, the confederal proposal was met with basically uniform derision and disregard from the West in late 1990 and early 1991 (pp. 123-124, 137). Only after the Belgrade protests of March 1991 and the violence in Croatia later that April and May, did the Western governments begin to signal their possible acceptance of a confederal reformation of Yugoslavia, but by that time it was too late. It is rather ironic that a number of provisions of the confederal plan found their way into the proposals of the Carrington Conference in the fall of 1991 – after thousands of dead and wounded, and several hundred thousand refugees in the war in Croatia. Had the confederal plan received Western backing and diplomatic involvement in the fall of 1990 when it needed it, it is entirely possible that war could have been avoided, and that some semblance of a common Yugoslav structure could have been preserved.
When it comes to the question of evidence of Slovenia’s commitment to liberal democracy and to Yugoslavia’s confederal future, I can only recommend that Prof. Kanin re-reads the relevant chapters of my book. Is the fact that the leaders of the Slovenian League of Communists took Mladina’s side in its clash with the JNA in 1988 (pp. 27-29) not evidence of their clear choice to defend that quintessentially liberal idea of the freedom of the press? Are the Slovenian constitutional amendments of 1989, which abandoned the Party’s leading role in society and extended the rights of Slovenian citizens in areas such as freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, right to privacy, and freedom for organized participation in politics (pp. 54-56), also not evidence of a commitment to a liberal-democratic transformation? Is the fact that the Slovenian state-run media and the still ruling League of Communists supported Markovic’s reform program in spite of, as the Ljubljana daily Delo put it, the federal prime minister’s “inability to resist the discreet charms of centralization” (p. 65), not evidence of Slovenia’s commitment to a common Yugoslav future? Is the official platform of the League of Communists of Slovenia for the Fourteenth Congress of the federal Party organization, which – in the words of Milan Kucan – was the platform “undoubtedly for Yugoslavia: a voluntary state of equal republics, free and equal nations, a democratic community of free citizens which measures its socialist content and existence by the criteria of a European quality of life… not a Yugoslavia as an extended Serbia to which – according to its wishes – others can be joined” (p. 70) – is this platform not evidence of a still-present commitment to Slovenia’s future in a reformed and democratized Yugoslavia? Are the proposals put forward by the Slovene delegation at the Fourteenth Congress, which included a series of human rights amendments such as the ban on political trials and torture, and which were defeated by Milosevic’s sizeable bloc in the Party (p. 71), not a sign of the commitment of Slovenia’s Communists to liberal democratization? Last, but not least, is the fact that Slovenia was the first republic to call and hold democratic elections, after which the ruling Communists peacefully surrendered their political offices, not evidence of a commitment to liberal democratization? Prof. Kanin is certainly correct in stating that the Slovenes used their financial upper hand in an attempt to negotiate a better deal with the federal centre and that they had used it for years. They were, however, hardly alone in employing such methods.
The case of Slovenian liberalization and democratization is a good introduction to my response to another important critique by Prof. Kanin – the one regarding my supposed inaccurate use of the term Realpolitik to describe the policies of the Western powers. Prof. Kanin uses the example of Bismarck and his ability to mould the European order according to Prussia’s interests to draw a distinction with the Western leaders of the 1980s and 1990s who were operating “in the thrall of inertia”. None of them, as Prof. Kanin argues, deserve the same label of Realpolitiker that belonged to a statesman such as Bismarck.
It is interesting that Prof. Kanin uses Bismarck’s example to challenge my use of the term Realpolitik, because it was exactly the old Chancellor who was often quoted by the Western anti-interventionists who argued – as he did a century earlier – that “The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.” This quote indeed captures the essence of Western Realpolitik when it comes to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Political realism in international relations is primarily concerned with power (derived from military or economic capacity) and the pursuit of stability. It has no place for ethical or ideological concerns. So, what would the quintessential Realpolitiker have done, had he been in some position of power in the West and confronted with the Yugoslav crisis? Well, he would most likely have noted the dwindling importance of Yugoslavia in the European geopolitical system of the late 1980s and he would have wanted it to remain quiet in order to devote his attention to more pressing interests further up north. He would have had little understanding for the liberalization and democratization agenda of Yugoslavia’s north-western republics, or for the clamouring for human rights by the Kosovo Albanians. He would, on the other hand, most likely have supported those who claimed to be fighting for the country’s preservation and centralization, especially since they happened to be wielding the biggest stick.
As my book repeatedly demonstrates, that was exactly the policy pursued by the Western powers until real war broke out in the summer of 1991. Inertia did play a large role, as Prof. Kanin rightly points out, but it was not the only, or even the most important, factor explaining Western policy. To get back to the case of Slovenian liberalization and democratization – inertia alone obviously cannot explain the fact that the Yugoslav Army received Western signals of support for its possible (and contemplated) intervention in Slovenia at the peak of the Mladina affair in 1988 (p. 28-29), as well as during the crisis with the Slovenian constitutional amendments in 1989 (p. 60). Just as inertia alone could not explain a host of other Western policies toward Yugoslavia during the period covered in my book: from the lack of real Western condemnation of the violence against the Kosovo Albanians in early 1989 (with the notable exception of the US Congress) (pp. 39-42); to Cutileiro’s and Carrington’s blackmail of Alija Izetbegovic with the military might of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs, and with the withholding of the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in March 1992 (pp. 294-300).
The important thing to note is that the foreign policy apparatuses of all Western powers – including Germany – subscribed to this rationale until real war broke out in the summer of 1991. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung may have been making a clear distinction between Yugoslavia’s “democratic northwest” and “Communist Belgrade” (as did a number of other press houses elsewhere in the West), but such distinctions did not have any real effect on Germany’s policy toward Yugoslavia. What changed Bonn’s outlook on the crisis were the extreme violence and the clear aggression, first of the JNA on Slovenia, and then of Serbia on Croatia. As I argue in the concluding chapter of my book (p. 307),
The nature and the aims of the Serbian aggression galvanized some of the most deeply ingrained principled ideas within the German foreign policy community: the idea of peaceful self-determination (which had been the basis for Germany’s reunification), the idea of strong anti-expansionism and anti-irredentism (which stemmed from Germany’s own World War II traumas), and the idea of a strong commitment to the growing capability of European multilateral institutions (which was the foundation of Germany’s post–World War II foreign policy). It was Milosevic’s challenge to these three principled ideas which shifted the spotlight of German foreign policy makers away from their material interests in the continuing existence of Yugoslavia – and if any country had real material interests in the perpetuation of the Yugoslav federation, it was Germany – to the moral interests of self-determination for Yugoslavia’s republics and Europe’s strong resistance to Serbia’s expansionism.
The point is that Germany’s policy shift cannot be, as Prof. Kanin does, viewed outside the context of the extreme violence which was unleashed on Croatia and was threatened to be unleashed on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prof. Kanin’s suggestion that Germany pursued the policy of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia without consideration for what would happen for the rest of the federation is false. As my book shows, Germany had a clear preference for the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Slovenia and Croatia, but was forced to take a back seat due to the intense criticism it was subjected to, primarily by Britain and France. Unsurprisingly, and unfortunately, the Western diplomatic, humanitarian, and military effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus reverted back to the very same mistakes which marred its inglorious beginnings in Slovenia and Croatia. Had my book been longer than the already lengthy 432 pages, and had it continued into the Bosnian war, the analysis would have not only shown Milosevic repeatedly hoodwinking the Westerners, as Prof. Kanin suggests. It would have shown a long record of ultimately unsuccessful Western struggles to shake off their impulses of Realpolitik and appeasement – impulses which culminated with what Prof. Kanin rightfully labels the needless mistake of Dayton.
Dr. Josip Glaurdic is Junior Research Fellow at Clare College, University of Cambridge. He earned his PhD in Political Science in 2009 at Yale University.
An immediate response by David B. Kanin:
Josip,
Thank you very much for taking the time to consider my review and respond to it. I am just about to get on a plane to Istanbul and then other places, so I hope you will not be offended by this very quick response.
First, you mischaracterize just a bit my comments on your treatment of Ante Markovic. In fact, I believe you gave him the right amount of attention and only would quibble with minor points of what you say about him. In fact, I meant to use your appropriate consideration of his shortcomings and failures to take a shot at those who have built up a mythology that he was a would-be liberal alternative to Milosevic and the others who brought Yugoslavia down.
When it comes to Slovenia, the issue is not whether its leaders were sincere about a society more open than Milosevic’s Serbia. The issue is whether – even before Milosevic came to power – they were sincere in their commitment to maintaining Yugoslavia at all. I believe they were not – they knew no re-tinkered “confederation” would hold together and prepared the ground carefully and over time to get out. You believe otherwise – I look forward to more exchanges with you on this point. In my view, part of the problem here is – as I wrote in my review – your narrow focus (1987-1992) just does not cover enough ground to consider the context and follow-on impact of your spot-on assessment of Western disarray and contradictory policies.
As to Bismarck – I agree he knew little about the Balkans, which is why he kept his country out of the region and worried about the implications of how Russia and Austro-Hungary played out their rivalry in the region. I must confess a little disappointment that your comments focused on Bismarck more than my critique of your treatment of Genscher and German policy in 1990-2.
On the later issue, I agree with you entirely that Germany’s policy shift cannot be considered separately from the context of the violence unleashed on Croatia (but not just Croatia). I disagree with your book’s contention that the Germans put the same priority on Bosnia’s independence as on Croatia’s – if that were the case they would not have been ready to drop the issue in reaction to the chaos in the policies of other Europeans until the Americans belatedly stepped in.
These are details, albeit not all minor ones. I want to stress again how valuable I believe your book is – I very much look forward to learning from the fruits of your future research. If I can ever be of any assistance to you, please let me know.
David B. Kanin is an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and a former senior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
There are three municipalities in the north of Kosovo and they are not even parallel but illegal ones. Illegal because “mayors” are not elected neither by provisions of UN SC resolution 1244 nor Kosovo constitution. Fourth municipality of North Mitrovica anyway is illegal since neither UNMIK nor Kosovo institutions established it. KFOR can’t consider illegal municipalities as legal because then there is a choice from them that either institutions in Pristina are legal or those in the north. Both can’t have the same status. KFOR thus can’t be in contradictory situation.
As for referendum, it will have more negative implications for Serbs in the north than any benefit. This referendum is illegal by both Kosovo Constitution and Constitution of Serbia. Situation is clear: if somebody recognizes such referendum then should recognize hundreds of other referendums throughout Balkan states. So Serbs in the north can hold their referendum but will continue to damage and isolate themselves.
I should remind that the same opposition against Kosovo institutions were in southern part of Kosovo from river Ibar. That opposition ended when Serbs in that area realized that were living in illusions. The same will happen with Serbs in the north. In fact Serbs in the north are hostages of criminals including “mayors” who threaten them if they don’t obey their “orders”. Problem is that those hostages are under extreme propaganda against Kosovo institutions and unfortunately believe in lies of criminals. The tactic of Kosovo institutions is becoming successful. There are reports that many Serbs in the north are aware of situation. Of course nobody wont say that Serbs in the north would rather wish to be part of Serbia. But maybe the others have wishes too i.e Albanians in the south Serbia. However Albanians in Serbia realized that their wishes can’t be realized. The same should happen with Serbs in the north who have much broader offer than Albanians in the south of Serbia.
Why do Albanians want to be the dictators of Serb lives in North Kosovo. Why can’t they just let north kosovo go like Serbia has let Kosovo go. Get over it. It’s lost territory. Serbia has let go of Kosovo and the Albanians should recognize Serbs don’t want to live in an independent Kosvoo but live in Serbia and it’s time for everyone to recognize northern Kosovo is Serbia.
LOL Serbs in south kosovo are surrounded by alabanians and the kla. Serbs in the north are right next to Serbia. Think a little.
I hesitate to comment in the face of such monomaniacal obsession to make clear one side’s position that the local institutions in the north are “illegal” and the people there in the hands of “criminals.” But just to be clear, UNSCR 1244 recognizes Yugoslav sovereignty in Kosovo (“Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”). Serbia is the recognized successor state to Yugoslavia. One could therefore argue that Serbian local institutions in Kosovo – left undisturbed since 1999 – are indeed legal as they are legally part of the Serbian governmental structure within its sovereign territory.
Also, there seems to be nothing to “recognize” in the referendum as so far called. It would be only an expression of opinion.
But the real point that needs to be made here is that single-minded instance that the people in the north have no legitimate interests and simply must surrender to the other side’s imposition of its reality will not bring peace.
@ Brian
Well Brian, why doesn’t Serbia let Preshevo Valley Albanians become part of Kosovo then.
And why also %30 used to be %40) of Macedonian population is not part of Albania,
and why doesn’t the %5 (used to be %20) population of Montenegro become part of Albania?
And Greece has deported in 1943 100 000 Albanians native to their land?
Answer these questions first…
Many Serbs think that the Serbs of North Kosovo must hold their Referendum, because that way there will be no guesswork as to what percentage of People what to save their lives, and the lives of their families, and the lives of their friends and neighbours.
The Serbian Government does not care about you, because they want their Bribes, and you would be totally stupid not to hold the Referendum, and we must never put Russia above suspicion as one of the Bribers, because you remember the Russian Citizenship matter.
America and Germany are certainly Bribing Tadic and Company, but we do not know if Turkey has been negotiating a price for the Russian gas deal, and that includes Kosovo’s Independence.
I am not accusing anyone of being a Fifth Columnist against Russia, just because of the Kosovo Serbs Citizenship matter, but the timing just before the Russian Election was unwise, and it must have cost United Russia Votes, and it may have led to a different Candidate being considered as Presidential Candidate for United Russia.
I wonder why President Medvedev did not want Alexander Lukashenko to be re-elected for no apparent reason, and his statements on Mikhail Khodorkovsky leaves much to be desired.
I had already written how the Opposition could vote for the Candidate that was already going to win to gain such a high percentage of the Votes that would be used by the Opposition as an excuse to attempt a Coup D’etat, and that is what happened in Belarus.
The Fact that President Medvedev told the Belarusian Voters that he did not endorse Alexander Lukashenko helped the cause of those who said the Vote Result was too high, but of course the excuse could be that America wanted that before Russia could join the World Trade Organization.
Another instance was President Medvedev called for the Russian Electoral Commissioner to resign, and called him the Wizard, and that implies the ability to use magic to rig an Election, and that the Russian Election Commissioner did something wrong with counting the votes if he should resign.
It shows either an overconfident arrogance or carelessness by President Medvedev that he would do that, and perhaps he thought that he might engineer a situation to a Candidate for United Russia in the upcoming Russia Election, and I am glad that he is not a Candidate at the next Russian Presidential Election, even if he is genuine, because common sense is also a necessary requirement to be President.
I think that Britain and America wants a new temporary alliance that would include Russia, and Russia would be compensated for allowing the CIA to blow up gas infrastructure and blame it on terrorists to stop gas supplies to Germany, until Germany started to Print enough Euros to save Europe’s Economy, and Anglo-America’s Economy, even if it caused a little inflation in Germany.
The Purpose of this is to have an American Puppet Elected as the next Russian President, because America needs Germany to rescue Anglo-America’s Economy by Printing Euros.
The People of Continental Europe never seem to learn that every time Germany schemes its Sickness to dominate Continental Europe that all of Continental Europe is destroyed.
Serbia should not join the European Union as it is setting a bad example, and countries should walk away from this European Union and the Euro Zone, because it is the Fourth Reich, and every Reich that comes along must be destroyed and it will have costs.
This is because History tells us that once a German Reich appears, then the only escape is to destroy the German Reich, and German Reich always had casualties and they always will have causalities.
The People of the World should boycott all German Goods and Services until Germany starts Printing Euros, because Germany encouraged the Euro Debt Crisis, and Germany broke the fiscal rules but did not pay the penalty.
The People in North Kosovo have been constantly and Maliciously Slandered by the European Union that that resistance to being brutalized, murdered and driven from the homes and Land, and the barricades against EULEX were just the work of criminals and radicals.
The vote cannot simply be considered a poll, because such a thing is no laughing matter, and it is to be taken seriously.
The Puppets and Traitors say that the Result of the Referendum is known in advance, and so there is no problem with knowing what it is on Referendum Day, and after Referendum Day.
The Puppets and Traitors say holding a Democratic Referendum could slow down Serbia’s progress on its European Union path, but Kosovo’s Independence is needed for that and for the Balance of the Bribe Money, as only the Deposit has been paid.
The Puppets and Traitors who have long ago Betrayed the Serbs in the North of Kosovo are saying that if the Serbs of Northern Kosovo hold that Referendum, then they could be left without the support of their Government, because America and Germany have ordered their Puppets and Traitors to Betray their fellow Citizens one way or another.
Many Serbs think that the Serbs of North Kosovo must hold their Referendum, because that way there will be no guesswork as to what percentage of People what to save their lives, and the lives of their families, and the lives of their friends and neighbours.
Along with Physical, Cultural, and Economic Genocide that the America led NATO has perpetrated against the Innocent Serbian People, they have committed Genocide on Serbia’s Democracy by installing and maintaining a Puppet Government, and America has a long history of Committing Genocide against the Democracy of others Nations, and of committing Genocide against America’s Constitution and America’s Democracy.
There can be no partial compensation or partial justice without America ordering their Puppets in the Serbian Government to deliberately lose the next Election.
This can be done if America and the European Union do not fund their Puppets Election Campaign, or give their Puppets good vote winning lies, because even if Monetary Compensation is difficult at these times, America and the Leading NATO Countries can give something back to the Greatly Wronged Serbian People who are the Most Innocent of all Groups in the Former Yugoslavia.
America has committed Genocide on the American Constitution, on American Democracy, and on other Nations Democracy with Colour Revolutions, and with making them Puppets, which is Genocide on those Countries’ Democracy.
This includes the Puppets in Belgrade, and the Puppets in Pristina, because both are Puppets of America Germany and America.
America and the Modern Day Nazis of Europe have committed Genocide on the United Nations and several of the United Nation’s Resolutions, on International Law, and on Treaties like the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Dayton Peace Accords, and a list that is big, but others can do their own research on this matter that concerns the entire World.
If America does not order their Puppets to lose the next Serbian Election, then Russia could make a Speech to the entire United Nations General Assembly informing the World about America’s disregard for Democracy.
Mr. Gallucci your personal agenda is understood and you start insulting people. Your interpretation of UN SC resolution 1244 is rather ridiculous. First of all you are speaking for the entity which was neither recognized nor UN member. Secondly, that entity (FRY) was federation and it collapsed. UN SC resolution 1244 said that Kosovo has substantial autonomy but within that federation NOT within Serbia. After collapse of so called FRY, Kosovo NEVER gave right to Serbia to be part of it. Third, Serbia hold a referendum on 2006 for its Constitution and clearly EXCLUDED Kosovo from that referendum.
(“Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”) is part of preamble of UN SC resolution 1244. Article 25 of UN Charter says: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”
Something that is written in preamble IS NOT a DECISION of SC thus NOT BINDING.
There are questions you never respond (if you believe you are right):
Supposing you are right, WHY Serbia didn’t hold municipal elections in the north of Kosovo on 2000 or 2002?
For me this is very clear. Serbia could NOT hold elections in Kosovo because this is a task of international civil presence (UNMIK) according to paragraph 11 (sub-paragraph (c))of UN SC resolution 1244. Of course until that task is not transferred from UNMIK to Kosovo institutions as sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 11 of UN SC resolution 1244 CLEARLY says. This VERY CLEAR that Serbia CAN’T hold elections in Kosovo UNTIL UN SC resolution 1244 is in force and as such are ILLEGAL. Of course not counting Kosovo Constitution.
You say:
“One could therefore argue that Serbian local institutions in Kosovo – left undisturbed since 1999 – are indeed legal as they are legally part of the Serbian governmental structure within its sovereign territory.”
I find it very ridiculous. Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo is ILLEGAL according to Constitution of former YU. You see the name of Kosovo for instance. Why all say Kosovo and not “Kosovo and Metohija” as this is name of Kosovo in Constitution of Serbia. Even UN SC refers to Kosovo and not “Kosovo and Metohija”.
The last question that you never respond is: Why Serbs in the north of Kosovo should have more rights then those in the south? Is that justice or injustice?
@Brian,
“LOL Serbs in south kosovo are surrounded by alabanians and the kla. Serbs in the north are right next to Serbia. Think a little.”
Are you trying to tell us your lack of knowledge or what. This is not just for laughing but sadness because of ignorance. For what KLA you are speaking about? If one wants to show justice for some people that should apply to the others. If Serbs in the north of Kosovo should have more autonomy then why others do not? IF Kosovo agrees on that (giving to northerners more autonomy or even secession) what to say then to Albanians in south Serbia? What to say then to Albanians in west Macedonia?
Some want to compare Kosovo situation with that on the north. They simply don’t know at all that this is absolutely not comparable. Kosovo according to ex YU Constitution of year 1974 had been part of Yugoslavia and DIRECTLY represented in federal bodies in the SAME LEVEL as today’s independent states such as Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia. Kosovo had its Constitution, its Assembly, President, Prime minister and ministers. Kosovo had its territorial defense as above mentioned states had. Kosovo had it representative of collective body of presidency in former YU. Kosovo had its delegation in YU assembly. Serbia could not change Constitution without approval of Kosovo Assembly according to that Constitution of former YU. Regardless of that, Serbia did it ILLEGALLY. Even Constitution or change of border of former YU could not be done without approval of Kosovo assembly. Republic of Slovenia and Croatia during the process of Kosovo at ICJ presented documents and facts proving this.
As it is known, former YU collapsed and Serbia with Montenegro established a new state called FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). That entity neither was recognized nor UN member.
Knowing all these facts then I find very ridiculous those who want to compare non-comparable situation.
Its very strange how some people fight for more autonomy for only certain group i.e Serbs in the north of Kosovo and not for the others? This is not justice but clearly a personal agenda for personal benefit.
We all know that after the last Election that there was going to be a Coalition Government of DSS, SRS, and SPS, but that America managed to get a European Union Puppet Government.
This was against the wishes of the Voters, because the SPS made certain promises during the Election Campaign, but I guess some Politicians view some promises that they make during an Election Campaign as some promises are made to be broken.
On May 15 2008, B92 said: “America expects the new Serbian government to be clearly oriented towards a European future, says American Ambassador Cameron Munter.”
American Ambassador Cameron Munter said that the SPS could contribute to good relations with Europe, and the continuation of Euro-Atlantic integration, and we all know that the DS wants Serbia to join NATO.
Munter falsely claimed that the main issue during the elections had been Europe and the Country’s European future, and we all know that this is just a Euphemism for an Independent Kosovo.
We know that it was only the Integrity of the SPS that saved Vojvodina from becoming a State within a State ready for Independence from Tadic and his fellow Traitors.
If Autonomy for Vojvodina constitutes Independence for Vojvodina, then, what would the More than Autonomy promised to Kosovo by be, except Independence?
We know that the SPS started off Patriotic, but because of the bad association of DS for four years, we the corrosion of Proper Principles, because the SPS has said that they could form a Coalition Government with the LDP and the DS who are the natural Allies, who take their orders from Germany and America.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 allows for hundreds but not thousands of Serbian police and soldiers to return to Kosovo.
We know that the minimum for thousands in 2,000, and that hundreds can be 19.99 hundreds, and so that means that 1,999 Serbian police and soldiers can enter North Kosovo to see to it that a Referendum in Northern Kosovo can be delayed for a while, as North Kosovo should directly join Serbian Administration, and not those of Pristina.
Many Serbs think that the Serbs of North Kosovo must hold their Referendum, because that way there will be no guesswork as to what percentage of People want to save their lives, and the lives of their families, and the lives of their friends and neighbours.
@ Diza Kosovar
As usual your convoluted logic twists things to suit you agenda. Kosovo as with Vojvodina are autonomous provinces within the Republic of Serbia. You can spout rubbish about the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 until you’re blue in the face if that makes you feel better. But it won’t change what fundamentally occured. And Kosovo was legally a constituent part of Serbia as the successor state of Yugoslavia, that is until your compatriots waged a guerilla insurgency with the assistance of your powerful friends in Washington, London, and Berlin. You may have got them onside for whatever nefarious reasons, but don’t use pseudo legal arguments to justify Albanian violence. But no doubt you’ll tell me how my ignorance is appalling, and how I’m blinded by propaganda. Suit yourself.
@PEN,
Tell us at least ONE function that Serbia had in Kosovo on 1975 for example. Not more, just ONE. You can’t change that fact that Kosovo had been Constituent part of former YU based on YU Constitution of 1974. Fortunately we live in 21 century of Internet and quickly can find what we need. You are simply not telling the truth about Serbia being successor of YU because it is a big LIE.
SC UN in its resolution 777 (1992) CLEARLY states:
“1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly”
As you can see, Serbia CAN’T clame that is successor of SFRY. Serbia IS NOT successor of former SFRY. The so called and NOT recognized FRY became UN member ONLY on year 2000. This is a fact.
Quoting you:
“that is until your compatriots waged a guerilla insurgency with the assistance of your powerful friends in Washington, London, and Berlin. You may have got them onside for whatever nefarious reasons, but don’t use pseudo legal arguments to justify Albanian violence. But no doubt you’ll tell me how my ignorance is appalling, and how I’m blinded by propaganda. Suit yourself.”
Do you somehow “forgot” years of attempts from former Kosovo president Rugova to talking with Serbia? You are speaking for “Albanian violence”. My friend fortunately we live in century 21. Apparently you live in 15 century. There is END of LIES of such kind.
Most of us already know that Germany and America hold a strong Contempt for Democracy, which can be called an Utter Contempt for Democracy, even though they are cunning in looking as if they are Humanitarians and Democrats.
The Fact that these German and American Politicians are Sick and Evil People, means that they have a sick and evil sense of what constitutes as humour to them when they murder People.
We know that Hitler had to resort to what was called the Final Solution against the Jews, and Germany and America today will do the same to preserve their German Fourth Reich and the Anglo-American Empire.
The final solution for Continental Europe will be for those who will not submit to German Domination of Continental Europe, and the most likely group as the Serbs.
We already know that the German and American Politicians are Evil and Sick, and they joke secretly of their Udder Contempt for Humanitarianism, for Democracy and for speaking what is True instead of Lies and Malicious Slander.
What this Udder Contempt is that they would put cancer causing chemicals and contraceptives in the milk supplies, because of their Utter Contempt using their Udder Contempt for Humanitarianism and Democracy.
We know that the Germanic Dutch Royal FrieslandCampina a Netherlands-based multinational company, have purchased two dairies, in Serbia and the Germanic Dutch are the puppets of Germany and America.
The Serbian People need to be vigilant to make sure that the batches of supplies that are destined for Serbia’s shops are randomly allocated after the packaging process.
The same random distribution to different Countries should also be done randomly every day after the packaging process.
It was said long ago that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, and that has proved to be true up till now and in the future.
The Unions should close down that factory if proper safe guards are not put in order, and the Products should be tested by loyal and patriotic Serbian Chemists, who are independent of the Government, maybe at the Universities, or private Companies who deal with Chemical Testing.
Along with Physical, Cultural, and Economic Genocide that the America led NATO has perpetrated against the Innocent Serbian People, they have committed Genocide on Serbia’s Democracy by installing and maintaining a Puppet Government, and America has a long history of Committing Genocide against the Democracy of others Nations, and of committing Genocide against America’s Constitution and America’s Democracy.
The Good, Proper, and Acceptable thing for Germany to do is to revoke their support for the Unilateral declaration of Independence by the Albanians of Serbia’s Province of Kosovo, so that Proper Negotiations can take place.
The SPS said that Serbia should change its Constitution and it should allow for Serbia to become part of Russia, and the next United Nations Security Council Resolution on Serbia should Mandate this if it is voted for at a Referendum.
We know that any Foreign Multinational Company from known Nazi Countries dealing in food and drink products should have their products tested, Kyrgyzstan is seeking the culprits who allowed dangerous radioactive coal to enter the Country, and every Household should have their own Geiger Counter.
These products should be randomly tested for radioactivity, and for contraceptives and for cancer causing chemicals and there must be no corruption with the methods of testing, that should be done randomly with different groups chosen by lottery to do the testing on the day.
@This Comment
Though I’m inclined not to criticise somebody who appears to have pro Serbian sentiments, I must confess I have no idea what you’re talking about. And is it necessary to right an entire dissertation when posting an opinion.
It leaves little room for me to lock horns with Diza Kosovar!
Mr.Gallucci should answer Dulos questions I think !
I will disagree with anyone, even person who appears to support my own group, if I genuinely do not agree with some of what they say.
If someone who appears to be a supporter of a group says that he is not inclined to criticise somebody who appears to be a supporter of the group he supports, and then say that a comment was unnecessarily too long, and that he did not understand any of it, then the following May help to understand that he should provide an explanation.
I think that Bribed Puppets and Traitors, would for a price, falsely claim to not understand what someone was saying, but they will not Confess for the Obvious Reasons, because they could use a Dictionary, or ask a good Interpreter, or ask the person who made the comment to explain.
History proves that Old Nazis did murder People, and they did not care how they do it, and the same applies for Modern Day Nazis.
If the Modern Day Nazis can sell you a product that will kill you and make a profit on it at the same time, while covering up their crime, then that would be intelligent work as far as Modern Day Technological Nazis are concerned; because Militaries cost Money rather than make Money, and Germany cannot Militarily occupy Continental Europe because of Britain, France, and Russia, but the closest Germany can get to this is to occupy Continental Europe as part of NATO.
Secret Fifth Columnists use the Method of agreeing with everything their Group says in order to build up Patriotic Points, and they only disagreeing at a few vital times in order to Deceive those they pretend to be a part of ideologically, even though they appear to belong to the same group.
If we begin to write novels here,we reach as fare as it appears that Barack Obama’s Grandmother is the cousin of Tadic’s Grandmother….! Therefore let us leave aside the novels, and to understand the issue of the groundwork, that can not be adjusted boundaries of the Balkan states on ethnic grounds because each state including Kosovo as a new state would have territorial claims against neighboring country, which would lead us to unexpected situations, instead of neighborly peace prevail.
I personally do not discern Serbian and German Nazis against neighboring states, but to Germany at that time had much greater military capacity but the heads were sick same as the Germans and Serbs.
Therefore, a distinction is in Germany today,after all that the terrible past has achieved so far with France,Italy and other countries to unify an Europe whole and economic exchange cultural experiences and kindness towards others who speak another language and another culture.
The question is, will do so far Serbia ?
It does sometimes happen that when a Person does not want to speak up for themselves, then a Natural Ally might speak up for them, and perhaps Russia could say a few things to the Serbian People by means of Russia’s Ambassador.
Tadic’s Plan must be realistic enough and constructive enough for Albanians know that Tadic has the hurdle of an Election and needs to Deceive the Voters, and so the pretence of Patriotism will be on show until the next Election, because Tadic’s Plan does not include the Partition of Kosovo.
We need to know that the United Nations has Unanimously Passed a Six Point Plan for Kosovo that supersedes the Nazi Ahtisaari Plan that was rejected by the United Nations Security Council, and we should be discussing this United Nations Six Point Plan for Kosovo.
We all know that Germany and America will do whatever they can to help their Puppets be re-elected, because then they have four years to give away Kosovo.
It could be that American led NATO will scrap the Komanovo Agreement, and allow 1,999 Serbian police officers and military personal to enter North Kosovo to reconfirm that the Status of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 is Valid.
Serbia dropped the Genocide charge against Genocidal Croatia, and this at the time that Croatia is committing Genocide against Serbia by not withdrawing Croatia’s support for the unilateral declaration of independence by the Albanians of Serbia’s Province of Kosovo.
There was no Public Vote in the Parliament or any announcement, but the Puppet and Traitor Tadic tookit upon himself to deny justice to those who were murdered by the Croatian Fascists.
We all know that Germany longs for its old WW 2 Ally Croatia to join the European Union, and with the regret for the few Good Countries in the European Union, the question that begs an answer is; if this the type of Union that anything but a Fool would want to join?
There are three Constitutional Changes that NATO and the German Dominate European Union need to destroy Serbia, and Tadic and Company will agree to them.
That Serbia’s Territorial Integrity must be loosely defined so that Kosovo, Vojvodina, Raska and other parts of Serbia like Presevo Valley and Bujanovac can be torn away, and we know that Tadic wanted Regionalization of Serbia to be put in the Constitution.
Serbian Citizens must be easily extradited to NATO Countries, but I think that Germany is the only European Union Country that can legally prevent its Citizens from being extradited, and the SPS wants Constituently Change.
The Serbian Central Bank must be completely free from Serbian Government influence and must owe loyalty to the Bank of International Settlements or BIS in Basel, Switzerland, where Many European Politicians have Secret Swiss Bank Accounts.
Many Serbs think that Serbia should change its Constitution and it should allow for Serbia to become part of Russia, and the next United Nations Security Council Resolution on Serbia should Mandate Serbia having Substantial Autonomy as part of the Russian Federation, if this is voted for at a Referendum, and perhaps the SRS or DSS will have this as one of their Policies for the next Election.
I think that Russia should insist on this Referendum by the Serbian People, and Russia can choose the timing for the Serbian People to hold this Referendum.
I think that Russia should insist on those three points and possibly more that NATO wants Serbia to Change its Constitution on cannot be done by means of a United Nations Security Council Resolution.
Serbia should tell the European Union that there can be no normalization of Relations between the German Dominated European Union and Serbia, for as long as the Kumanovo Agreement exists.
There is nowhere else with any Country in the World that a Kumanovo Agreement exists, and certainly not with a Country and its Province.
The scrapping of the Kumanovo Agreement can be part the next United Nations Security Council Resolution that Russia should insist on for Serbia, in order to reconfirm who is one of Serbia’s Many true Friends in this World.
Today is twelfth anniversary of 12 Albanians murdered from criminals in the north of Kosovo. Those criminals also expelled 12K Albanians from north. They still can’t go home because of criminals there and unfortunately with international presence which is not acting to let people go home. Those expelled Albanians must be permitted to go home and and not letting criminals to hold occupied their houses and flats. Those 12K Albanians must go home and create new multi ethnic municipality oh North Mitrovica, which would be good example. Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo must live together in the independent state of Kosovo.
I wrote the words the SPS wants Constituently Change, but I meant to write that the SPS want Constitutional Change, or to Change the Constitution because their American and German led NATO Masters demand it of their Puppets.
It is a Fact that Tadic and the DS want to Regionalize Serbia and put that in the Constitution; whereas, if Regionalization is so good for Serbia at this time, then it could be done with an Act of Parliament, that could be undone by Act of Parliament if it was bad.
However, the real purpose is to break up Serbia into smaller pieces, which will declare their independence from Serbia, either willing or unwillingly, while Tadic and Company will be able to ride the European Union Gravy Train, as their reward for Treason.
Serbia should tell the European Union that there can be no normalization of Relations between the German Dominated European Union and Serbia, because of the Kumanovo Agreement.
It will be interesting for the Russian Election to show the World what America will do to a Country to make it their Puppet.
We already have seen how Germany’s Puppets who are just another type of Waffen SS Division has withdrawn a Genocide suit against Croatia while Croatia continues to commit Genocide of the Serbian People.
The issue has been over-complicated here, keep it simple: Principle: Kosovo has historical identity and attributes comparable to all recognized countries in the Balkans, as such it is not comparable to other internal issues that may exist within other countries i.e. Republica Srpska(violent product of genocide), Minorities in Macedonia etc. Subsequently talking about any re-organizing of internal make up of Kosovo should, by default, open the question of Albanians in Presevo Valley. This is because Tito traded Presevo Valley with 3 northern municipalities to change Kosovo demographics (in favor of serbs, 5% Albanian population was excluded from Kosovo, while 5% Serbs were incorporated within Kosovo, with net effect of roughly 10%).
Therefore whatever the settlement in North Kosovo ends up being, be it separation or anything outside Ahtisaari, then Presevo Valley should get the same settlement. In any other case it will be historical injustice and a bandaid rather than lasting solution.
@Wildwest
Quote “Republica Srpska(violent product of genocide)”.
Please explain.
Don’t insult me, please. If we have different opinions we can discus it like normal people.