A “Republika Srpska” in Kosova?

The only way Kosova can hope to manage successfully the creation of a Serb counter-government is if Washington can accomplish what it has failed to so far – to convince at least some of the five EU members who do not recognize Kosova to do so now. 

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Conflict Background

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By David B. Kanin

The agreement that ended the Bosnia war in 1995 marked the one success Serbia enjoyed in a decade in which Belgrade otherwise suffered a string of losses that continue to affect its internal mood and international diplomacy. The ongoing rounds of negotiations over how Serbs living in Kosova will organize themselves are evolving into a major opportunity for Serbia to enjoy another such success, and to cauterize some of the damage it did to itself by bungling into its war with NATO in 1999.

Bosnia and Kosova

At Dayton, Slobodan Milosevic accomplished two things. First, he held out for a political arrangement that precluded development of a meaningful Bosnia state and enshrined Republika Srpska as an all-but independent entity. Second, he convinced the internationals into accepting the reintroduction of Serbian control over the “anvil” in Western Bosnia; for the sake of preserving an entirely arbitrary formula decreeing that Serbs should retain control over 49 percent of Bosnian territory, Richard Holbrooke acquiesced in a patchwork division that prevented the existence of either a functioning Bosnian state or contiguous Bosnjak political community. Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman, who shared Milosevic’s interest in minimizing Bosnjak strength, naturally was content to accept this solution (he never really thought Croatia would get Banja Luka).

In the 1990s, the cardinal error made repeatedly by the internationals was to overestimate their own ability to drive subsequent events as Yugoslavia fell apart. Regarding Bosnia, they also underestimated the force of inertia that would undermine the serial, unsuccessful, improvisational policies and demands they would push on Bosnians of all stripes. This same mistake may be creeping into the EU-mediated effort to force an executive Serbian agency on the contested Kosovar state.

Ivica Dacic, Milosevic’s successor in more ways than one, has a chance to pull off a success similar to his mentor’s. Of course, this assumes Dacic can maintain his political position in the face of corruption allegations, the political calculations of Alexander Vucic, and protests of his diplomacy by short-sighted nationalists who do not understand the opportunity inherent in what Dacic is trying to accomplish. Belgrade, by working to replace the current parallel arrangements north of the Ibar with a political/administrative structure that would incorporate Serbs in all parts of the contested Kosovar state, is attempting not only to protect local Serbs, but also to institutionalize Serbian claims to sovereignty over all of its former province.

As the Serbs have insisted all along, status is the decisive subject of discussion—customs and “border” arrangements lose symbolic significance if tangible decisions on status change the overall context of the sovereignty issue. That is just what a “Republika Srpska” in Kosova would do.

Assessing the diplomatic trajectory 

The flaw in the international approach to the talks is reflected in the conventional wisdom that Serbia has no choice but to eventually recognize Kosova, and that creation of what would amount to a Serbian counter-government in that contested state would mean the acceptance by Serbs of their incorporation in the Kosova. The opposite is true because of the unequal status of the two protagonists. Serbia is recognized as a sovereign state on all sides, and so could define a Serbian counter-government inside Kosova as an agent of Serbia itself—a sort of organizational Banquo’s ghost that would haunt Kosova until a changed regional or international context permits Serbia to restore its control over what would then once more become Kosovo.

There is no contradiction between Dacic’s efforts and a recent B92 poll indicating that most in Serbia acknowledge the fact that Kosova is “in practice” an independent state. The same poll found that 65 percent of respondents would prefer to see Kosovo restored to Serbia rather than sacrifice sovereignty over Kosova for the sake of joining the EU. 61 percent thought Dacic was doing a good job representing Serbia’s interests. The Prime Minister’s approach is meant to maximize his country’s long-term flexibility on what remains an open issue of contested sovereignty.

Therefore, Dacic is right and his domestic critics are wrong—successive Serbian governments not only would not have to recognize Kosova, but would be able to establish ties to a “Republika Srpska” that would be able to function as a sort of political transmission belt between Belgrade and itself. Once such a creature comes into being—and after Serbs north of the Ibar stop making building barricades and reflect on what actually has happened—the more thoughtful notables in the North would see they could continue to function separately from (and in opposition to) the government in Pristina. Their co-nationals south of the river would grasp that the new situation would mean they would not have to accept their subordination as a supplicant minority in a Kosovar state.

Dacic—unlike Vuk Jeremic, who made a hash of the previous Serbian government’s efforts against Kosova—is endeavoring to freeze the conflict in a manner that would work to his country’s advantage by keeping the sovereignty issue open while ending the need to constantly defend Serbia’s stance. Meanwhile, he can advertise his country’s peaceful intentions and, perhaps, get the coveted date for
start the accession dance with the EU.

Dacic clearly is on the defensive, beset by political problems and by the criticism of his Kosova policy. His plea that people recognize that Serbia does not control its former province and should save what can be saved is misunderstood as capitulation–he is not communicating his stance very well.  Ironically, Kostunica is calling for a freeze in the conflict–which is exactly what Dacic is attempting to accomplish, but under better terms than the DSS has in mind. A structure that incorporates Serbs south of the Ibar is an advance – from the Serb point of view – on the current smuggler/”mayoral” system now in place Brussels, following in the tradition of European policies toward the Yugoslav space since it began to fall apart two decades ago, is interested mainly in demonstrating its ability to manage the Balkans. The Europeans will accept any political status quo that permits them to trumpet their own role and involves an absence of immediate violence.

The internationals also appear not to recognize another analogical problem. Agreement to create a “Republika Srpska” inside Kosova would have the opposite impact of the Erdut Agreement that settled the status of Serbs in Croatia. Erdut simply codified a decisive Croatian military victory that—with Milosevic’s acquiescence or active cooperation, depending on your point of view—already had put paid to the existence of a cohesive Krajina Serb community. Those Serbs who limped back into Slavonia after Erdut recognized that from now on they would exist merely as a supplicant minority in a resoundingly Croatian Croatia.

Pristina’s calculus

Things are very different regarding Kosova, which lacks the uncontested recognition enjoyed by Croatia and even the dysfunctional Bosnia. Kosovar Serbs may have been defeated when Milosevic caved into to NATO’s bombing, but they have managed to retain their sense of community and insistence that their former province retains its historical, cultural—and political—status as part of Serbia. Serbs living south of the Ibar have cooperated with Pristina out of necessity, but that necessity would be removed if a Serbian counter-government comes into being. This puts Kosova in a bind. Its supposed international friends may be ready to press it to sacrifice an element of its contested sovereignty—just as they did major harm to the Bosnjaks by forcing them to accept an unworkable state and the return of Serbs to the Anvil. The Kosovar version of a “Republika Srpska” would be weaker than its counterpart in Bosnia, but still would be an element working to undermine Kosova because—unlike Bosnia—not everyone in the EU recognizes the Kosovar state.

The domestic political calculus in Pristina is the opposite of that in Belgrade. If he knuckles under on this unconditionally, Prime Minister Thaci would be wrong and his domestic critics right, no matter how much authority he would claim Pristina would have over a Serb counter-government. Given his country’s disadvantageous international position, if the internationals force Thaci to accept a Serb political structure in Kosova his non-negotiable minimal stance should be to insist that everyone gaining authority in this Serbian entity explicitly acknowledge Pristina as its legal and legitimate government—the new Republika Srpska should at least acknowledge Kosovar sovereignty to the same extent the existing one has been forced to pay lip service to the notional Bosnia.

This brings us back to the question of the EU Five, whose refusal of repeated US approaches involves an ongoing, singular failure of American Balkan policy. The only way Kosova can hope to manage successfully the creation of a Serb counter-government is if Washington can accomplish what it has failed to so far – to convince at least some of the five EU members who do not recognize Kosova to do so now. It would not be good enough to launch another round of failed demarches while continuing to insist complacently that this eventually will happen. Pristina would need some tangible success to offset Dacic’s success; recognition by at least one of the five at the same time as the new “Republika Srpska” is created is the only thing that might mitigate what otherwise would be another setback to the US-directed effort to enable Kosova to gain internal self confidence, regional legitimacy, and international recognition.

David B. Kanin is an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and a former senior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

To read other articles by David for TransConflict, please click here

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26 Responses

  1. Fadil

    Professor Kanin you are right. The “Trojan horse” must be prevented in Kosovo. That would create just instability and eternal confrontation.

  2. Lt Rinas

    Dear David, could you present principles you apply when addressing issues of Republic of Srpska (RS) and Kosovo and Metohia. I would also like to remind audience that “Kosova” is a variant of word “Kosovo” in Serbian language which means “blackbird”. Maybe in that fact we may, symbolically, find the reason why K&M will never be recognised by Serbia and will remain a matter in dispute in this part of Europe for a long , long time. Especially having in mind recent Pristina authorities’ attempts to present the historical heritage of Serbian state at K&M as “Kosovar” heritage.

    1. Fadil

      @Lt Rinas,

      A name of country is used based on majority use. Overwhelming majority of Kosovo citizens use word Kosova and not Kosovo so Mr. Kanin is right.

      You may think and believe whatever you wish. That is absolutely your problem. Your state Serbia may not recognize Kosovo “long, long time” and at the same time will be “long, long” isolated country. In fact Serbia’s choice.

      Fortunately there are people in Serbia, including prime minister, admitting that saying “Kosovo is Serbian” is a big lie. I hope, you and other Serbs will follow that reasonable thinking.

  3. Lt Rinas

    Fadil, I have no wish to argue with you because I find your way of communication inapropriate. The question was directed to Mr Kanin and this is “transcoflict” and not “conflict till trance”.

    1. Fadil

      @Lt Rinas,

      Regardless on whether the question was addressed to me or not, I think everyone may give contribution into explaining things. As for the conflict, it will come to an end when you realize what Serbian prime Dacic did and that is famous saying that “Kosovo belongs to Serbia” is a LIE.

      Secondly, there can’t be too much favoring of a certain group, such as Serbs in northern Kosovo while discriminating other groups, such as Serbs living in southern Kosovo and Albanians living in southern Serbia.

  4. Janek

    Professor Kanin, I would not overestimate the competences, social, constitutional and gepolitical position of the Serbian municipalities (SM) in Kosovo/a. There are lacking some important factors characterstic for Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example the ability to block decision making process on the state level of governance. Secondly, the SM do not constitute an entity as strong as RS in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Exccept that, it is all not about builiding a (new) constitutional institutions enabling Serbia to interfere into internal affairs of Kosovo – they already exist. It is aboiut ability to use funds, financial assets and natural resources by the SM.
    SF

    1. Fadil

      @Janek,

      There are two things you should bear in mind. Giving so much privileges to certain group, as it happens with Serbs, while discriminating the others, like Albanians in southern Serbia, just makes troubles. Secondly, having a “Trojan horse” within Kosovo continues agony of Serbian community on Kosovo.

      If Serbs in Kosovo want living there for long time, the only solution is complete inclusion in Kosovo institutions and Kosovo society. Being as “Trojan horse” in Kosovo, Serbian community will harm itself .

      1. Bora

        @Fadil, are you actually reading what you write? “If Serbs in Kosovo want living there for long time, the only solution is complete inclusion in Kosovo institutions and Kosovo society.” In other words, Serbs will not live there for long. Is that what you really think? Or you just trying to troll every comment on this forum? Shameful how your buddies in Pristhina didn’t teach you manners and basic principles of human rights. And lastly, Serbs will live “there” for a long time. Luckily it’s not up to guys like you to decide their destiny.

        1. Fadil

          @Bora,

          You ate misinterpreting what I am saying. Serbs in Kosovo have an opportunity living normally in Kosovo only being part of Kosovo society. Nobody is going to kill them, harass them or discriminate them but being in constant confrontation with the environment (Kosovo government and society) they will harm THEMSELVES and seek for other places to live. In other words they will disappear from Kosovo because of their OWN attitude.

  5. Bora

    The number of Kosovo Serbs left in southern Kosovo towns is below dozen in many cases. The town of Djakovica has ONE living Serbian family. The town of Prishtina only a dozen, surrounded by the barb wire.Serbian monasteries and churches are destroyed, Serbian graveyards on Kosovo are frequently damaged and desecrated. The intention is to convince Serbs to leave Kosovo, once for all. There’s only a lip service paid to “multicultural” society, mostly for pictures and propaganda plots by Prishtina. Kosovo Albanians have only one idea: to create their own, mono-ethnic, tribal democracy based on blood law and insane idea that “all Albanians live in one state”. The will of Serbian people including Serbs in Kosovo will not be altered. Serbia and Serbs will use every possible diplomatic, economic, financial, cultural, and other opportunity to diminish Albanian sick idea of “greater Albania”. Albanians think the can play hard these days but we are ready for a long road, longer then America is ready to pay for.

    1. Fadil

      @Bora,

      This kind of propaganda FAILED long time ago. There are too many internationals that know what kind of rubbish you are witting here.

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