As it becomes clear that the arrangement between Belgrade and Pristina is no more decisive than was Dayton or so many other internationally supervised agreements, local actors will discount it and refocus on whatever issues shape the next rounds of their various, unending internal, inter-communal, and international disputes.

The only way Kosova can hope to manage successfully the creation of a Serb counter-government is if Washington can accomplish what it has failed to so far – to convince at least some of the five EU members who do not recognize Kosova to do so now. 

The Lebanonization of Syria means the latter could face a long period of instability and rivalry among sectarian, tribal, and other competitors for power, resources, and status. 

It should not be assumed that the developing arrangement between Pristina and Belgrade will put an end to North Ibar as a separate entity, any more than it will settle the overarching sovereignty issue. Still, the events of the last year indicate that the main threat to this Serb enclave [...]

Serbian president Nikolic’s platform on Kosovo has more to do with domestic politics – particularly attempts to undermine prime minister Dacic’s effort to strike a deal that would freeze Kosovo’s de facto partition – rather than with the status of his country’s former province.

Whatever happens, regarding the Balkans as a whole, international notables once again have demonstrated they have no real strategy regarding how to grapple with the region beyond ad hoc, improvisational management of the various twists and turns they often neither anticipate nor efficiently adjust to.

The granting of free speech by a Burmese government attempting to reform – and inexperienced in the attendant complications of doing so – has provoked an unexpected outburst of explicit, popular, legitimized, hatred directed at a single targeted community, the Rohingya.

Along with substantive questions, both Serbia and Kosova continue to grapple with the spoiler problem which underscores – as the unfortunate examples of Ireland’s Michael Collins and Israel’s Yitzhak Rabin demonstrate – the dangers notables face if they prove willing to accept something less than total victory.

The chance of a meaningful outcome to the next round of political negotiations depends on Serbian and Kosovar protagonists taking responsibility for negotiations away from US, EU and Russian overseers.

In neither Bosnia nor Iraq did the Americans anticipate that fragmentation and mutual communal suspicion would trump the power and political engineering of soldiers, diplomats, and the multitude of Western NGOs.